Bangladesh and India cannot escape geography; they should use its possibilities. They share rivers, borders, markets, security concerns and the consequences of one another's decisions. India is Bangladesh's largest neighbour, an important trading partner and a decisive supporter in 1971. Yet geography and gratitude cannot alone sustain the relationship. Durable friendship requires sovereign equality, political trust, reciprocity and benefits that citizens can see.
That principle should determine whether and how the Prime Minister visits New Delhi. A visit must not become diplomatic theatre, a request for acceptance or an emotional test of friendship. It should proceed only when an agreed agenda can produce measurable gains for Bangladesh while addressing India's legitimate interests. Dialogue is necessary; unprepared diplomacy is not.
History is the first discipline. Ancient Bengal was neither a province of modern India nor isolated from the subcontinent. Vanga, Gauda, Pundra, Radha, Samatata and Harikela were independent polities or parts of larger empires. The delta, maritime trade, language and folk traditions gave Bengal a distinct civilisational character.
Muslim rule did not erase that character. In the thirteenth century, Ikhtiyar al-Din Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalji established authority in northern and western Bengal; he did not conquer the whole region. Islam spread through Sufi networks, scholarship, trade, agrarian expansion, settlement, social mobility and personal conviction. Under Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah, "Bangalah" acquired firmer political meaning. Bengali Muslims emerged as a rooted people whose faith, language and history developed together.
Colonial conquest exposed the danger of internal division: Plassey resulted not from Mir Jafar's betrayal alone, but also from court intrigue, military weakness, commercial interests and East India Company strategy. The 1947 Partition of British India created India and Pakistan and divided Bengal, placing East Bengal within Pakistan's eastern wing. It also demonstrated that a hurried compromise negotiated without adequate popular consent, justice and workable institutions can carry the seeds of future conflict. War may impose an outcome, but a fair, inclusive and enforceable compromise is more sustainable because it creates consent rather than submission.
Later, the Language Movement, autonomy struggle, 1970 electoral mandate and Liberation War proved that religious affinity could not settle questions of language, democracy, economic justice or representation. They produced a Bangladeshi national identity that carries the Muslim majority's historical experience while guaranteeing equal citizenship to Hindus, Buddhists, Christians and ethnic communities. India's decision to shelter nearly ten million refugees and provide training, diplomacy and military support in 1971 deserves enduring gratitude. But gratitude between states is not permanent indebtedness; current decisions must rest on current interests, sovereign equality and reciprocal responsibility.
The Ganges Water Treaty, Land Boundary Agreement, enclave exchange, maritime delimitation, electricity trade, connectivity and security cooperation prove that difficult problems can be resolved. Bangladesh is strategically important to India's north-eastern connectivity, access to the Bay of Bengal and regional stability; India's market, transport network, energy system and medical services matter to Bangladesh. Neither country is doing the other a favour. Both possess assets the other values.
The trust deficit is real. Teesta remains unresolved; border killings and irregular push-ins offend human dignity; non-tariff barriers and abrupt trade measures create uncertainty. A trade deficit alone does not prove unfairness, but unequal market access and logistical constraints require correction. Most damagingly, many Bangladeshis came to believe that after the disputed elections beginning in 2014, New Delhi prioritised Sheikh Hasina's government over their democratic aspirations. India may have sought stability, but durable stability rests on public consent, credible elections and strong institutions, not one party or leader.
The July 2024 uprising renewed that lesson at immense human cost. It demanded dignity, voting rights, accountability and rule of law. The government in 2026 must translate that mandate into foreign policy: calm in language, professional in preparation, firm on sovereignty and accountable for results. Bangladesh must not exchange one external dependence for another.
If I were Prime Minister, I would propose arriving in New Delhi on 11 September, one day before the BRICS Summit, for a full bilateral meeting. On 12-13 September, I would attend the BRICS Outreach as head of government of the current BIMSTEC chair. The sequence would convey gratitude for 1971, commitment to constructive neighbourly cooperation and determination to deepen wider partnerships.
I would invite two or three senior representatives nominated by the principal opposition parties to join under an agreed national brief. They would not conduct separate diplomacy; their presence would show that India policy belongs to the state and people, not the government of the day. I would tell India's leaders and citizens: our grievances are not against the Indian people. We are permanent neighbours seeking partnership through mutual respect, fairness and shared prosperity.
The visit should be confirmed only after a full bilateral meeting, pre-agreed agenda, principal expected outcomes, core draft of a possible joint statement and implementation framework are secured. Without them, there should be no official visit or formal meeting. Travel is not an achievement; measurable national gain is its only defensible purpose.
The negotiating mandate should rest on four directives.
First, restore sovereign trust. Bangladesh should seek India's written position and a time-bound legal process under the extradition treaty concerning Sheikh Hasina and other fugitives convicted or facing trial. India should prevent its territory from being used for incitement, violence or organised operations against Bangladesh. Bangladesh must likewise prevent its territory from being used against India's security. Reciprocal security requires equal obligations.
Second, protect water rights and border lives. The two sides need a dated roadmap for interim Teesta sharing, basin-wide management and real-time dry-season data exchange. Work on the future Ganges treaty must begin early. A binding border protocol should restrict lethal force to imminent threats to life, require joint investigation and accountability for every death, strengthen flag meetings and prohibit transferring anyone across the border without verified identity and lawful procedure.
Third, negotiate economic reciprocity. Bangladesh needs a programme to reduce non-tariff barriers, expand land-port capacity, replace the withdrawn transshipment facility and improve access for garments, jute, pharmaceuticals and agricultural products. Indian transit benefits should be matched by fair fees, infrastructure investment and guaranteed Bangladeshi access to Nepal and Bhutan for trade and electricity. Independent experts should review power and energy contracts for price, capacity charges, liabilities and purchasing conditions.
Fourth, institutionalise delivery. Every agreement should identify the responsible agency, deadline, financing, performance indicator and dispute mechanism, with public review every six months. A joint statement must replace promises to "enhance cooperation" with specifics: what water allocation, tariff facility, border protocol or corridor, and by what date. Parliament should be informed, and agreements affecting public resources disclosed unless a narrowly defined security interest requires confidentiality.
Bangladesh must correct its own failures. Weak preparation, fragmented ministries, personalised diplomacy, poor contract scrutiny and weak follow-up reduce its leverage. No neighbour can be blamed for concessions Bangladesh grants without valuation, conditions or enforcement. Sovereignty is protected by economic strength, national unity, capable institutions and negotiators who know what they can offer, what they must obtain and when to walk away.
Bangladesh should neither boycott India nor seek its approval. It should hear India's legitimate concerns, defend its rights and expand balanced relations with China, the United States, Europe, Japan, the Muslim world, ASEAN and the BRICS states. Strategic autonomy is not equidistance from every power; it is freedom to decide each issue by Bangladesh's interests and principles.
The success of a Delhi visit should be judged after the delegation returns. What did the farmer receive in dry-season water? What changed for the border family, exporter, worker, patient and young citizen? Precise answers would prove that the visit served the republic. Equal sovereignty, people-centred cooperation and measurable delivery should govern Bangladesh-India relations.
Major (Retd.) Md. Akhtaruzzaman, Former Member of Parliament. [email protected]
