Of the 133 ordinances promulgated during the tenure of the interim government, the BNP government made 97 ordinances into law without changes, while 13 ordinances were decided to be enacted into law with amendments. The remaining 16 ordinances, including the National Human Rights Commission Ordinance, lapsed. The lapse triggered an outcry, as many believed that the ordinance drafted by the interim government was robust enough to lay the foundation for a truly independent and effective commission free from government influence. The government, however, had promised to make it even better after necessary review and scrutiny. But the draft National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Act, 2026, which the Cabinet approved last week, was as good as reenacting the NHRC Act 2009 and setting the stage for a weak and toothless commission, lacking structural independence and investigative powers.
While the draft NHRC Act, 2026 proposes establishing a National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) unit to prevent custodial torture, deaths and enforced disappearances and enables the NHRC to issue orders to ensure effective investigations, it significantly restricts the commission's ability to independently investigate allegations against members of disciplined forces. The NHRC Ordinance, 2025 sought to empower the commission to directly investigate and inquire into allegations of human rights violations involving law enforcement agencies and government authorities. The draft NHRC Act, 2026, however, retains Section 18 of the NHRC Act, 2009, which prevents the commission from independently investigating members of disciplined forces and higher authorities. In such cases, it can only seek reports from the government or the chiefs of the forces concerned.
Such restrictions of human rights commission's jurisdiction is of grave concern given that law enforcement agencies and intelligence services in Bangladesh have a history of perpetrating gross human rights violations, including enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture and running secret detention centers. Investigations into such grave violation of human rights cases are to be conducted by the police, as per Enforced Disappearance Prevention and Redress Act, 2026. But it poses a serious conflict of interest as many of the accused in such cases are themselves members of police.
As Transparency International Bangladesh has rightly pointed out, expecting a junior official to investigate allegations against a senior official is unlikely to ensure an impartial or independent inquiry, particularly within a rigid hierarchical structure. Officials may be reluctant to expose wrongdoing by their colleagues, report misconduct or pursue allegations against powerful superiors. Such institutional pressures can be further compounded by political influence and administrative pressure from senior officials in the executive branch, creating a strong incentive to shield those accused of wrongdoing. Assigning the investigation of allegations against police or security personnel to the police themselves therefore carries an inherent risk that serious cases will be suppressed rather than properly investigated.
The limitations of the existing legal framework were evident during the tenure of the Awami League government, when the NHRC was unable to take any meaningful or visible action against widespread human rights violations, largely because its jurisdiction was restricted. Repeating the same structural weaknesses of the previous law in a new one undermines the very purpose of reform.
The proposed law also backtracks on another important safeguard contained in the 2025 ordinance: the composition of the commission itself. The ordinance envisaged a broader and more diverse body, headed by an Appellate Division judge appointed by the Chief Justice and comprising representatives from the government, parliament, academia, human rights organisations, the media and marginalised communities. The new draft, however, proposes a selection mechanism that risks giving the government disproportionate influence over the appointment of commissioners. A human rights watchdog cannot be expected to hold the government accountable if its own leadership remains dependent on the government.
Given these limitations, it seems unlikely that the commission will be able to secure the international accreditation required for a national human rights institution to receive full recognition and credibility. The government must reconsider the draft law and ensure that the NHRC has genuine structural independence to investigate allegations against security forces and public officials without government interference. Anything less would risk turning the commission into an institution that exists on paper but remains powerless to protect human rights.
