Following the devastating flood in Nepal caused by part of a glacier collapsing, the country is seeking climate compensation from China, India, and the United States, arguing that major emitters should bear responsibility for climate-related harm suffered by countries that have contributed little to global warming. Nepal’s foreign minister has described the demand as a matter of moral liability, rather than charity. But does international law support such a claim?
The answer is neither straightforward nor entirely negative. Nepal contributes only around 0.1 percent of global carbon dioxide (CO2) and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, yet it is highly vulnerable to climate-related hazards, including glacier melting, flooding, and landslides. The disparity between climate change contribution and climate vulnerability lies at the heart of climate injustice. But moral, political, and legal responsibilities differ vastly. Whether Nepal can move from a claim for climate justice to compensation depends on international law governing state responsibility, causation, and reparation.
In 1991, the Alliance of Small Island States proposed an international insurance mechanism for climate-related losses, but the idea did not enter the 1992 UNFCCC. The Warsaw International Mechanism was established in 2013, followed by Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, which formally recognised loss and damage while the accompanying decision stated that Article 8 does not provide a basis for liability or compensation. The creation of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 and its operationalisation at COP28 marked an important shift towards financial support. The fund provides aid to vulnerable countries responding to loss and damage, but itself does not establish legal responsibility for such aid. A compensation claim based on state responsibility explores whether a state breached an applicable international obligation and must therefore repair the resulting injury.
The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2025 Advisory Opinion on “Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change” helped clarify this distinction. The ICJ did not recognise an automatic right to compensation for climate-related harm. It also did not hold major emitters legally responsible for climate disasters solely on the ground that they produce large amounts of GHG. The ICJ’s broader finding was that climate change engages both treaty obligations and the general rules of international law. Where a state breaches an applicable international obligation, the general law of state responsibility may apply and, where the necessary conditions are met, reparation may follow. This creates an important legal opening for Nepal.
The Paris Agreement does not itself create an automatic right to compensation. But that does not mean that compensation has no place in the wider framework of international law. If Nepal can establish an applicable obligation, a breach of that obligation, and a sufficient causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the injury suffered, a claim for reparation could potentially arise. But this is also where Nepal’s case becomes considerably more difficult.
Nepal has identified China, India, and the United States from among the world’s largest current emitters. But being a major emitter does not by itself establish legal responsibility. Responsibility can be assessed via different measures, including current emissions, historical cumulative emissions, per-capita emissions, and emissions that can be scientifically connected to particular harms. As such, a claim for compensation based on an emissions ranking may be politically persuasive but legally vulnerable. Political prominence cannot substitute for proof of an internationally wrongful act.
Causation presents an even greater challenge. Unlike a conventional environmental accident, climate change results from GHG and CO2 emissions released over decades by countless sources. Climate-related disasters are also influenced by natural variability, geography, land use, and local vulnerability. Scientific attribution has nevertheless advanced significantly, allowing researchers to assess how human-induced warming has changed the likelihood or intensity of particular extreme events. But scientific attribution is not the same as legal causation. That is, showing that climate change contributed to a flood does not automatically establish that a particular state caused the resulting damage. Nepal would need to connect the scientific evidence with specific international obligations, state conduct, and the particular harm for which compensation is being sought.
If responsibility is assessed through current absolute emissions, the selection of China, India, and the United States may appear logical. But historical emissions, per-capita emissions, or contribution to a particular hazard could produce a different picture. A legally durable claim needs to focus not simply on who emits the most, but also on which obligations have been breached and whether the resulting harm can be sufficiently linked to those breaches.
Bangladesh, for instance, has contributed relatively little to global GHG emissions while remaining highly vulnerable to sea-level rise, cyclones, flooding, salinity intrusion, and climate-related displacement. It has already addressed the question of climate responsibility before the ICJ, arguing that the UN climate regime does not displace the broader rules of international law and that breaches of applicable climate obligations may give rise to state responsibility and reparation.
Nepal’s claim, therefore, offers Bangladesh a real-world test of an argument it has already advanced internationally. If Nepal can build a case around specific obligations, identifiable breaches, vigorous scientific evidence, and demonstrable harm, it could provide a valuable model for other climate-vulnerable states. But if Nepal’s claim rests mainly on the proposition that major emitters should pay because they emit the most, the country will likely face myriad legal obstacles.
The distinction between Loss and Damage finance and legal compensation will, therefore, become increasingly important. Vulnerable countries need immediate financial support to deal with unavoidable climate harm, but they also need legal avenues to establish responsibility where an internationally wrongful act has caused damage.
Nepal’s claim carries considerable moral force, but turning it into a successful legal case will be difficult. For Bangladesh and other vulnerable countries, Nepal’s experience could offer important lessons for future compensation claims. The question facing international law is no longer about who should help countries suffering the consequences of climate change, but about establishing at which point the duty to help becomes an obligation to repair.
Mst Asma Mahmud is a senior civil judge and MPhil fellow at the Institute of Bangladesh Studies, University of Rajshahi.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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