On August 20, for only the second time in our history, parliamentarians will have the opportunity to elect the president of the republic. If the ruling party sticks to its decision not to allow its MPs to vote freely, however, the entire exercise is poised to be anything but an election. It could instead be described as the beginning of the new president’s coronation.
Like the first presidential vote 35 years ago, this one too follows another pro-democracy uprising. The first uprising forced out the military dictator, General HM Ershad; the second overthrew the civilian but increasingly dictatorial regime of Sheikh Hasina. In between these upheavals, we had seven presidential elections, all won unopposed by nominees of the then ruling parties. Interestingly, in both post-uprising parliaments, BNP would play a decisive role in determining the country’s democratic future.
The second mass uprising, known as the July Uprising, was, in many ways, a very different political upheaval. It was largely initiated and steered by young people, particularly the Gen Z. Their aspirations were also far more radical, seeking deep and wide-ranging reforms of the state and its institutions. Nearly two decades of mass disenfranchisement and the systematic persecution of dissent and opposition under a civilian authoritarian regime created the conditions for broader national unity to bring an end to tyranny and “reconstruct the state on the foundation of democracy and human dignity.”
This was the premise on which all the major active political parties, after painstaking negotiations lasting more than a year, agreed to a broad reform agenda known as the July National Charter. The charter’s signatories, including the ruling BNP and the opposition 11-party alliance, declared that it “aims to reform the constitution, electoral system, judiciary, public administration, police administration, and mechanisms for combating corruption.”
The document arguably represents the second major expression in our history—after the all-party declaration of 1990—of a broad national consensus on political reform. Much of it could, and should, have been implemented without great difficulty had that unity been preserved instead of being undermined by disputes over procedural issues.
The July Charter is particularly significant because, under its proposed reforms, the presidency would acquire a degree of independence in appointing key officials to several state institutions—powers that previous presidents did not enjoy. In 1991, constitutional reform transformed the presidency into a largely ceremonial office. Over the following decades, we witnessed the gradual concentration of almost all state power in the hands of the prime minister, eventually producing what became a textbook example of electoral autocracy under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership.
The July Charter seeks to restore a degree of balance between the president and the prime minister by empowering the presidency to make appointments to the National Human Rights Commission, Information Commission, Law Commission, Press Council, Energy Regulatory Commission, and the governor of the central bank. The BNP agreed to these provisions but registered a note of dissent over the inclusion of the Bangladesh Bank governor as well as the chair and members of the Energy Regulatory Commission.
The charter also provides a conditional exemption from some of its provisions, stating that “if any political party or alliance secures a public mandate based on explicit mention in their election manifesto, they may proceed accordingly with necessary measures.”
As a signatory to the charter, BNP is expected to empower the country’s 23rd president accordingly. Its manifesto, known as the 31-point plan, remains silent on the presidency and its powers, thereby making the charter’s proposals effectively binding on the party. Although implementation of the charter remains stalled amid an ongoing dispute between the ruling BNP and the opposition 11-party alliance over procedural questions, it is widely expected that even limited constitutional changes would eventually result in a significant enhancement of the president’s powers. The president’s role also assumes particular significance in appointing a caretaker government to oversee national elections if political parties fail to agree on selecting the head of a caretaker administration.
The national consensus reached after the July Uprising also prescribes that the president should be elected through a secret ballot. Article 10 of the July Charter, under the heading “Presidential Election Procedure,” states: “The Constitution shall stipulate that Bangladesh shall have a President elected by majority vote through secret ballot by members of both houses of Parliament (lower and upper).”
Because the constitutional amendments have yet to be made, the forthcoming election will take place without an upper house. The election has also been necessitated by the premature resignation of Mohammed Shahabuddin from the presidency. The absence of an upper house makes the contest even less competitive, particularly because the current single-chamber parliament gives the ruling party a two-thirds majority. The outcome, therefore, appears to be a foregone conclusion in favour of the ruling party’s nominee Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir.
The election could, at least theoretically, still produce a different outcome if BNP lifted the Article 70 restriction on its MPs. On August 11, Chief Whip Nurul Islam Moni told the media that Article 70 of the Constitution would remain in force during the presidential election, meaning that any lawmaker voting against the party’s decision would risk losing their parliamentary membership. This is clearly at odds with what BNP promised the nation when it signed the July Charter. BNP’s note of dissent on amending Article 70 reserves only two additional areas, beyond confidence votes and finance bills, where the restriction would apply: constitutional amendments and national security. Article 70, when incorporated into the constitution, was not intended to prevent MPs from exercising their freedom of choice—perhaps only once in a parliamentary term—to vote for the person who would hold the country’s highest constitutional office.
Taking away MPs’ freedom to choose the new president obviously raises the question of whether the party lacks confidence in the MPs elected on its ticket to support its nominee. More fundamentally, does the very principle of a secret ballot not strengthen the independence and stature of the office of the president? Ostensibly, as a co-signatory of the charter, presumed winner Mirza Fakhrul would command greater respect, although he may understandably have had no part in the decision to block a free vote.
Undoubtedly, the delay in implementing the July Charter over persistent procedural disputes is not only making the reform agenda uncertain; it is also taking us back towards the very system that we fought, and paid such a huge price, to overthrow.
Kamal Ahmed is consulting editor at The Daily Star. He led the Media Reform Commission under the interim government. His X handle is @ahmedka1.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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