On 24 May, loudspeakers crackled across the paddy fields of Brahmanbaria as dusk settled. Residents were told to stay alert. Report suspicious movements. Watch the riverbanks.

It was an unusual instruction for a border that has long been defined by its permeability — by history, by family, by labour. But Border Guard Bangladesh’s public awareness campaign in the frontier villages of Brahmanbaria was a direct response to the new political reality unfolding on the other side.

In West Bengal, a new BJP government had just taken power with a single dominant message: detect, delete, deport. Within days, authorities began setting up holding centres and intensifying enforcement, triggering panic among people lacking proper identification documents.

By late May, hundreds of people had gathered at key crossing points such as the Hakimpur checkpoint in North 24 Parganas, with reports of long queues as they attempted to “return” to Bangladesh.

The seismic shift in West Bengal

For years, the most significant structural obstacle to India’s anti-immigration agenda along the Bangladesh border was West Bengal. Under Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress government, the state repeatedly clashed with the Centre — refusing to hand over land to the Border Security Force for fencing, declining to implement the National Register of Citizens, and publicly rejecting what Banerjee described as the criminalisation of Bengali-speaking people.

The human cost is already well documented. In late 2025, Bangladeshi authorities recovered 14 people in Chuadanga who claimed to be residents of Odisha, not Bangladesh. They alleged that Indian police had confiscated their Aadhaar cards and ration documents before forcing them across the border.

That friction is now gone.

On 4 May, the Bharatiya Janata Party swept the West Bengal Assembly elections, securing 207 of 294 seats and ending fifteen years of TMC rule. On 9 May, Suvendu Adhikari — the former TMC leader-turned-BJP strongman who had campaigned vigorously on driving out “infiltrators” — was sworn in as the state’s first-ever BJP Chief Minister at Brigade Parade Ground in Kolkata. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah attended the ceremony, signalling strong central backing for the new regime.

The pace of change that followed was striking.

In its very first cabinet meeting, the Adhikari government committed to transferring land to the BSF for border fencing within 45 days — a move the previous administration had resisted for over a decade. Progress was swift: by 20 May, land for a 27-kilometre stretch had been handed over. By 27 May, the total had reached 142.79 acres, with work on outposts and barbed-wire fencing already underway. The government also transferred over 120 hectares in the strategically vital Siliguri Corridor to the Centre.

Simultaneously, all 23 district magistrates were directed to establish holding centres for suspected undocumented migrants on 24 May. Within a week, at least 386 detainees were being held across 13 such centres in eight border districts.

Unlike Assam, where suspected foreigners are supposed to be produced before Foreigners’ Tribunals, West Bengal’s new policy reportedly bypasses court proceedings for many detainees prior to deportation. Chief Minister Adhikari was explicit: those falling outside the purview of the Citizenship Amendment Act “will be treated as infiltrators” and handed over to the BSF.

Bangladesh’s response

Remarkably, Bangladesh has not remained passive.

At the operational level, the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) acted swiftly. The 60th Battalion launched public awareness campaigns using loudspeakers in frontier villages of Brahmanbaria district, urging residents to report suspicious movements and stay vigilant along riverbanks. Patrols were intensified across multiple sectors, and intelligence monitoring was expanded.

In a notable incident at the Sadipur border in Benapole on 31 May, 2026, BGB personnel foiled an alleged attempt by members of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) to push 13 people — including women and children — into Bangladesh by opening a section of the border fence. The BGB immediately placed the entire border on maximum alert. A flag meeting was held, but no immediate resolution was reached, leaving the stranded individuals in no-man’s land.

According to BGB data, 2,479 people were pushed into Bangladesh from India during the eight-month period from 7 May last year to 26 January this year. Not all were Bangladeshi nationals; at least 120 were later identified as Indian citizens, while some were also Rohingya refugees. Bangladeshi authorities have protested such instances, describing them as violations of bilateral border management agreements and international human rights norms.

On 12 May, 2025 Bangladesh sent a detailed diplomatic note to New Delhi, reaffirming that it has consistently repatriated verified Bangladeshi nationals through formal channels. The note highlighted India’s own delays — including restricted consular access to jails, name mismatches on deportation lists, and procedural lapses — as key contributors to the backlog of 2,868 unresolved nationality verification cases cited by India’s Ministry of External Affairs.

In response to the recent push-in attempts, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shama Obaed was categorical: “We will in no way accept push-ins of people.” She reminded New Delhi of assurances given after the West Bengal elections that further push-ins would not occur — a commitment Dhaka is now publicly holding India to. “If not,” she warned, “we will discuss it at a political and diplomatic level.”

The broader stakes

To grasp the full significance of this border crisis, it is essential to look beyond day-to-day operations and examine the deeper structural forces at play.

First, there is the political economy of push-ins. India’s shift from judicial deportation to administrative “pushbacks” — formalised under the Immigration and Foreigners Act 2025 — was deliberately designed to be faster, cheaper, and less accountable than court-supervised repatriation. With no FIR, no court hearing, and often no proper nationality verification, the system carries an inherent risk of error. Those errors are effectively exported to Bangladesh.

The people most at risk — and the hardest to assist — are those trapped in legal limbo, unable to prove their nationality on either side. Take 20-year-old Abdul Sheikh, for instance. Born in Kolkata to Bangladeshi parents, he holds no valid documents for either country. He represents tens of thousands in similar situations: neither readily deportable under Bangladesh’s rules nor protected under India’s. For them, the crisis offers no clear bureaucratic exit.

The human cost is already well documented. In late 2025, Bangladeshi authorities recovered 14 people in Chuadanga who claimed to be residents of Odisha, not Bangladesh. They alleged that Indian police had confiscated their Aadhaar cards and ration documents before forcing them across the border.

Even more emblematic is the case of Amina Begum, a 68-year-old woman from Barpeta, Assam. Despite her entire family being recognised as Indian citizens, she was declared a foreigner by a tribunal and pushed into Bangladesh under cover of night. A year later, she struggles to walk without support and lives in constant fear of rearrest. Her story is not an outlier — it is symptomatic of a systemic issue.

Second, there is the question of whom this crisis truly serves politically and whom it harms structurally. The BJP’s “Bangladeshi infiltrators” rhetoric has been explicitly framed around religious identity. Undocumented Hindu migrants are often treated as refugees eligible for protection under the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), while Muslim migrants are labelled infiltrators subject to deportation. Thus, this is less about neutral border management and more about demographic politics — with Bangladesh positioned as the pressure valve.

Third, there is the regional and geographical dimension. The India–Bangladesh border stretches over 4,000 kilometres, weaving through rivers, farmland, and densely populated villages. Roughly 860 kilometres remain unfenced. The new West Bengal government is now aggressively pursuing border fencing, handing over land that the previous TMC administration had withheld for more than a decade. Bangladesh has objected, citing the 1975 bilateral border guidelines, which prohibit defence structures within 150 yards of the boundary. The fencing issue alone holds the potential for prolonged confrontation along the frontier.

What will really happen at the border?

In the near term, pressure along the border is likely to intensify before any easing occurs.

The new West Bengal government has made clear its intention to escalate enforcement. Home Minister Amit Shah is expected to visit the state’s border districts in June to review security arrangements personally. Holding centres are being rapidly expanded, and there are active discussions in Indian political circles about bypassing these centres altogether and directly handing over detainees to the BSF for immediate transfer. Such a move would eliminate virtually all remaining administrative safeguards.

On the Bangladeshi side, the BGB has signalled that it will continue to physically resist push-in attempts, as it has already done on multiple occasions. However, guarding every stretch of the 4,000-kilometre border is practically impossible — particularly along riverine sections where, as one BSF official admitted to AFP, “it is not difficult to cross”. The likely outcome is a persistent cycle of attempted push-ins: some foiled at the fence, others slipping through, with each incident adding to the growing tally of diplomatic protests and grievances.

The people most at risk — and the hardest to assist — are those trapped in legal limbo, unable to prove their nationality on either side. Take 20-year-old Abdul Sheikh, for instance. Born in Kolkata to Bangladeshi parents, he holds no valid documents for either country. He represents tens of thousands in similar situations: neither readily deportable under Bangladesh’s rules nor protected under India’s. For them, the crisis offers no clear bureaucratic exit.

The June 8–11 talks: What to expect

The 57th Director General-level BGB-BSF conference, scheduled for 8–11 June in New Delhi, comes at a particularly critical juncture. It is the first such meeting since Bangladesh’s new BNP government under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman took office in February, and the first since the BJP strengthened its hold across India’s eastern border states.

Dhaka is sending a high-powered 15-member delegation — unusually heavyweight for a routine border management meeting. Alongside senior BGB officers, the team includes representatives from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministries of Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Shipping, the Land Survey Department, and the Joint Rivers Commission. The composition signals that Bangladesh intends to raise issues that go well beyond standard border security matters.

The formal agenda includes border fencing, cross-border crimes, and the handover of irregular migrants. However, three issues are expected to dominate Bangladesh’s interventions.

The first is push-ins. Bangladesh will press India to commit to formal, bilaterally agreed repatriation procedures — rejecting court-bypassing tactics, overnight forced crossings, and deportees left stranded in no-man’s land. Given India’s clear preference for administrative speed over judicial oversight, a binding commitment is unlikely. Still, the language in the joint record of discussions (to be signed on 11 June) will be important. A firm reaffirmation of existing bilateral protocols could at least create a useful diplomatic paper trail.

None of this will be quick or guaranteed. But the alternative — a hardening border defined by fear, loudspeakers, and midnight river crossings — is a crisis destined to outlast any election cycle.

The second issue is border killings. Rights group Ain O Salish Kendra documented at least four Bangladeshis killed by BSF firing in the first four months of 2026. Meanwhile, Manabadhikar Shongskriti Foundation reported that in May alone, four Bangladeshis were killed by the BSF — three by gunfire and one through torture. It also recorded the recovery of the bodies of a fisherman and an unidentified woman, as well as the stabbing death of a young man near the frontier, bringing the total number of Bangladesh–India border-related deaths in May to seven. Between 2009 and 2023, the total number of Bangladeshi fatalities along the border stood at 594. The BGB has stated that it will “strongly raise” the issue. Past DG-level meetings have repeatedly produced commitments to reduce such incidents, yet measurable progress has been limited.

The third is the longstanding nationality verification backlog. While India’s Ministry of External Affairs claims that Bangladesh has failed to provide an “actionable response” to 2,868 pending cases since September 2020, Bangladesh, as noted earlier, has its own counterargument. Both sides agree that a lasting solution requires a joint verification mechanism with clear timelines, but neither has yet put forward a concrete proposal.

The talks are expected to end with a measured joint statement affirming cooperation, pledging to reduce killings, and reiterating commitment to formal repatriation channels. Whether these words translate into meaningful changes on the ground — especially in West Bengal — will ultimately depend on political will in New Delhi, which has so far been conspicuously absent.

Is there a solution in sight?

The honest answer is that a solution is not imminent.

India’s sharpened domestic migration politics, now energised by the BJP’s sweeping victory in Bengal, and the absence of a comprehensive bilateral repatriation framework with clear legal safeguards and verification procedures are major hurdles to a solution.

On the Indian side, the incentives point away from compromise. The “detect, delete, deport” slogan was never mere campaign rhetoric — it has become active policy in West Bengal, Assam, and at the Centre.

On the Bangladeshi side, the new BNP government under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has displayed greater resolve than its predecessor. Still, it must also manage a delicate reset in relations with New Delhi. Dhaka seeks practical cooperation on trade, water-sharing, transit, and the Teesta River. Escalating the migration issue into open confrontation could jeopardise these broader interests. Bangladesh’s carefully calibrated response — firm in principle, measured in tone — reflects the tightrope it is walking.

Nevertheless, a narrow path to partial resolution does exist. It rests on three essential steps.

First, the establishment of a jointly agreed nationality verification mechanism with clear, fixed timelines. This would allow the backlog of cases to be cleared systematically and prevent new cases from piling up. It is technically feasible and would deliver verified repatriations for India while providing procedural protections for Bangladesh.

Second, a formal bilateral protocol — preferably elevated to a binding agreement — that prohibits pushbacks that bypass judicial processes. India’s own Supreme Court has ruled that deportations require proper legal oversight. Leveraging this through sustained diplomatic pressure and international attention remains Bangladesh’s strongest source of leverage.

Third, consistent international engagement. Organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and UN human rights experts have already criticised India’s deportation practices. Sustained global scrutiny, including at forums in Geneva, can impose reputational costs that bilateral talks alone cannot achieve.

None of this will be quick or guaranteed. But the alternative — a hardening border defined by fear, loudspeakers, and midnight river crossings — is a crisis destined to outlast any election cycle.

However, the upcoming talks in New Delhi represent a significant opportunity for Bangladesh — perhaps the best in years. Whether India is prepared to listen is the question that the 8–11 June talks will begin to answer.

Jannatul Naym Pieal is a Dhaka-based writer, researcher and journalist. He can be reached at [email protected].

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