THE effectiveness of labour legislation rests not only on its intent but on the clarity and internal coherence of its definitions. In Bangladesh, the regulatory framework governing child labour under the Bangladesh Labour Act 2006 is weakened by persistent age-related ambiguities and structural contradictions. These inconsistencies dilute institutional accountability, generate legal uncertainty and create room for exploitation, ultimately undermining both domestic child protection objectives and Bangladesh’s international commitments.
A fundamental inconsistency arises from the definition of “child” itself. Section 2(63) of the Labour Act defines a child as a person who has not attained the age of fourteen. This stands in direct conflict with Section 4 of the Children Act 2013, which recognises every person below eighteen as a child. The latter reflects Bangladesh’s obligations under Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which defines a child as any human being below the age of eighteen unless majority is attained earlier under domestic law. Contemporary scientific research reinforces this standard, showing that neurological development related to judgement, impulse control and decision-making continues into late adolescence. The international adoption of eighteen as the threshold of childhood reflects not cultural arbitrariness but a principled commitment to the best interests of the child.
Domestic private law further consolidates this position. Section 11 of the Contract Act 1872 makes contractual capacity conditional on attaining majority, while Section 4 of the Majority Act 1875 provides that a person domiciled in Bangladesh reaches majority upon completing eighteen years of age. Taken together, these provisions establish a clear legal principle: individuals below eighteen lack the capacity to enter binding contracts. This coherence is disrupted by the Labour Act. While Section 35 prohibits parents or guardians from entering agreements permitting a child’s employment, Section 34 allows adolescents — defined as those aged fourteen to under eighteen — to work under specified conditions. In effect, the Act permits minors to enter employment relationships, which are contractual in nature, before they attain legal majority. This contradiction exposes children to contractual obligations without full legal capacity and places the Labour Act at odds with both the Contract Act and the Majority Act. A harmonised definition of ‘child’ is therefore essential to ensure legal consistency and meaningful protection.
A further weakness lies in the treatment of hazardous work. Although Section 39 empowers the government to declare hazardous occupations through gazette notifications, the Act itself contains no general definition of what constitutes ‘hazardous work’. This omission undermines interpretation and enforcement, leaving employers, inspectors and courts without a guiding standard. A statutory definition encompassing work involving physical danger, exposure to harmful substances, or unsafe environments would provide a necessary baseline, to be supplemented by periodically updated notifications. UNICEF data indicating that around seven per cent of children aged five to seventeen are engaged in child labour, often in hazardous conditions, underscores the urgency of closing this definitional gap.
Similar ambiguity surrounds the concept of ‘light work’. Section 44 permits children aged twelve and above to engage in light work provided it does not harm their health, development or education. Yet the Act offers no guidance on what qualifies as light work. In the absence of clear criteria, tasks that appear simple may in practice be physically taxing or developmentally harmful. This vagueness enables exploitation and renders enforcement largely discretionary. Clear parameters relating to permissible tasks, working hours and conditions are necessary to ensure that light work does not become a legalised pathway into child labour.
The Act also fails to recognise tea plantation workers as a distinct category, despite the sector’s unique vulnerabilities. While certain professions, such as working journalists, receive specific legal recognition due to the nature of their work, tea plantation workers — among whom child labour remains prevalent — are subsumed under general classifications. Tea plantation labour is characterised by harsh working conditions, low wages and routine exposure to physical risk. Recognising this sector as a specialised category would allow for tailored protections, targeted inspections and sector-specific welfare measures, addressing entrenched patterns of exploitation more effectively.
Definitional gaps persist in the Act’s treatment of ‘workers’ more broadly. Section 2(65) excludes individuals employed mainly in managerial, administrative or supervisory roles. This creates a grey zone for lower-level assistants or helpers who perform supervisory functions in name but remain economically vulnerable. Such exclusions risk denying legal protection to workers, including children, engaged in informal or auxiliary roles. These ambiguities undermine the Act’s stated objective of comprehensive labour protection.
Structural inconsistencies within the Act further weaken its protective intent. Chapter III is titled ‘Employment of Adolescent’, despite Sections 34, 35 and 44 explicitly addressing child employment. The omission of “child” from the chapter title diminishes the visibility of child labour regulation and downplays its importance. Given the national and international significance of child labour as a rights issue, the chapter should explicitly acknowledge both child and adolescent workers.
A particularly troubling contradiction arises between the Act’s categorical prohibition of child labour and its conditional allowances. Section 34(1) imposes an absolute ban on employing children under fourteen in any occupation. Yet Section 44(2) applies provisions relating to adolescent workers mutatis mutandis to child workers and handicapped workers. This creates confusion by simultaneously prohibiting and conditionally permitting child labour. The undefined notion of light work exacerbates this tension and places the Act at odds with international standards that strongly discourage any form of child labour.
Enforcement challenges are further compounded by weaknesses in age verification. UNICEF estimates that birth registration coverage in Bangladesh stands at only fifty-six per cent. Section 36 of the Labour Act resolves age disputes through birth certificates, school records or medical certificates. In practice, the absence of reliable documentation allows employers to misclassify underage children as adolescents, circumventing legal safeguards.
The risk of manipulation is heightened by the medical certification process. Section 37(3) requires employers to bear the cost of fitness certificates for adolescent workers. While intended to ease the financial burden on families, this arrangement creates opportunities for undue influence over medical practitioners, undermining the credibility of certification and weakening protections against child labour.
Taken together, these age-related ambiguities, definitional loopholes and internal contradictions significantly impair the Bangladesh Labour Act 2006’s capacity to safeguard children’s rights to health, education and development. Inconsistent age thresholds and vague terminology erode accountability and facilitate exploitation. Addressing these deficiencies through harmonised definitions, clearer statutory standards and strengthened enforcement is not merely a matter of legislative refinement. It is an urgent necessity to restore the Act’s protective purpose and ensure that child labour regulation reflects both legal coherence and moral responsibility.
Hafsa Sadia is a student of law at Bangladesh University of Professionals.
