LEADING English-language Ukrainian military news outlet Militarnyi in May reported that Bangladesh and the United States were in final stages of signing strategic defence agreements granting US military access to Bangladeshi ports and airfields. Citing the US Trade representative’s visit to Dhaka in early May, the story noted potential outcome although local media did not carry the news. The agreements in question are the General Security of Military Information Agreement and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement — military information and logistics agreement, in short.
Bangladesh has not yet signed the agreements, but the United States has interests in doing so to enable closer defence ties, advance military sale, information sharing and deep military cooperation. Washington first presented draft GSOMIA in 2012 and ACSA in 2019. By April 2022, talks on the ACSA had reached the third of five stages. The United States has tied the agreements to Bangladesh’s Forces Goal 2030, a long-term military modernisation plan, saying that they would grant access to ‘high-end, American-made equipment.’
In February 2026, the US president Donald Trump in a congratulatory message to Bangladesh’s prime minister urged to take ‘decisive action to complete routine defense agreements’ to access ‘the best equipment in the world.’ Some observers linked this call, along with the signing of Agreement on Reciprocal Trade on February 9 and the visit by the US Trade representative in early May, indicators of final steps before the GSOMIA and the ACSA. The ART reportedly contains a non-disclosure clause and provisions of the agreement remain undisclosed. The US Trade representative’s meeting focused on implementing the terms of the ART, with Trump directly linking trade preferences to signing the defense instruments.
Signing the GSOMIA and the ACSA would mark a turning point in Dhaka’s foreign and defence policy shift. For decades, Bangladesh has avoided formal military alignment, balancing ties with Washington, Beijing and New Delhi. These agreements would end that equidistance. Even logistics and intelligence-sharing agreements would be seen as a de facto tilt towards the US-led order. Thus, Bangladesh could risk pressure from China while receiving non-binding security guarantee from an increasingly transactional United States. Thus, the decision is a fundamental test of whether Bangladesh can navigate between two competing global powers.
For the United States, the GSOMIA and the ACSA are instruments to counter China’s influence on the Indian Ocean. Access to Bangladesh’s maritime infrastructure in the Bay of Bengal would give Washington a logistical access close to critical sea lanes. China, which supplies nearly 80 per cent of Bangladesh’s weapon import, may interpret any such agreement as a strategic pivot towards the United States. India would also watch closely. The US military’s access to logistical infrastructure on its eastern flank could alter the regional balance of power. In such a scenario, New Delhi is most likely to re-calibrate its posture towards Dhaka.
Dhaka’s carefully crafted balancing act states that major defence procurement from the United States is not an immediate priority (UNB, April 12, 2022). At the same time, it could use the negotiations to hedge among the United Staes, China and India, hoping to extract favourable terms (New Age, October 18, 2019).
A transactional ‘America first’ policy, perceptions in the decline of the United States’ global hegemon and China’s gravitational pull suggest that Bangladesh is not simply signing technical agreements, it may be betting its long-term strategic autonomy on a great-power game where its own interests could, at best, be only an afterthought.
If Bangladesh signs the agreements, it could risk calibrated quiet response from Beijing: delays in Belt and Road Initiative funds, informal barriers to apparel manufacturing and exports or constrained military spare parts for Chinese-origin equipment. If it hesitates or walks away, Washington may impose tariff and non-tariff barriers on the ‘single export basket ie ready-made garment,’ suspend joint exercises or brand Bangladesh as unreliable partner. Either path reveals the brittleness of a balanced foreign policy being exercised. Hedging could become strategic entrapment. A small power caught between two super powers, each able to adversely impact non-alignment while offering ‘no binding’ protection. The question is not whether Bangladesh can avoid taking sides but whether it can sign on terms that preserve its own meaningful strategic autonomy.
The United States under the ‘America first’ policy has become a source of economic pressure. In mid-2025, it imposed 35 per ceht tariff on Bangladeshi goods, tied to a ‘China deficit disparity,’ offering market access only as a bargaining chip for defence deals. Dhaka must meet strict conditions to keep a preferential 19 per cent tariff, with the constant threat of a crippling 35 per cent rate. A 10 per cent global baseline tariff further destabilises Bangladesh’s mostly single-tracked export basket (apparel) — a barrier to exercising strategic autonomy. This structural vulnerability makes it impossible to resist such coercion. This is, indeed, economic coercion, not partnership. A US court later struck down Trump’s reciprocal tariff. As with any other country, the burden of that tariff was waived by a court order, but the burden of the terms of the ART remains valid for Bangladesh.
Bangladesh hosts over 1.2 a million Rohingya refugees, with Washington being a primary donor in humanitarian aid. The US National Security Strategy barely mentions South Asia, signalling that humanitarian funding is conditional and vulnerable. From the perspective of the Trump administration’s ‘America first’ policy, Bangladesh is most likely viewed through a transactional lens rather than a long-term strategic partner to be cultivated.
China offers an alternative to the US transactional demands, but not free of risks. It has signed several agreements with Dhaka worth a couple of billion dollars in loans, zero-tariff access for Bangladeshi goods until 2028 and the relocation of light manufacturing. For a nation like Bangladesh grappling with US tariffs, China presents itself as an alternative. Beijing now supplies nearly 80 per cent of Bangladesh’s military hardware.
This interlinked economic and military dependence drew Bangladesh closer to Beijing, with its supply chains and financial stability relying significantly on China’s continued goodwill. An 80 per cent reliance on one source for military hardware is considerable and such a degree of dependence naturally raises questions about the autonomy of national security decisions. Where military supply chains become heavily concentrated, the space for fully independent foreign policy choices may gradually narrow, not by intention, but as a practical reality of dependence. In this context, Bangladesh is long overdue to consider and begin ts own defence industry development.
Bangladesh’s strategic hedging is becoming difficult to sustain. The ‘in-between’ is disappearing. The United States is forging an anti-China bloc, the Quad, with India, Japan and Australia, pressuring Bangladesh, while Beijing embeds Dhaka into its Belt and Road Initiative network. Dhaka risks becoming a passive battleground for geopolitical proxy war rather than an autonomous partner. Bangladesh is rapidly losing control over its fate, perceived as aligning with one bloc while economically chained to the other.
Bangladesh is no longer just navigating a geopolitical crossroads. It is trapped in a minefield where the prizes are trivial but the explosions devastating. The country’s leadership must identify the tools of strategic autonomy for the 21st century. It is not about picking the ‘right ally;’ it is about preventing any single power from holding the keys to survival.
Mohammad Abdur Razzak ([email protected]), a retired commodore of the Bangladesh Navy, is a geopolitical analyst.
