THE Anti-Corruption Commission has been running without its chair and commissioners for more than a week, leaving the principal agency that fights against corruption in a state of operational paralysis. The leadership vacuum emerged on March 3 after they had resigned, roughly two weeks after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party government assumed office. Officials say that routine administrative functions and previously initiated enquiries are continuing at the institutional level, but major decisions remain stalled because they require approval from the commission’s top leadership. These include authorising corruption inquiries, filing cases, approving charge sheets or final investigation reports and ordering the freezing of assets of the accused. As a result, the organisation’s officials and employees are largely confined to routine tasks while enquiries and investigations involving several high-profile suspects remain effectively suspended. The situation has also exposed a legal and institutional gap. Neither the Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2004 nor the Anti-Corruption Commission Rules 2007 clearly outlines how the agency should function in the absence of a commission. Analysts say that the recurring leadership disruption in the agency reflect structural weaknesses that have repeatedly undermined the continuity and credibility of anti-corruption efforts.
The present paralysis at the commission once again exposes the structural fragility. With no chair or commissioners in office, the agency is unable to take decisions on investigations, corruption cases or asset freezes, effectively suspending its most consequential functions. This institutional gap exists because neither the law that governs it or the rules lays out how the body should operate in the absence of a commission. The immediate consequence is operational paralysis. Since its establishment in 2004, several commissions have left office prematurely, often following shifts in state power, creating recurring disruptions in the continuity of anti-corruption efforts. Such cycles weaken institutional memory, delay investigations and erode public confidence in the agency’s capacity to act independently. The crisis, therefore, illustrates how an institution designed to function as an independent watchdog remains vulnerable to political turnover. The appointment of a commission should not merely fill vacancies but restore credibility. The selection process should prioritise professional expertise, integrity and independence so that the leadership of the agency is able to enforce accountability without fear or favour and insulate the institution from the political fluctuations that have repeatedly compromised its effectiveness.
The government should act to restore the leadership. The opportunity should be used to appoint individuals of proven integrity, expertise and independence. Without such leadership, the commission risks remaining vulnerable to political turnover, further weakening public trust in the already fragile anti-corruption framework.
