Farmers in Bangladesh are again complaining about not getting fertiliser at government-fixed prices when Aman cultivation is under way and preparations for early winter vegetables are beginning. Reports from a number of districts say that farmers are either being denied their required quantities at authorised dealer points or being asked to wait, only to find the same fertilisers available in the open market at higher prices. The allegation is that a section of dealers are diverting supplies to retailers and creating an artificial scarcity. Interestingly, the agriculture ministry says there is no shortage. Its data show fertiliser demand for the July-September period at 13.21 lakh tonnes against stocks of 13.65 lakh tonnes. If that is indeed the case, one wonders, why are farmers standing in queues or buying the same product at a premium elsewhere? If it was not for scarcity of fertiliser, then why did some enraged farmers allegedly force into a dealer's store and take away 197 sacks of urea fetiliser at Bhurungamari in Kurigram recently?
This is not a minor issue that can be dismissed as a temporary market disorder. Fertiliser has to be applied according to the crop calendar, which does not wait for administrative explanations or market corrections. So, when urea, TSP, DAP or MOP is not available at the right time, the loss is not limited to the extra Tk300 or Tk350 paid for a sack. Delayed or inadequate application may lower yields; higher input cost raises farmer's break-even price; and both ultimately reappear in the kitchen market as dearer essentials.
The matter becomes still more concerning because Bangladesh is heavily dependent on imported fertiliser. The country is projected to require around 5.8 million tonnes of chemical fertiliser in FY2026-27. Though the seven state-run fertiliser factories together have installed capacity exceeding 37 lakh tonnes, their production in the previous fiscal was only around 1.106 million tonnes, largely because of gas shortages. The resulting shortfall has therefore to be met from outside, making the country vulnerable to international prices, shipping disruptions and geopolitical shocks.
Those shocks are no longer hypothetical. The Persian Gulf conflict has disrupted a major route for energy and fertiliser trade through the Strait of Hormuz. Earlier this year, the World Bank warned that its fertiliser price index could rise by more than 30 per cent in 2026 and urea prices by nearly 60 per cent, as Middle Eastern exports and production were disrupted and natural gas costs increased. The FAO, too, warned that the Gulf crisis was creating a double-cost shock for farmers through dearer fertiliser and fuel. More recently, the FAO Food Price Index for August rose to its highest level since late 2022 as wars, weather problems and disruptions to Black Sea trade added pressure to cereals and other food commodities.
Against this backdrop, Bangladesh is being squeezed from two sides. At home there are allegations of manipulation and weak monitoring of the distribution chain; abroad, the prices and availability of fertiliser, fuel and food are becoming more uncertain. If domestic food production suffers because farmers cannot get inputs at reasonable prices, the country may later have to import more food precisely when international prices are rising. That would be a case of paying twice for the same failure-first through costly inputs and lower local output, and then through expensive food imports.
The immediate task, therefore, is to break any artificial scarcity. If official stocks are adequate, the government should be able to tell how much fertiliser has left a warehouse, which dealer received it and how much was sold to farmers. Reports that some individuals or families control several licences through different names deserve investigation. Allocation, sale and remaining stock at every dealer point should be digitally recorded and made publicly visible at union and upazila levels. Surprise inspections and mobile courts may help, but occasional fines will not dismantle a syndicate if the structure itself allows local monopolies to thrive.
At the same time, action against dealers alone cannot be the long-term answer. The government should have a strategy on assured stocks and timely supply of agricultural inputs to farmers at fair prices, rather than wake up to a crisis after the crop calendar has already begun to run out. Such a strategy requires a minimum strategic reserve of major fertilisers above routine seasonal demand, early procurement before international prices spike, diversified import sources and sufficient foreign-exchange provisioning for emergency purchases. Recent arrangement for procuring fertilisers from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Russia, Canada and other sources are welcome. But procurement decisions should anticipate the Aman, Boro and winter cropping calendars by months, not follow panic in the field.
There is also the question of subsidy. At a time when international fertiliser prices are volatile, passing the entire additional import cost on to farmers would be self-defeating. The government has budgeted large sums for fertiliser and agricultural subsidies, and this is precisely the kind of external shock for which such support exists. A marginal farmer who reduces fertiliser use because of price may save some money today, but the economy could lose far more through lower output tomorrow. Subsidy, however, has to reach farmers, not disappear somewhere between the port, warehouse, dealer and retailer.
In the medium term, domestic production has to be strengthened. Fertiliser factories cannot operate at a fraction of installed capacity year after year because of gas shortage while the country spends scarce foreign currency importing the same product. Natural gas itself is scarce and competing demands from power and industry cannot be ignored. But agriculture and food security are also strategic sectors. A realistic energy allocation plan for efficient fertiliser plants, along with modernisation to reduce gas consumption per tonne of output, should be part of national food-security planning.
The recent easing of domestic food inflation should therefore not lull the government into complacency. Input inflation today often becomes food inflation a season later. If Aman yields suffer or winter vegetable cultivation becomes costlier, the impact will eventually be borne not only by farmers, but also by consumers already struggling with the cost of living. In the circumstances, securing fertiliser is not merely an agricultural ministry's seasonal routine. It is part of inflation management and national food security. Farmers should not have to fight dealers for a bag of fertiliser when official warehouses are said to be adequately stocked. The government must ensure that what exists on paper reaches the field, at the right time and at the declared price.
