THE government’s asking 24 lower court judges to explain their remarks on social media opposing the repeal of the ordinances related to the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court secretariat, lays bare the fragility of judicial independence. That the judges have been called on by the executive to explain their remarks to the very executive is precisely the kind of executive overreach that underscores why an effectively independent judiciary is indispensable. The notices serve as the evidence of the structural imbalance that persists, where the executive continues to wield disciplinary control over the subordinate court judges. When judges must answer to the executive for expressing concern about institutional arrangements that directly affect the judicial autonomy, the principle of the separation of powers, as enshrined in unequivocal terms in the constitution, is rendered hollow. The law, justice and parliamentary affairs ministry is reported to have mentioned in the show-cause notices that the remarks violate High Court directives on the use of Facebook. What it appears to have missed is that there are many High Court directives that have ordered the government to establish the Supreme Court Secretariat to ensure an effective independence of the judiciary.
The rationale for a judicial secretariat has for long been clear and repeatedly affirmed, including in judicial pronouncements and reform proposals. Without such a secretariat, the judiciary remains tied to the executive in matters of posting, promotion, discipline and budgeting. The High Court’s directives and the broader reform discourse have consistently emphasised that a meaningful separation cannot exist without institutional autonomy. In this context, the Supreme Court Judges’ Appointment Ordinance 2025 and the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance 2025, along with its 2026 amendment, should be passed into law without dilution or delay. The executive’s objections, composed largely of concerns about checks and balances, ring hollow when viewed against its continued insistence on retaining control over the judiciary. True checks and balances do not arise from executive dominance but from clearly demarcated and respected institutional boundaries. The concentration of judicial administrative powers to the judiciary is not a threat but a necessity, ensuring that those who interpret the laws are not subject to undue influence from those who execute them. What is disheartening is the conduct of the BNP government in this regard. Having repeatedly assured the public of its commitment to the complete separation of the judiciary from the executive, it now appears to have backtracked.
The government should reverse course, withdraw the notices and recommit to the principles that it earlier espoused. The passage of the relevant ordinances into law would be a decisive step in that direction, signalling a genuine willingness to uphold judicial independence. Anything less would confirm the enduring suspicion that despite rhetorical commitments, the executive remains unwilling to surrender its grip on the judiciary.
