West Asia may be entering one of its most consequential geopolitical transformations in decades. On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, under which an armed attack on one signatory would be regarded as an attack on all three. The agreement is significant not only because of the military capabilities of its members, but because it reflects a broader regional instinct: West Asian powers increasingly want greater control over their own security rather than relying entirely on the US. The precise obligations under the pact, however, remain unclear, making predictions of an entirely new regional order premature.
Saudi Political Scientist Nawaf Obaid described this transformation in Al Jazeera as the beginning of a “post-American Middle East.” The phrase is provocative, but it should not be interpreted as the disappearance of the US from the region. American military capabilities, technology, investment, diplomatic relationships, and political influence will remain substantial. What appears to be changing is something more subtle: Washington may no longer be the unquestioned organiser of regional security. And for Bangladesh, that distinction matters enormously.
A lot of the time, any development in West Asia is viewed in Dhaka primarily through the prism of Palestine, great-power rivalry, or ideological affinity. But for Bangladesh, West Asia is also an economic neighbourhood. Changes in Gulf security can quickly reach Bangladeshi households through remittances, employment, energy prices, shipping costs, and inflation.
Consider migration. Bangladesh’s overseas employment data is regularly published by the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET). The concentration of Bangladeshi workers in Gulf countries highlights the strategic importance of regional stability. The importance of these workers is equally visible in remittance flows. Country-wise remittance data are published by the Bangladesh Bank. These figures demonstrate how strongly Bangladesh’s external economic stability is connected with migrant workers abroad. This means that instability in the Gulf is not distant geopolitics for Bangladesh. It can become a household-income problem almost immediately. Energy presents another vulnerability. The conflict surrounding Iran and disruptions affecting the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated how quickly geopolitical shocks can disturb global oil and LNG markets. Bangladesh’s growing dependence on imported energy makes such disruptions particularly consequential.
The appropriate Bangladeshi response, therefore, should not be to decide whether a Saudi-Türkiye-Pakistan alignment is “good” or “bad.” Nor should Dhaka rush to interpret regional politics through religious solidarity alone. Bangladesh’s interests require something more pragmatic. The priority should be strategic diversification.
Bangladesh should deepen its relationships with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the Gulf states while preserving productive relations with the United States and other major partners. The emergence of new centres of power makes diplomatic flexibility more valuable, not less. A changing international order rewards countries capable of maintaining multiple partnerships without becoming unnecessarily entangled in rival blocs.
Second, Dhaka should transform its Gulf diplomacy from predominantly labour-export diplomacy into broader economic diplomacy. Bangladesh sends large numbers of workers to the region, but the Gulf economies themselves are changing rapidly. Saudi Arabia, for example, is pursuing economic transformation through Vision 2030, which emphasises investment, technology, tourism, and economic diversification.
Bangladesh should increasingly negotiate for skilled employment, professional mobility, investment partnerships, and technology cooperation rather than remaining disproportionately dependent on low-skilled labour markets.
Third, the latest crisis should accelerate Bangladesh’s search for energy resilience. No diplomacy can eliminate the risks associated with excessive dependence on vulnerable external supply routes. Greater renewable-energy capacity, diversified LNG, and petroleum sourcing, improved storage, and stronger regional electricity cooperation should therefore be understood not merely as economic or environmental policies but as elements of national security.
Finally, Bangladesh should avoid interpreting the emerging West Asian order through sectarian categories. Regional stability will ultimately require accommodation among Saudi Arabia, Iran, Türkiye, the Gulf states and other actors—not permanent confrontation between competing camps. Furthermore, Bangladesh has little to gain from importing West Asian rivalries into its own foreign policy. Its comparative advantage lies in maintaining dialogue with competing powers while focusing on economic security, migrant welfare, and multilateral diplomacy.
So, a post-American West Asia may ultimately prove too dramatic. America is unlikely to disappear from the region, just as China, Russia, or any single regional power is unlikely to replace it. What appears more plausible is a post-unipolar West Asia, one in which regional states possess greater agency and several centres of power coexist. For Bangladesh, that world creates both uncertainty and opportunity.
Hamidur Rashid Jamil is an MPhil researcher at the University of Dhaka.
