THE foreign policy of Bangladesh is entering a moment in which ASEAN is no longer a distant regional organisation but an increasingly important strategic horizon. Professor Muhammad Yunus had earlier raised Bangladesh’s aspiration for closer engagement with ASEAN, including the possibility of membership. The BNP government also appears interested in closer engagement with ASEAN. The question, however, is not merely whether Bangladesh wishes to join ASEAN. The deeper question is whether ASEAN can imagine Bangladesh as part of its regional community, and whether Bangladesh is institutionally, politically and strategically prepared for such a possibility.
The answer is neither simple nor immediate. ASEAN is not simply a trade bloc. It is a regional community built around geography, political consensus, institutional discipline, economic integration, security habits and a shared diplomatic culture. Bangladesh has many assets: a large population, a growing economy, a strategic location on the Bay of Bengal, an expanding manufacturing base and a potentially important role as a bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia. Yet ASEAN membership depends not only on strategic relevance. It depends on legal criteria, political consensus, institutional readiness and regional trust.
Article 6 of the ASEAN Charter sets out the basic conditions for admission of new members. A prospective member must be located in the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia; it must be recognised by all existing ASEAN member states; it must agree to be bound by the ASEAN Charter; and it must demonstrate the ability and willingness to carry out the obligations of membership. Beyond these written requirements lies an equally important political condition: ASEAN works by consensus. This means that even one member state’s hesitation can delay or block accession.
This is where Bangladesh faces its most fundamental challenge. Is Bangladesh part of Southeast Asia? Conventional geography places Bangladesh in South Asia. Strategic geography, however, tells a more complex story. Bangladesh shares a border with Myanmar, opens onto the Bay of Bengal, and has historical, commercial, religious, maritime and cultural connections with the wider Southeast Asian world. The old routes between Bengal, Arakan, the Malay world and the Bay of Bengal created a long history of mobility and exchange. Bangladesh can therefore argue that it does not stand outside Southeast Asia; it stands at the connective edge between South Asia and Southeast Asia.
But ASEAN does not admit members on the basis of strategic imagination alone. The example of Timor-Leste is instructive. Timor-Leste was clearly located within Southeast Asia, yet its accession took more than a decade. It applied for ASEAN membership in 2011, was granted observer status in 2022, received a roadmap for full membership in 2023, and finally became ASEAN’s eleventh member in 2025. The Timor-Leste case shows that geography is necessary but not sufficient. ASEAN membership requires patience, institutional preparation, political confidence and consensus among existing members.
Where, then, does Bangladesh’s potential lie? First, Bangladesh is a major market. With nearly 180 million people, a large young labour force, a strong garment sector and growing capacities in pharmaceuticals, agriculture, shipbuilding, information technology and services, Bangladesh could become an attractive economic partner for ASEAN. Several ASEAN economies face labour shortages, demographic ageing and demand for foreign workers. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand already have significant experience with migrant labour. If Bangladesh can move from a low-cost labour-export model to a more regulated, skilled, rights-based and mutually beneficial labour partnership, it could become highly relevant to ASEAN’s future economy.
Second, Bangladesh is central to the Bay of Bengal. In contemporary Indo-Pacific politics, the Bay of Bengal is not merely a body of water. It is a field of trade routes, energy movement, maritime security, port development, climate vulnerability, fisheries, blue economy and geopolitical competition. If ASEAN wants to think beyond the Mekong and the South China Sea and imagine a broader maritime Southeast Asia, Bangladesh becomes difficult to ignore. Chattogram, Mongla, Payra and Matarbari are not only national infrastructure projects. Properly developed, they could become part of a wider chain of connectivity between South Asia and Southeast Asia.
Third, Bangladesh can provide ASEAN with an entry point into South Asia. SAARC remains largely inactive. BIMSTEC has potential but has not yet become a strong political or economic architecture. India-China competition continues to complicate regional cooperation. In this context, Bangladesh could serve as a practical bridge between ASEAN and South Asia, especially in trade, logistics, labour mobility, disaster management, food security, climate adaptation and maritime cooperation. For ASEAN, Bangladesh may not be a traditional Southeast Asian state, but it may be a strategic connector that Southeast Asia increasingly needs.
Yet the constraints are serious. The first is geographical. ASEAN members may argue that Bangladesh does not fall within the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia, as required by the ASEAN Charter. This is the strongest legal and political obstacle. The comparison with Timor-Leste is therefore limited. Timor-Leste was small and institutionally fragile, but it was geographically Southeast Asian. Bangladesh is large and strategically important, but it is generally classified as South Asian. This distinction matters.
The second concern is ASEAN’s own institutional capacity. Integrating Timor-Leste already required a long and carefully managed process. Admitting a much larger country with a complex political economy, a large population and a distinct regional identity would be a far more demanding decision. ASEAN may worry that Bangladesh’s inclusion could bring South Asian tensions into Southeast Asian forums: India-Bangladesh issues, Myanmar-related problems, the Rohingya crisis, border politics, irregular migration and the wider rivalry between India and China. ASEAN’s diplomatic style is cautious, gradual and consensus-driven. It is unlikely to take a major enlargement decision without calculating these risks carefully.
The third concern is Myanmar and the Rohingya crisis. Bangladesh’s relationship with Myanmar is deeply shaped by the forced displacement of Rohingya refugees. ASEAN itself has struggled to manage Myanmar’s internal crisis since the military coup. Some ASEAN members may fear that including Bangladesh would make ASEAN more directly involved in the Rohingya question. Others may see Bangladesh’s inclusion as a way to create a more realistic regional mechanism for addressing displacement, repatriation, humanitarian protection and cross-border stability. ASEAN members are unlikely to hold a single view on this issue.
The fourth concern is institutional compatibility. ASEAN membership means participation in hundreds of meetings, working groups, legal instruments, economic agreements, security dialogues, social-cultural programmes and technical frameworks. It requires administrative capacity across ministries, regulatory alignment, diplomatic continuity, and the ability to follow ASEAN’s dense institutional calendar. Bangladesh must therefore ask itself whether it has prepared a whole-of-government ASEAN strategy, or whether membership is still mostly a political aspiration expressed through diplomatic speeches.
The fifth concern is ASEAN identity. ASEAN sees itself as a Southeast Asian family. If Bangladesh is admitted, other neighbouring states may also seek similar consideration. Sri Lanka, for instance, could make a maritime argument. Nepal could make a connectivity argument. Even countries beyond the immediate region may frame themselves as strategic partners of Southeast Asia. ASEAN may therefore prefer to keep Bangladesh close through partnership mechanisms rather than extend full membership. This would allow ASEAN to benefit from Bangladesh’s strategic location without changing the geographical identity of the organisation.
For these reasons, Bangladesh’s most realistic path is not immediate full membership but gradual institutional integration. The first step should be sectoral dialogue partnership. Bangladesh has already shown interest in this direction. Such a status would allow cooperation in specific areas such as trade, labour mobility, education, health, disaster management, climate adaptation, maritime security, digital economy and counter-trafficking. The second step could be broader dialogue partnership or a customised ASEAN-Bangladesh connectivity framework. The third step, if political conditions evolve, could involve observer status or a special roadmap for deeper engagement. Full membership should be treated as a long-term strategic objective, not as an instant diplomatic demand.
If Bangladesh receives a polite ‘no’, it should not treat that as a diplomatic defeat. It should treat it as an invitation to prepare better. Three tasks would then become essential. First, Bangladesh should not fight the geography question emotionally. Instead, it should develop a connectivity-based argument: the issue is not only whether Bangladesh is conventionally located within Southeast Asia, but whether Bangladesh is functionally necessary for Southeast Asia’s future connectivity. Second, Bangladesh should deepen bilateral relations with each ASEAN member state, especially Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines. ASEAN consensus is built one capital at a time. Third, Bangladesh must transform its image from a labour-exporting state into a multidimensional partner in skills, trade, technology, investment, education, maritime cooperation, climate resilience and regional security.
ASEAN may also set informal or formal conditions for Bangladesh. These may include: first obtaining sectoral dialogue partner status; reviewing ASEAN legal instruments; increasing trade and connectivity with Southeast Asia; improving fair recruitment and labour migration governance; strengthening measures against human trafficking, irregular migration and cybercrime; modernising ports, customs and supply-chain systems; working constructively with ASEAN on Myanmar and the Rohingya crisis; and demonstrating domestic political stability, rule of law, policy continuity and administrative capacity.
Bangladesh therefore needs a strategy of architecture, not emotion. It is not enough to say that Bangladesh should be admitted because it is important. Bangladesh must show why its inclusion would strengthen ASEAN, not complicate it. This requires a dedicated ASEAN strategy within the ministry of foreign affairs, stronger ASEAN expertise in government and universities, regular policy dialogues with ASEAN capitals, a business-led connectivity agenda, better maritime diplomacy and a labour mobility framework based on skills, rights and mutual benefit. Bangladesh should also invest in language training, area studies, port diplomacy, customs modernisation and direct shipping and air links with ASEAN economies.
In the end, Bangladesh may not become ASEAN’s twelfth member immediately. Indeed, the legal and geographical obstacles are significant. But this does not mean the aspiration is meaningless. It can become a powerful organising idea for Bangladesh’s foreign policy. For too long, Bangladesh has been viewed mainly through the lens of South Asian politics. Yet its geography, economy, demography and maritime location also connect it deeply with Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific. The challenge is to turn that geographical potential into institutional credibility.
Timor-Leste’s accession shows that ASEAN’s door is not permanently closed. But it also shows that the door opens slowly, after years of preparation, confidence-building and consensus formation. Bangladesh’s task is therefore not simply to knock on the door. It must build the case, demonstrate readiness, reduce anxieties and prove that keeping Bangladesh outside ASEAN may one day mean leaving out one of the most important bridges between South Asia and Southeast Asia.
Dr AKM Ahsan Ullah is professor of international studies and global migration in the University of Brunei Darussalam.
