Bangladesh’s gas crisis did not arrive as a sudden shock; it crept in quietly, disguised as policy pragmatism and short-term fixes, until it became a structural threat to the economy.
What is unfolding now is not merely a seasonal shortage or a logistical hiccup, but the cumulative consequence of years of strategic neglect, compounded by global volatility and domestic inertia.
The numbers alone tell a story of exhaustion. The country currently demands around 3.8 billion cubic feet of gas per day, while supply lingers at roughly 2.58 billion cubic feet, leaving a daily deficit of 1.22 billion cubic feet. Even compared to the same period last year, supply has fallen by 176 million cubic feet per day.
For an economy whose industrial backbone, power generation, and fertilizer production depend overwhelmingly on gas, this gap is not technical; it is existential.
The roots of this imbalance lie in a policy choice made years ago: To manage scarcity through imports rather than confront it through exploration.
During the previous government’s tenure, liquefied natural gas was elevated from a stopgap solution to a structural pillar of energy policy. Instead of aggressively investing in onshore and offshore exploration, Bangladesh chose the predictability of foreign cargoes, even as global energy markets grew more volatile and geopolitics more intrusive.
The financial cost of this choice is staggering. Since the 2018–19 fiscal year, the country has spent or committed to spend more than Tk 2.56 trillion on LNG imports.
In the current fiscal year alone, plans are in place to import 115 cargoes at an estimated cost of Tk 51,540 crore, significantly higher than the previous year.
These figures reflect not only rising volumes, but also the growing price of dependency.
Meanwhile, domestic production has been quietly eroding. Four of the five companies extracting gas in Bangladesh have recorded declines over the past year.
Bangladesh Gas Fields Company Limited saw production fall by more than 500 million cubic metres year-on-year. Bapex’s output dropped by around 14%. Even Chevron, which supplies nearly half of the country’s gas through its three onshore fields, experienced a decline of over one billion cubic metres in a single year.
Only one operator showed a marginal increase, insufficient to offset the broader trend. This is not a coincidence; it is what depletion looks like when exploration stagnates and development lags behind demand growth.
Adding to this fragility is inefficiency within the system itself. Around 150 million cubic feet of gas is reportedly lost from the grid every day due to leaks, technical losses, and mismanagement.
In such a scenario, drilling new wells without fixing transmission and distribution inefficiencies is akin to pouring water into a cracked vessel. The result is predictable: New supply fails to translate into meaningful relief, while costs continue to rise.
The interim government inherited this crisis with high public expectations. As a caretaker authority overseeing a critical political transition, it was seen as uniquely positioned to take difficult, long-term decisions insulated from electoral pressures.
Energy, the lifeblood of the economy, was expected to be an early priority. Yet more than a year into its tenure, the crisis appears deeper, not eased.
Import dependence remains entrenched, local production continues to decline, and infrastructure expansion has barely moved beyond announcements.
Two floating LNG terminals currently supply the grid, together capable of handling about one billion cubic feet per day. This capacity is already insufficient, yet tangible progress on new terminals remains elusive.
Building another floating terminal, even if approved today, would take at least three years to become operational. By then, the interim government will be long gone, and the political cost deferred to an elected successor.
This pattern of postponement, where today’s inaction becomes tomorrow’s inherited problem, has become a recurring feature of Bangladesh’s energy governance.
The risks of this approach extend beyond balance sheets. Global energy markets are increasingly shaped by sanctions, conflicts, and strategic rivalries. Recent disruptions in LPG supply, triggered by sanctions affecting shipping and trading routes, offer a glimpse of how external events can suddenly constrict access to fuel.
For a country that imports a growing share of its primary energy, such shocks can quickly cascade through the economy, shutting down factories, reducing export capacity, and straining foreign exchange reserves.
Bangladesh is discovering, belatedly, that energy security is inseparable from national security.
The industrial impact is already visible. Many factories operate for months without adequate gas pressure; others have shut down entirely.
Power plants built at great cost sit underutilized for lack of fuel. Export-oriented industries, particularly those competing on thin margins, face rising production costs and declining reliability.
At a time when Bangladesh seeks to attract foreign investment and diversify its economy, persistent energy shortages send a deeply discouraging signal. Investors may tolerate policy uncertainty; they rarely tolerate unreliable energy.
To be fair, plans do exist. An integrated energy roadmap stretching from 2026 to 2050 envisions phased reforms and investments worth an estimated $70-80 billion. There are promises of drilling 100 wells by 2028, purchasing new rigs, updating production-sharing contracts, and reducing reliance on spot LNG through short-term agreements.
These are not trivial measures. Yet plans, in the absence of urgency and coordination, risk becoming another layer of deferred responsibility. Energy systems do not respond to intent; they respond to execution.
What is most troubling is the continued absence of a clear exit strategy from LNG dependency. Importing LNG can stabilize supply in the short run, but it cannot anchor an economy indefinitely, especially one vulnerable to currency pressure and external shocks.
Without a defined timeline to reduce imports and replace them with domestic production, LNG risks becoming a permanent crutch, draining public finances while crowding out investment in exploration.
The opportunity cost is immense. Every taka spent on expensive spot cargoes is a taka not invested in seismic surveys, offshore drilling, or modern grid management.
Bangladesh’s gas story is ultimately a lesson in policy time horizons. Exploration does not yield immediate political dividends; imports do.
Infrastructure takes years; cargoes arrive in weeks. But nations that prioritize convenience over capacity eventually pay a higher price. The current crisis is not merely about gas shortages; it is about the erosion of strategic autonomy.
An economy that cannot fuel its factories without navigating sanctions regimes and shipping constraints is an economy exposed to forces beyond its control.
The interim government still has limited time to shape the contours of what comes next. Even if it cannot deliver immediate relief, it can establish credibility by locking in irreversible steps toward exploration, efficiency, and diversification.
Failing that, the burden will fall on the next elected government, which will inherit not only depleted fields and expensive contracts, but also public frustration and industrial fatigue.
Bangladesh once built its growth narrative on affordable energy. That advantage is slipping away. Reclaiming it will require more than cargoes and committees; it will require a decisive break from the politics of postponement.
Without that, the country risks running its economy on empty, sustained by imports, vulnerable to shocks, and perpetually one crisis away from paralysis.
HM Nazmul Alam is an Academic, Journalist, and Political Analyst based in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Currently he teaches at IUBAT.
