The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia on August 7 2026, could become one of the most consequential new security arrangements in the Muslim world. Its central provision is straightforward: an armed attack against one member will be regarded as an attack against all three. The governments concerned describe the pact as defensive, consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter, and not directed against any particular country.
For Bangladesh, however, the real question is not whether closer association with three friendly Muslim states is politically attractive. It is whether membership would strengthen national security sufficiently to justify the military obligations, diplomatic repercussions and possible loss of strategic flexibility involved.
Strategic importance of the Pact: The agreement appears to serve several wider objectives.
First, it seeks to create a greater degree of regional strategic autonomy. For decades Middle Eastern security has depended heavily upon the United States. The new arrangement brings together complementary capabilities: Saudi financial and political influence, Türkiye’s large military and sophisticated defence industry, and Pakistan’s experienced armed forces and nuclear capability.
Second, it could strengthen collective deterrence. Although officially directed against no country, the pact inevitably affects strategic calculations concerning Iran, Israel and other possible regional conflicts.
Third, cooperation in defence industries may prove almost as important as collective defence itself. Türkiye possesses an expanding drone, missile, electronics and naval industry; Pakistan has significant missile, aircraft and weapons-development capabilities; Saudi Arabia can provide capital and procurement capacity.
Finally, the agreement may represent an attempt by major Muslim states to acquire greater security autonomy without becoming wholly dependent upon Washington, Beijing or Moscow.
Yet considerable uncertainty remains. Unlike NATO, the new organisation does not yet possess a mature integrated military command, permanent multinational force structure or decades of common operational planning. Publicly available details of specific military commitments remain limited.
Its credibility will therefore depend upon some difficult questions: 1. Would Pakistan actually fight if Saudi Arabia were attacked? 2. Would Saudi Arabia become involved in a Pakistan–India conflict? 3. Would Türkiye risk confrontation with a major power on Pakistan’s behalf? 4. Would all three interpret the expression “armed attack” identically?
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal undoubtedly strengthens the psychological deterrent value of the arrangement. It should not, however, automatically be interpreted as a formal Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. Saudi officials have specifically stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear ambitions or an arms race.
Could the Pact weaken or break apart: Its greatest structural weakness is that its members do not necessarily share the same principal adversary.
Pakistan’s traditional strategic concern is India. Saudi security priorities lie mainly in the Gulf and wider Middle East. Türkiye must simultaneously manage relations and tensions involving NATO, Russia, Syria, Iran, Israel, Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.
Military alliances are generally strongest when their members possess broadly similar threat perceptions. The Makkah Pact may therefore face difficulties whenever the interests of one member do not coincide with those of the others.
International reaction: India has particularly strong reasons to scrutinise the arrangement because Pakistan is a founding member. New Delhi has publicly stated that it is “closely following” developments. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia maintains major economic and strategic relations with India and will probably seek to prevent the pact from becoming an explicitly anti-Indian organisation.
Israel is likely to view the combination with caution because Türkiye–Israel relations have deteriorated, Pakistan does not recognise Israel, and Saudi Arabia occupies a central position in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Yet Riyadh’s relationship with Washington and its broader Western interests make an openly anti-Israel military bloc unlikely.
The United States may adopt a mixed approach. All three members maintain important relationships with Washington and Türkiye remains a NATO member. American opposition would probably intensify only if the pact evolved into an explicitly anti-American bloc, facilitated nuclear proliferation, directly confronted Israel, or became strategically subordinate to China or Russia.
European governments are similarly likely to remain cautious but pragmatic.
Expansion of the Pact: Expansion appears possible. Pakistan has publicly stated that the Makkah Accord remains open to countries willing to uphold its principles.
Any enlargement, however, would require prospective members to accept genuine reciprocal defence obligations. The significance of the organisation would increase substantially if other major Muslim military powers eventually became associated with it.
Should Bangladesh join: There are substantial arguments in favour.
Bangladesh occupies a difficult geographical position, surrounded largely by India and sharing another sensitive frontier with Myanmar. It cannot match the military capabilities of much larger neighbours merely by increasing defence expenditure.
Association with Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia could therefore offer: (a) stronger external deterrence; (b) access to defence technology and joint production; (c) diversification away from excessive dependence on one arms supplier; (d) greater intelligence, cyber and maritime cooperation; (e) enhanced security in the Bay of Bengal; and (f) greater diplomatic influence.
Bangladesh could also contribute significantly to the arrangement. As one of the world’s largest Muslim-majority countries, it possesses substantial armed forces, extensive UN peacekeeping experience and an important strategic location linking South and Southeast Asia with the Bay of Bengal.
There are, however, equally serious arguments against immediate membership.
The greatest danger is that Bangladesh could inherit other members’ wars. A renewed Pakistan–India confrontation, a Saudi–Iran conflict or a major Turkish military crisis could create pressure upon Dhaka to become involved in disputes far removed from Bangladesh’s immediate national interests.
Relations with India could also deteriorate. Whatever the present state of bilateral relations, geography cannot be changed. India remains central to Bangladesh’s border security, river-water questions, connectivity, trade and regional calculations. Formal Bangladeshi membership in an alliance containing Pakistan could therefore provoke diplomatic, economic or military counterbalancing by New Delhi.
Membership could also reduce Bangladesh’s traditional strategic flexibility. Article 25 of the Constitution emphasises sovereignty, equality, non-interference, peaceful settlement of disputes, international law and the UN Charter. A defensive alliance is not inherently incompatible with these principles, but Bangladesh should avoid treaty obligations that automatically surrender its independent decision on when its Armed Forces should enter a war.
China must also be considered. Beijing would not necessarily regard an organisation containing Pakistan as hostile, but Bangladesh should ensure that any new alignment does not undermine its important economic and defence relationship with China.
The economic dimension is equally important. Saudi Arabia was Bangladesh’s largest source of remittances in FY2025–26, while Bangladesh also depends heavily upon Western, Chinese and regional markets, investment and trade. A defence arrangement that strengthened military security but damaged exports, remittances or investment could ultimately weaken national power.
A more prudent middle course: Bangladesh should therefore avoid an immediate choice between full membership and complete disengagement. A better approach would be phased association. Dhaka could initially seek observer, associate or dialogue-partner status and expand cooperation in: (a) joint military exercises and officer exchanges; (b) intelligence and counterterrorism; (c) cyber defence; (d) naval and maritime security; (e) defence production and technology transfer; (f) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Before accepting a collective-defence obligation, Bangladesh should obtain explicit answers to several questions:
What legally constitutes an attack? Is military intervention automatic, or may each member determine its own response? Would the treaty apply to Kashmir or other disputed territories? Does it cover overseas deployments? How would Türkiye reconcile pact obligations with NATO commitments? Does Pakistani nuclear deterrence extend to other members? What are the mechanisms for withdrawal?
Above all, Bangladesh must ask:
Would the other members genuinely defend Bangladesh if Bangladesh itself were attacked?
Without a convincing answer, Dhaka could assume major obligations without receiving equivalent security in return.
Conclusion: The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement should not be dismissed as symbolic. Saudi financial power, Turkish military-industrial capability and Pakistan’s conventional and strategic strength give the arrangement considerable potential.
For Bangladesh, closer association could improve defence capability, technology access, maritime security, procurement diversification and diplomatic leverage.
But immediate accession to an automatic mutual-defence commitment would presently be unwise.
Bangladesh should move closer to the Makkah Pact, participate extensively in defence cooperation and carefully observe how its institutions and doctrines develop before considering full membership.
If the joint pact ultimately establishes a credible joint command and puts in place clear rules governing military intervention and protecting members from being automatically dragged into one another's bilateral conflicts, Bangladesh could consider full accession.
eventually become an important eastern pillar of a wider security architecture stretching from the Mediterranean and Arabian Peninsula through Pakistan to the Bay of Bengal.
The fundamental test must remain simple: the alliance should strengthen Bangladesh’s sovereignty without compromising Bangladesh’s sovereign right to decide when, where and why its Armed Forces go to war.
Lt Col Mudassir Hussain Khan (rtd) is a Bir Protik
