When Bangladesh signed its reciprocal trade agreement with the United States in February, headlines focused on garments and tariffs. Less noticed was a short clause in Article 4.3. It makes clear that Bangladesh shall not purchase nuclear reactors, fuel rods, or enriched uranium from any country that “jeopardises essential US interests”.
No country is named. But policymakers have no doubt: it refers to Russia, which is building Bangladesh’s first nuclear power plant.
The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, with two 1,200-megawatt reactors, is expected to supply roughly a tenth of national capacity.
The first unit may start supplying power to the grid within months. Yet its operational future now hinges on a geopolitical question it was never designed to answer.
“If the agreement prevents the import of uranium or fuel rods from Russia, the nuclear plant simply cannot operate,” said Professor M Tamim, a leading energy policy expert.
Officials have sought to calm concerns. Md Anwar Hossain, secretary of the science and technology ministry, said the existing project is insulated.
“Unit-1 and Unit-2 are being constructed under an international agreement following IAEA guidelines. The project utilises Russian technology and financial support, and a long-term fuel supply agreement is already in place. Therefore, the recent trade agreement will not affect these two units,” he said.
The deeper problem is structural. Dhaka has anchored its nuclear future to a supplier Washington has effectively blacklisted.
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“The core of the issue lies in the reliance on Russia, which is currently a sanctioned country,” Prof Tamim said.
Nuclear plants require continuous refuelling, with contracts for enriched uranium periodically renegotiated. Each renewal could force Bangladesh into the same dilemma: comply with Washington’s conditions or face higher tariffs to its garment exports.
“This creates a situation where Bangladesh might be forced to seek US permission or exemptions for essential materials,” Prof Tamim warned.
Pressed on how such constraints would be managed, Secretary Anwar only said, “If challenges arise in the future, we will adapt our planning as necessary.”
However, adjusting Bangladesh’s nuclear energy policy as circumstances demand may prove far from easy.
The global nuclear market is tightly controlled by Russia’s Rosatom, China’s CNNC, the United States’ Westinghouse, and France’s Framatome. Switching suppliers mid-project is not an option. Reactors are engineered for specific fuel assemblies. Conversion costs are immense; downtime can stretch for years.
By the time Rooppur is complete, Bangladesh will have invested billions in Russian technology it may struggle to fuel beyond its initial cycle.
Prof Tamim is blunt: the US trade deal is “a very bad contract that limits sovereign decision-making.”
There is, however, a narrow opening. The agreement allows exemptions for proprietary materials where no alternative supplier exists. In theory, Rosatom’s fuel assemblies -- designed specifically for VVER-1200 reactors -- might qualify.
Prof Tamim acknowledges the possibility, cautiously. “There is some hope that proprietary technology might offer an escape clause,” he said.
Future expansion raises further questions.
During his Bangladesh visit in April 2024, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev said in a statement that both sides were starting the discussion of new projects.
Bangladesh expressed a “strong interest” in the construction of two more power units at Rooppur NPP site, he said, adding that the possibility of constructing a multi-purpose high power research reactor was also being reviewed.
But after signing the trade deal with the US, if Bangladesh pursues additional units now, the agreement could restrict its choice of suppliers.
If Russian and Chinese options are effectively excluded, the economics shift. Western vendors are costlier, financing terms are less favourable, and delivery timelines are historically uneven.
A constitutional issue regarding the deal also lingers. Whether the US trade agreement requires parliamentary ratification -- or could be rejected -- remains unclear. Given its long-term implications for Bangladesh’s energy sovereignty, the absence of legislative scrutiny would be contentious.
Bangladesh, a country of 170 million people, suffers chronic electricity shortages that hamper industrialisation and depress living standards. While it is trying to industrialise and reduce reliance on costly fossil fuel imports, restricting access to cheaper suppliers will raise the cost of that transition.
For now, as Prof Tamim suggests, the approach is to “wait and watch how these diplomatic and legal constraints affect existing and future nuclear projects”.
The current units may be safe. The future of the programme is far less certain.
