Bangladesh’s electoral credibility could be undermined unless weaknesses in key digital systems are addressed, according to a report by the Tech Global Institute (TGI), a technology policy research organisation.
The policy paper, titled “Hijacking the Vote: Inside Bangladesh’s Data-Driven Election Manipulation”, was published on TGI’s website on February 5 ahead of the country’s 13th national election. It argues that election-related fraud is no longer limited to ballot box snatching or interference at polling centres, but has evolved into more coordinated and data-driven practices, with apps, dashboards and the national identity database playing a growing role.
The study identifies vulnerabilities in Bangladesh’s national identity system, the Postal Vote BD app, digital result management and other election-related digital mechanisms. TGI warns that unless these weaknesses are tackled, voter confidence and perceptions of electoral integrity could be seriously compromised.
Fowzia Afroz, TGI’s Country Head for Bangladesh, told The Daily Star that vulnerabilities in Bangladesh’s digital infrastructure have contributed to election manipulation risks. She cited instances of candidates contacting voters directly via mobile phone and questioned how personal information could be accessed without exposure to official databases.
Afroz referred to previous reporting by several organisations suggesting the national identity database had been compromised in the past, and said such breaches could be linked to irregularities seen in earlier elections. “This leakage of data is also related to non-resident or elderly Bangladeshis casting votes without their knowledge as we have seen in the previous elections conducted by the past administration,” she said.
The report notes that nearly 180 public and private entities, including banks, mobile operators and other service providers, have access to the national identity database for verification purposes. TGI says this broad access creates avenues for misuse, particularly if data can be extracted for political purposes. It warns that if candidates or parties could identify absent or deceased voters, it would be easier to attempt fraudulent voting in their names.
Postal voting for expatriate Bangladeshis is also highlighted as a potential pressure point. Registration for postal ballots began on November 18, 2025 and ran until January 5, 2026. The report argues that Postal Vote BD is not a standalone mechanism but part of the wider digital ecosystem, meaning existing weaknesses could carry over into the postal voting process and deepen public scepticism.
Digital result management is another area of concern. The Election Commission plans to make constituency-level information available through its Smart Election Management BD app, but the report says questions remain about design and operational transparency. It points to a lack of clarity on how data are verified, whether information could be delayed or altered, and whether results from sensitive constituencies could be selectively displayed, factors it says could undermine confidence in preliminary figures.
TGI also describes operational vulnerabilities in result aggregation platforms such as KOPOT, a centralised digital reporting system used by election officials. It argues that without mechanisms to flag statistically unusual returns and without time-stamped logs showing when data are revised, such systems can weaken the credibility of early results. The report says these gaps point to specific technical points of failure within election-related digital processes.
The planned installation of CCTV cameras in about 42,000 polling centres is intended to enhance security, yet the report warns that without clear legal guardrails and detailed operational guidelines, the measures could have unintended consequences. It says continuous video recording inside polling centres may create a perception of surveillance, particularly in politically sensitive or closely contested areas. The report raises unresolved questions about camera placement, how long footage will be retained, and who will have access, warning that uncertainty could affect both voter privacy and electoral transparency.
Drawing on data from 150 constituencies in the 2024 election, the report identifies three patterns it describes as problematic. These include low turnout combined with unusually high numbers of invalid votes while heavily favouring a single candidate, near 100% turnout in some centres overwhelmingly benefiting one candidate, and more than a thousand centres reporting no invalid ballots. While such outcomes may be mathematically possible, the report argues that the statistical patterns indicate systemic vulnerabilities that could be exploited through digital systems.
To reduce these risks, TGI offers 10 recommendations, including tighter access controls for the national identity database, mandatory public audit trails for digital result reporting, and a strengthened legal framework governing the collection, retention and use of CCTV footage to prevent misuse.
