Dhaka's sharp reaction to Sheikh Hasina's television interview from New Delhi, and the diplomatic exchanges that followed, have once again pulled Bangladesh-India relations into the headlines. Speculation over whether and when high-level visits will resume has added to the noise. These episodes will pass, as they always do. The relationship they interrupt will not.
The latest diplomatic tensions between Dhaka and New Delhi have once again thrust Bangladesh-India relations into the national spotlight. Like previous episodes, they have generated intense public debate over the immediate dispute. Yet the more important question lies beyond the controversy itself: How should Bangladesh manage its relationship with India to best advance its long-term national interests? The latest diplomatic tensions should not obscure a larger reality: Bangladesh's future depends on managing its most important bilateral relationship with strategic realism, strong institutions, and a clear focus on national interests.
Start with what does not change. Bangladesh and India share more than 4,000 kilometres of border and 54 transboundary rivers. The Ganges Water Treaty is due for renewal in 2026, and the Teesta sharing arrangement has remained unresolved since talks stalled in 2011, leaving northern Bangladesh exposed to erratic upstream flows every dry season. India remains one of Bangladesh's largest sources of imports, at roughly US$11 to $12 billion a year, even as a persistent trade deficit and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) continue to frustrate Bangladeshi exporters. Cross-border connectivity projects, from the Feni bridge to inland waterway transit, are advancing even as unresolved irritants, including recurring border killings by the BSF and disputes over the pricing of power imported from the Adani plant in Jharkhand, sit unresolved on the same agenda. These are not abstractions. They are the actual texture of the relationship, and they will still be there long after the current row has faded.
Bangladesh and India are two sovereign states, but they differ significantly in size, economic weight, and strategic influence. Recognising this asymmetry is not an admission of weakness; it is the starting point of effective diplomacy. Bangladesh runs a large and persistent trade deficit with India, relies on it for important industrial inputs, and, as the downstream riparian, is directly affected by upstream decisions on shared rivers. These structural realities call for strategic management: a foreign policy that combines principled diplomacy with pragmatic engagement while strengthening Bangladesh's own economic and institutional capacity to safeguard its long-term national interests.
But asymmetry is not the same as powerlessness. Bangladesh's growing economy, its strategic location on the Bay of Bengal, and its pivotal role in providing transit and connectivity to India's northeastern states give Dhaka meaningful leverage-provided it is exercised consistently rather than only during moments of crisis. Both countries derive significant benefits from cooperation: India through transit, connectivity, and regional integration, and Bangladesh through trade, industrial inputs, investment, and market access. That mutuality gives sustained, institutional engagement greater influence than episodic confrontation. The challenge is not to deny structural asymmetries but to manage them effectively. Bangladesh should negotiate as a confident partner-firm in defending its core interests while steadily strengthening its economic, institutional, and diplomatic leverage.
Building a more resilient Bangladesh-India relationship requires a different approach to diplomacy. Rather than reacting to successive political crises, Bangladesh should pursue a strategy of long-term statecraft guided by three principles.
First, pursue strategic continuity rather than political reaction. Every major decision should be judged by a simple test: does it strengthen Bangladesh's security, economic resilience, and long-term development? Cooperation on water, trade, energy, and connectivity should be treated as enduring national priorities, not interrupted whenever political tensions arise. Institutions such as the Joint Rivers Commission should meet and negotiate on a regular, predictable schedule that endures across changes of government and fluctuations in the political climate. The measure of institutional maturity is whether cooperation continues despite political turbulence, not only when bilateral relations are at their best.
Second, build institutions rather than rely on personalities. Political leadership can play an important role in advancing Bangladesh-India cooperation, but durable bilateral relations cannot depend primarily on personal rapport between leaders. Instead, they must be anchored in strong and enduring institutions. Regular ministerial and senior officials' dialogue, effective technical mechanisms on water and trade, stronger business and academic exchanges, and active engagement through regional platforms such as BIMSTEC can provide the continuity needed to sustain cooperation despite changes in political leadership or temporary diplomatic tensions. But institutions alone are not enough. A durable partnership also requires reciprocity. India must recognise that the confidence of a smaller neighbour depends not only on economic cooperation but also on consistent respect for its legitimate interests and sensitivity to its concerns.
Third, separate disagreements from cooperation. A mature foreign policy rests on a simple principle: not every issue should be linked to every other issue. Bangladesh has to negotiate firmly on difficult matters such as transboundary water sharing, border management, and energy pricing while sustaining cooperation in trade, connectivity, investment, and regional initiatives where mutual interests remain strong. India, likewise, should avoid allowing political disagreements to impede collaboration in areas that serve the long-term interests of both countries. The objective is not to eliminate disputes but to ensure that no single dispute is allowed to define, or derail, the broader relationship.
These principles are particularly relevant today. Bangladesh's political transition since 2024 has created an opportunity to rethink how its India policy is formulated and implemented. At the same time, intensifying geopolitical competition, economic fragmentation, and the growing strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal call for a more consistent, institutional, and forward-looking approach from both Dhaka and New Delhi. Forthcoming engagements through BIMSTEC and BRICS-related forums should therefore be seen not merely as diplomatic events but as opportunities to rebuild confidence, strengthen working-level cooperation, and demonstrate that dialogue can continue even when political relations are under strain.
None of this suggests that Bangladesh should soften its position when its sovereignty or national interests are at stake. A confident foreign policy must defend legitimate national concerns - whether over border killings, transboundary rivers, trade, or other bilateral issues - firmly and consistently. At the same time, those disputes should be managed through sustained diplomacy rather than allowed to dominate the entire relationship or interrupt cooperation in areas where mutual interests remain strong. Strategic statecraft requires both resolve in defending national interests and the discipline to preserve cooperation where it serves Bangladesh's long-term objectives.
Political disagreements between neighbouring countries are common; the real test of diplomacy is whether they can be managed without derailing cooperation on issues of enduring national importance. The current controversy, like many before it, will pass. The shared rivers, unresolved water issues, expanding trade and connectivity, and the growing strategic importance of the Bay of Bengal will remain. Bangladesh's long-term interests are best served by a relationship resilient enough to withstand political shocks while sustaining cooperation where mutual interests endure. Building such a relationship requires strategic realism, strong institutions, and the patience to pursue long-term objectives despite short-term political tensions.
Successful smaller states manage asymmetry not by denying it but by strengthening their own economic and institutional capacity, diversifying external partnerships, and negotiating from clearly defined national interests. The same approach should guide Bangladesh's relationship with India. Ultimately, the success of Bangladesh's India policy should not be judged by the intensity of diplomatic exchanges or the symbolism of high-level visits.It should be judged by a more enduring standard: does it make Bangladesh more secure, more prosperous, and more resilient? If the answer is yes, then Bangladesh's diplomacy is serving its true purpose: advancing the country's long-term national interests. That is the kind of diplomacy Bangladesh needs.
Dr Golam Rasul is Professor of Economics at the International University of Business Agriculture and Technology (IUBAT), Dhaka, Bangladesh. [email protected]
