The arithmetic of Bangladesh’s next election is deceptively simple. Out of an electorate of nearly 12.8 crore, more than 5.56 crore voters are under 37.
That is roughly 44% of all voters, a demographic weight large enough to tilt outcomes in constituencies where victory margins are often counted in hundreds, not thousands.
Yet the political meaning of this youth bulge goes far beyond numbers. It carries the accumulated frustration of three elections widely dismissed as hollow exercises and the raw expectations born of an uprising that promised to reset the rules of the game.
For years, young Bangladeshis grew up being told that voting was their most basic civic right. Many reached voting age only to discover that this right could be suspended without any formal announcement.
In 2014, an election boycotted by major opposition parties saw turnout sink to around 40%, with more than half the seats decided without a contest.
In 2018, participation officially soared to 80%, but credible studies later suggested widespread irregularities, including ballots cast long before polling day in a majority of surveyed constituencies.
In 2024, turnout again fell to about 42% as voters faced another election lacking genuine competition.
For a generation coming of age politically, these were not abstract debates about democratic standards but lived experiences of exclusion, intimidation, and ritualized consent.
This history explains why the current moment feels different.
The coming polls are not merely another five-yearly exercise but a test of whether the promise of political renewal can translate into institutional credibility.
Many young voters were active participants or close witnesses in the mass mobilization that culminated in regime change in mid-2024. They saw peers injured, detained, and in some cases killed.
Politics, for them, is no longer a distant spectacle played out by older men on television screens. It is entwined with sacrifice and risk.
That emotional proximity has sharpened their expectations and narrowed their patience for cosmetic reforms.
Survey data underline this intensity. Recent nationwide youth polls suggest that close to nine in 10 young respondents are likely to vote, and in some surveys the figure rises to an extraordinary 97%.
This is not the apathy often lazily attributed to younger generations. It is closer to a pent-up demand to be counted.
When asked about priorities, corruption tops the list by a wide margin, followed by unemployment and the cost of living.
Concerns about safety, security, and democratic rights also feature prominently, reflecting an understanding that economic anxieties and political freedoms are inseparable.
The demographic context makes these concerns urgent.
Bangladesh adds hundreds of thousands of young people to the labour market each year. Official figures already place youth unemployment at significantly higher levels than the national average, while underemployment and informal work mask the depth of the problem.
Education has expanded rapidly, but quality and relevance lag behind, producing graduates who are credentialed yet insecure.
Inflation has further eroded purchasing power, hitting young urban households particularly hard.
For first-time voters and repeat voters alike, the ballot is increasingly seen as a lever to demand economic dignity, not just political representation.
Yet enthusiasm alone does not guarantee impact.
The same demographic that could decide the election could also be manipulated or neutralized if old habits persist.
In past polls, many young voters were deterred not by indifference but by fear. Open voting booths, partisan enforcers hovering near ballot boxes, and subtle signals about how one was expected to vote transformed the act of voting into a performance of compliance.
Others found their votes had already been cast. These experiences taught a damaging lesson that participation carried risks without rewards.
The challenge for the forthcoming election is therefore twofold.
First, the process must visibly break from the practices that hollowed out previous polls.
This means not just procedural tweaks but a culture shift at polling centres. Secrecy of the ballot must be enforced in a way that is obvious to voters standing in line.
Security forces and election officials must be seen as neutral guardians rather than silent accomplices. Turnout figures alone will not restore trust if young voters suspect that results are predetermined.
Second, political parties must recognize that this cohort cannot be mobilized solely through slogans or inherited loyalties.
Many young voters have little memory of the political bargains of the 1990s or early 2000s. Their reference points are the last decade, marked by constrained political space and economic uncertainty.
Appeals rooted in nostalgia or fear-mongering are unlikely to resonate. What they respond to are concrete proposals on jobs, education reform, corruption control, and the rule of law, backed by credible commitments.
There is also the added complexity of a possible referendum tied to constitutional and reformist questions emerging from the post-uprising settlement.
In such a vote, youth participation could be even more decisive.
Referendums strip politics down to choices rather than personalities, forcing voters to engage with ideas about governance structures and accountability.
For a generation that took to the streets demanding systemic change, this presents both an opportunity and a risk.
A poorly framed or rushed referendum could deepen cynicism, while a transparent and inclusive process could anchor reforms in popular legitimacy.
Sceptics argue that youthful optimism has flared before only to be extinguished by entrenched interests. They point out that power structures rarely yield easily and that demography does not automatically translate into agency.
These cautions are not without merit. A large youth electorate can be fragmented by class, geography, and ideology. Urban students and rural first-time voters do not share identical priorities. Social media can amplify mobilization but also misinformation, polarising young voters along manufactured lines.
Still, there is a qualitative difference this time.
Unlike previous moments of political transition, today’s young voters are not simply inheriting a system; they have already challenged it.
Their political socialization has been shaped by protest as much as by polling stations. That experience has lowered the threshold of what they consider acceptable. It has also created a generational memory that will not fade easily if betrayed.
The coming election, then, is less about whether young people will show up and more about whether the system will meet them halfway.
If nearly half the electorate turns out believing that their vote matters, the legitimacy dividend could be enormous.
It would not solve Bangladesh’s structural problems overnight, but it would re-establish the most basic democratic contract: That participation has meaning.
Conversely, if familiar patterns re-emerge, the damage could be long-lasting. A generation that invests hope only to be disappointed again may not retreat quietly into apathy.
Disillusionment can radicalize as easily as it can demobilize. In that sense, the stakes are not confined to February’s results but extend to the stability of the political order in the years ahead.
Bangladesh’s youth are often described as the country’s demographic dividend. Dividends, however, are not automatic. They require governance systems capable of converting numbers into opportunity.
The ballot box is one such system. Whether it functions as intended this time will determine not only who governs next, but whether an entire generation continues to believe that change is possible without returning to the streets.
HM Nazmul Alam is an Academic, Journalist, and Political Analyst based in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Currently he teaches at IUBAT. Email: [email protected].
