THE identification of high-risk zones and risky voting centres should serve as a warning before the 13th national elections, scheduled for February 12. Rights-based research organisation Sapran, in its report published on February 5, says that two decades of electoral data point unambiguously to Chattogram and Rangpur as being persistent flashpoints of violence against minority communities, with new danger zones emerging in Dinajpur, Gaibandha, Lalmonirhat and Cox’s Bazar during interim periods. The report says that violence against minority communities before and after elections are not random eruptions but structurally embedded patterns, shaped by historical vendettas, land disputes, weak local governance and the political exploitation of communal fault lines. That over a half of recorded incidents in 2001–24 involved direct physical attacks, killings and vandalism of houses, businesses and places of worship, underlines the gravity of the threat. Elections, meant to be moments of democratic renewal, have too often become seasons of fear for minorities living along the north and the south-east. If left unaddressed, these patterns risk repeating themselves yet again, undermining not only the safety of vulnerable citizens but also the legitimacy of the electoral process itself. Preventive action, therefore, is not optional but a constitutional obligation of the state.
Besides, there are a large number of polling centres that have been categorised as risky. Of the total 42,761 polling centres, 25,328 centres are considered risky, accounting for about 59 per cent of the total polling centres. The government also appears to recognise the scale of the challenge, judging by the heavy security architecture being rolled out. The authorities intend to deploy nearly 900,000 personnel, including members of the armed forces. Body-worn cameras, closed-circuit television camera coverage, drones, dog squads and a centralised coordination cell linked to the 999 emergency service also signal a determination to maintain order and deter violence. These measures are welcome, particularly in high-risk districts identified by independent research. Yet, security cannot be reduced to hardware and headcounts alone. Over-securitisation without community trust may push violence out of sight rather than eliminate it. What is equally crucial is targeted deployment based on credible risk mapping, continuous engagement with minority leaders and swift action against misinformation and online rumours that have previously triggered many incidents of violence. Formal commitments from political parties to restrain their supporters need to be enforced, not merely announced. The credibility of the election security app and coordination cells will ultimately be judged by how quickly they respond on the ground when threats emerge.
High-risk zones and vulnerable polling centres demand additional and layered protection and protection does not necessarily mean only force but foresight and dialogue too. The authorities must, therefore, take all measures to ensure that the elections are held peacefully.
