THE national election scheduled for February 12 is fast approaching, with only a few days remaining. Speculation continues over whether a free, fair and credible election can be conducted on time amid a fraught political environment characterised by deep polarisation, sporadic violence, fragile stability and entrenched mistrust. Years of contested elections, marred by allegations of vote rigging, voter suppression, administrative bias and politically motivated violence, have progressively eroded public confidence in the electoral process.
Since the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in July 2024, Bangladesh has been navigating a fluid political transition marked by both opportunities and formidable challenges. The interim administration faces the delicate task of balancing diverse political forces, responding to mounting calls for elections and managing the complex security concerns that have surfaced during the interim government. Its responsibilities are immense: restoring public confidence in politics, rebuilding institutions weakened by years of partisanship and ensuring an election that earns legitimacy both domestically and internationally — each far easier to pledge than to achieve. The election on 12th February thus stands as a pivotal moment in Bangladesh’s political evolution, with consequences likely to resonate well beyond the country’s borders.
The 2024 student uprising and the interim administration’s subsequent ban on the Awami League, a move that has dramatically reshaped the political landscape by removing one of the country’s two dominant parties and creating a vacuum in a system long defined by AL–BNP rivalry. In May 2025, the Election Commission suspended the AL’s registration under the Anti-Terrorism Act, citing its alleged role in violent crackdowns during the uprising and the conviction of Sheikh Hasina. The ban has effectively excluded the party from electoral participation and political activity, dismantled its organisational infrastructure and forced its leadership into exile, incarceration, or concealment. As overt expressions of support for the Awami League have become increasingly associated with the risk of arrest, many of its supporters have withdrawn from formal political engagement or likely redirected their allegiance toward independent or other political parties.
Despite the quagmire, the Awami League’s deep-rooted organisational networks remain remarkably resilient. At the grassroots level, its supporters continue to exert subtle yet significant influence across professional groups, local community structures and student fronts. Although these networks are fragmented, they oscillate between disengagement, quiet resistance and cautious alignment with the present political parties.
Evidence of this resilience surfaced earlier through sporadic, unannounced processions in major cities — often organised without the knowledge of law enforcement, indicating that the AL, though dormant, has still been working covertly in the political landscape. This has become even more pronounced in recent times. Before and after Sheikh Hasina’s conviction, Dhaka and several other districts saw a sharp rise in political violence, including arson attacks on buses, coordinated sabotage and multiple crude-bomb explosions. Dozens of such incidents in the days surrounding the verdict and the announcement of lockdowns created a climate of fear, which authorities believe was driven by groups seeking to destabilise the situation and demonstrate defiance through targeted unrest.
The killing of Sharif Osman Bin Hadi, allegedly by Awami League–linked perpetrators, has had a profound and destabilising impact on both the party’s political standing and the broader national election environment in Bangladesh. The incident has reinforced existing public perceptions of political violence and intolerance, further eroding the AL’s moral legitimacy at a time when it is already weakened by legal sanctions, organisational disarray and leadership absence. The killing has narrowed the space for overt or covert activities for AL’s supporters.
Amid these developments, exiled AL leaders have increasingly turned to social media to mobilise followers. Their messaging blends defiance with implicit threats of confrontation, further complicating an already volatile political atmosphere. Moreover, AL leaders have been denouncing the upcoming national election under the interim government.
Historical voting patterns suggest that roughly 30–35 per cent of the electorate has remained consistently loyal to the Awami League across decades of political fluctuation, forming a durable baseline under normal conditions. Although this support may have declined during the transition, the party has continued to retain a substantive base among the population. Notably, a segment of this electorate constitutes a hardened core whose political allegiance is unlikely to shift to any other party, reflecting a deeply entrenched and resilient loyalty to the AL.
Against this backdrop, the residual political weight of former Awami League supporters is likely to emerge as a decisive factor in the 2026 national election. Although currently lacking an official party platform around which to mobilise, their collective electoral presence retains the capacity to shape outcomes, particularly in closely contested constituencies. While some may choose to abstain from voting as a form of silent political protest, others are expected to align themselves with parties or individual candidates perceived to uphold values and attitudes associated with the AL.
For many AL supporters, however, voting preferences are increasingly driven by pragmatic concerns rather than ideological loyalty. Chief among these is the expectation of personal safety and protection from political harassment or intimidation. Above all, they seek reassurance that they will be able to live in peace and security, irrespective of which party ultimately forms the government. Acknowledging this electoral reality, leading contenders have moved to appeal to Awami League voters. While both the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami retain their own committed voter bases, the electoral behaviour of former AL supporters may ultimately prove decisive in determining vote margins and shaping the outcome of the national election.
Bangladesh Nationalist Party
Since the ban on the Awami League, Bangladesh’s political landscape has been left with a significant vacuum. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party, now the largest political force in the field, is widely expected to emerge as a dominant contender in the upcoming national election. The party seeks to consolidate its position by forming alliances with centrist and like-minded groups while maintaining a deliberate distance from Jamaat-e-Islami. After years of marginalisation and electoral exclusion, the BNP now perceives a renewed opportunity to reassert itself as a major political actor. Despite enduring systematic repression during the previous regime, the party has largely remained united. Its current emphasis on institutional reform, electoral transparency and governance accountability has strengthened its standing as the principal mainstream opposition. However, the BNP continues to face challenges related to alliance management and internal cohesion.
The death of Khaleda Zia, long-time BNP leader and a central figure in Bangladesh’s polarised politics, marks the close of a defining political era and introduces emotional weight into the current electoral landscape. Her decades-long rivalry with the Awami League shaped the country’s two-party dominance and while her passing at 80 elevates her as a powerful symbol for supporters, evident in widespread public mourning, it also leaves the BNP without its most iconic leader. At the same time, Tarique Rahman’s return after 17 years in exile has reopened the possibility of consolidating the BNP’s leadership around a figure closely associated with party continuity, raising expectations among loyalists for a revival of the party’s national relevance under his stewardship. His homecoming, coming soon after Khaleda Zia’s death, has emerged as a focal point of hope, energising core BNP constituencies and framing the election as a struggle to preserve her political legacy. Together, Zia’s passing and Rahman’s re-emergence have deepened emotional fault lines, reinforced political identity and sharpened competing narratives about Bangladesh’s democratic future.
Jamaat-e-Islami
MEANWHILE, the Jamaat-e-Islami, having regained registration, has sought to rebrand itself as a moderate Islamist force, forming coalitions with other smaller parties to broaden its base. The recent landslide victories of Islami Chhatra Shibir, the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, in the student union election at major public universities, have sent a powerful signal about the shifting dynamics of Bangladesh’s political landscape ahead of the national election. After years of organisational dormancy and political marginalisation, Shibir’s resurgence on major university campuses underscores its deep-rooted network, disciplined structure and ability to mobilise young voters around issues of governance, justice and Islamic values. These victories not only rejuvenate Jamaat-e-Islami’s political relevance but also position it as a potential influencer in shaping alliances and voter sentiment in the forthcoming polls. The outcome has raised concern among secular and centrist parties, particularly the BNP, which now faces the strategic dilemma of whether to maintain its distance from Jamaat or to engage in tactical coordination to consolidate the opposition vote. Overall, the Shibir triumph reflects a growing undercurrent of ideological realignment among the youth, which could significantly impact the trajectory of national politics in the months ahead. Some political analysts argue that this has no impact on the national election, though there is likely an increase in voters.
National Citizen Party
THE National Citizen Party, launched in February 2025 in the aftermath of the July 2024 uprising, emerged as Bangladesh’s first student-led, youth-driven political alternative seeking to transcend the traditional BNP–Awami League divide through a centrist, reformist and citizen-focused agenda. Drawing support from young activists, civil society and professionals, it initially symbolised a generational shift toward transparency, accountability and institutional reform. However, as the election approaches, the party has fallen into serious disarray, with key leaders defecting to the BNP–Jamaat alliance and others resigning, exposing ideological ambiguity, organisational weakness and strategic confusion. As a result, the NCP’s identity and credibility have eroded, leaving it politically adrift, weakening its ability to influence the national election and making it appear less as a transformative new force than as another party ensnared in Bangladesh’s conventional power politics. On the other hand, the Jatiya Party has grappled with internal divisions and shifting alliances and, following the fall of Sheikh Hasina, has plunged into a deep existential crisis.
At the grassroots level, Bangladesh’s politics is shaped by unwavering loyalty to party leadership, entrenched patronage networks and the strategic mobilisation of partisan muscle power. State institutions, including segments of the security forces and the civil administration, have, over the decades, often been used as tools to serve the interests of the ruling party, a pattern repeatedly documented by both domestic media and international observers, such as the EU Election Observation Missions. Political activity on the ground is heavily influenced by the operations of student, youth, labour and local party wings, which frequently act as enforcers during election campaigns and in the resolution—or escalation—of everyday governance disputes. Unlike before, this election may follow a different trajectory.
As Bangladesh approaches the 2026 national election, the country stands at a critical yet promising juncture. Despite political fragmentation, leadership transitions and lingering mistrust, the election offers an opportunity to restore institutional credibility and rebuild public confidence in democratic processes. The evolving roles of major political actors and the pragmatic engagement of voters signal a possible shift toward stability over confrontation. If conducted with restraint, freely, fairly and with respect for electoral integrity, the 2026 election can mark a meaningful step toward political renewal — laying the groundwork for a more participatory, accountable and resilient democratic future for Bangladesh.
Dr Md Motiar Rahman is a retired additional inspector general of police.
