THE interim government in its final week signed a trade agreement with the United States that many political economists called outrightly asymmetrical. The agreement on reciprocal trade between Bangladesh and the United States, signed on February 10, was framed by the interim government as a breakthrough to avert US punitive tariffs. The deal locks Dhaka into directed purchases, including aircraft from Boeing for Biman Bangladesh Airlines, massive US energy import and expanded agricultural and military buying, threatening domestic producers and public revenue. Beyond trade, its sweeping clauses on subsidies, standards and third-country relations undermine policy autonomy and push Bangladesh deeper into trade colonialism, replacing genuine reciprocity with coercive market opening. Evading accountability, the interim government pushed the agreement through in secret, leaving the people to shoulder its cost. In this context, the demand, put forth at rally on April 27, that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party government should take early steps to scrap the deal is justified. Left parties are not alone. Civil society think tanks, too, have raised concern that the deal compromises the economic sovereignty of the country and should, therefore, be reconsidered in the parliament.
The Centre for Policy Dialogue has recently warned that the implementation of the trade agreement could result in an annual loss of about Tk 13.27 billion in import duty revenue. Under the agreement, Bangladesh would be required to grant duty-free access to around 4,500 imported products from the United States. In addition, 2,210 another categories of products are expected to receive duty-free treatment within the next 5–10 years. As a result, the agreement, once implemented, could substantially reduce state income. It also noted that granting unilateral duty-free access to the United States may conflict with the rules of the World Trade Organisation, potentially creating pressure to extend similar benefits to other member countries as well. The agreement significantly constrains Bangladesh’s long-standing strategy of balancing relations among major global powers while pursuing diversified economic partnerships. Policies once shaped by developmental necessity, from reliance on Chinese industrial materials to energy cooperation with Russia, may now risk being viewed as non-compliant under the new framework. The nuclear clause is especially restrictive, raising questions about the future of projects like such as the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant and Bangladesh’s ability to independently shape its energy partnership.
At a time when the US–Israel war in Iran has underscored the importance of strategic autonomy, Bangladesh cannot afford to bind its future foreign and economic policies through a treaty negotiated without meaningful public debates. An agreement with far-reaching implications for trade, energy and geopolitical alignment must be revisited through full parliamentary scrutiny and democratic consultation. Decisions that shape the sovereign political future should emerge from national consensus, not executive expediency.
