FOR over a decade, global geopolitics has shifted from American unipolarity to a more complex multipolar world, characterised by a tripartite power dynamic involving the US, China, and Russia. This evolution, termed strategic triangularism, involves competitive, cooperative, and confrontational interactions among these powers that shape international order. While previously theoretical, this triangular world order is becoming more evident as the US wields its hegemonic authority, China expands its global influence, and Russia strengthens its strategic presence in Eurasia and the Middle East. These trends indicate a transition from a unipolar world to a more contested, multipolar landscape.
Scholars argue that US power has often been weaponised in ways that deepen global instability — from prolonged military engagements to unilateral sanctions and diplomatic coercion that undermine cooperative international frameworks. Meanwhile, China’s rise over the same period has been marked by extraordinary economic growth, expansive trade networks like the Belt and Road Initiative, and assertive regional policies that challenge US dominance in Asia and beyond. Russia, for its part, having suffered a post-Soviet contraction in influence, has in recent years reasserted its military and geopolitical weight, leveraging energy resources, strategic alignments, and military power to complicate Western policies and revitalise its standing as a global actor. Collectively, the interactions among these three powers do not merely generate competition; they are catalysing a new world order in which power is negotiated within an uneven but persistent triangle of influence and rivalry.
In this evolving triangular order, the United States has traditionally functioned as a system-shaping power. However, under Donald Trump, this dominance has become more overt and imperial, extending beyond traditional alliances. While still relying on NATO and longstanding partnerships, recent years have seen a shift toward coercive leadership, particularly amid increased pressure on European allies to increase defence spending, expand trade, and assert greater strategic autonomy. This approach has blurred the line between alliance management and domination, treating partners as instruments of US dominance rather than equal stakeholders. The renewed US interest in Greenland reflects a 19th-century geopolitical instinct resurfacing today. Scholarly analyses suggest this behaviour reinforces perceptions of US unilateralism and accelerates hedging among allies, many of whom are engaging China economically and accommodating Russia. Consequently, Washington’s actions paradoxically contribute to the emergence of a tripartite world order, defined by recalibrated loyalties and strategic calculations of allies.
China, for its part, leverages economic statecraft, investment networks across Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia, and a spectrum of ‘strategic partners’ that stop short of formal military pacts but create dependency and diplomatic alignment, as highlighted in analyses of Beijing’s global strategy. Russia — while economically constrained — has deepened security and energy ties with Beijing and cultivated alliances with Tehran, Minsk, and other states disaffected by Western policy, using these relationships to sustain its influence and disrupt Western cohesion. These interconnected alliances do not form rigid blocs akin to the Cold War but rather reflect a flexible, contested balance of influence in which allies help define each pole’s strategic capacity and the broader shape of the international order.
Each of the three powers defines the triangular world order through distinct strategic lenses shaped by historical experience, perceptions of power, and geopolitical interests. From the American perspective, the triangle is primarily considered a structure of strategic competition and containment, in which the United States must defend its global primacy against a rising China and a resurgent Russia.
China views the triangular order as both a consequence and an opportunity of its ascendance, interpreting US actions as attempts to preserve an outdated unipolar system and justifying China’s pursuit of an alternative order emphasising multipolarity, development cooperation, and regional leadership, championing ‘win-win cooperation’ and global governance reform.
Russia’s view is shaped by its resurgence in military and energy domains and a longstanding commitment to multipolarity that opposes US hegemony; Moscow sees the triangular order as a chance to reassert great-power status, resist Western encroachment (notably NATO expansion), and leverage its strategic partnership with China to balance American power without subsuming its autonomy. Collectively, these differing perspectives underscore that the triangle is not a symmetrical axis of united purpose but a dynamic, contested arena in which each power’s worldview and strategic priorities continually redefine what global order means to them.
The new world order is increasingly taking shape as a multipolar, fragmented system in which power is distributed among the United States, China, and Russia. Under this emerging architecture, the US envisions a bloc-orientated order driven by America First policies, economic and geopolitical competition, and a recalibration of alliances — essentially a return to a bloc logic reminiscent of the Cold War but with three rival poles rather than two. Trump’s administration has reinforced this shift by reviving Monroe Doctrine-like rhetoric and pressing for US dominance in the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific, while simultaneously challenging traditional institutions and alliances, underscoring a transactional, assertive US posture that reshapes old commitments and pressures partners to align more closely with American strategic interests.
Meanwhile, China and Russia are promoting multipolarity, inclusive governance, and alternatives to US-centric systems through institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, appealing especially to states dissatisfied with Western dominance.
For the Global South, this means countries are no longer compelled to choose strictly between East and West but can leverage competition among great powers for infrastructure, investment, and diplomatic support — yet they also face heightened pressures to navigate a complex field of influence that can amplify dependency or domestic vulnerabilities.
For a country like Bangladesh, strategically positioned in the Indo-Pacific and a participant in major regional frameworks, the tripolar order presents opportunities for diversified partnerships, development financing, and geopolitical relevance, but also risks entanglement in great-power rivalries that could complicate its autonomy and economic priorities in areas such as trade, security cooperation, and infrastructure investment.
Drawing on recent scholarly debates on tripartite ordering and the erosion of the post-1945 system, the emerging triangular world order is likely to be less rule-bound and more power-negotiated, with profound consequences for the Global South. Analysts argue that a US–China–Russia triangle does not amount to a stable concert of powers but rather an uneven, competitive geometry in which norms are subordinated to interests and smaller states face intensified pressure to align, hedge, or absorb spillover shocks. In the Global South, this environment reduces the protective value of multilateralism while increasing exposure to sanctions, proxy rivalries, and economic coercion. Bangladesh exemplifies this dilemma: strategically located, economically integrated, and diplomatically active, yet structurally vulnerable to great-power competition in trade, security, climate finance, and humanitarian crises. The triangular order thus magnifies both opportunity and risk — offering leverage through diversification, while simultaneously narrowing the margin for error in foreign-policy choices.
The engagement strategies of the US, Russia, and China towards the Global South differ significantly. The United States remains the most coercive actor, using sanctions, conditional aid, and diplomatic pressure, prioritising a transactional approach over developmental support. In contrast, Russia acts as a more insulated power, engaging selectively through energy and arms without pushing for deep political changes in partner states. China has become a key partner for the Global South, offering infrastructure financing and development cooperation via initiatives like the Belt and Road, emphasising sovereignty and non-interference, which appeals to countries wary of Western conditionality. These distinct approaches create a hierarchy of risks and opportunities, prompting Global South states to navigate their relationships based on interests rather than ideology.
An emerging consensus in scholarship holds that the Global South must move beyond episodic hedging toward a deliberate, strategically disciplined multialignment that engages all three poles without sliding into dependency on any single power. For Bangladesh, this is not an abstract prescription but an immediate strategic necessity. Dhaka already balances US market access and security engagement, Chinese infrastructure financing and industrial investment, and Russian cooperation in energy and defence — most visibly in projects such as the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, and continued access to Western export markets. The challenge now is to convert this pragmatic balancing into a more institutionalised strategy — deepening economic and diplomatic ties across South and Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East; strengthening regional mechanisms within BIMSTEC, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and UN peacekeeping networks; and diversifying sources of finance, technology, and security cooperation to reduce exposure to sanctions pressure or geopolitical coercion. Equally critical is closer coordination with similarly positioned states — such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and Kenya — to amplify collective bargaining power on issues ranging from climate finance and labour migration to supply-chain resilience.
Cooperation among the Global South is no longer a matter of ideological solidarity but of strategic survival. In a world where power increasingly overrides principle, Bangladesh’s long-term autonomy will depend not on choosing sides, but on calibrated multialignment anchored in robust South–South collaboration and sustained national resilience.
Simon Mohsin is a political and international affairs analyst.
