Perhaps the most striking, and largely unforeseen, consequence of the fall of the Hasina government has been the surge in support for Jamaat-e-Islami over the past 18 months. The Islamist party’s rise has been so dramatic that, although recent polling suggests the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is likely to secure a majority in the February 12 election, some commentators argue that the Jamaat-led alliance could still emerge victorious.
The scale of this shift should not be underestimated. During Awami League’s final years in power, Jamaat was so marginalised and repressed that it could barely function as a political organisation: many of its senior leaders were imprisoned, and the party operated under severe constraints, effectively in secret. Historically, Jamaat had never been a mass electoral force. In the series of elections following the fall of General Ershad, its vote share never exceeded 12 percent, with its high-water mark coming in 1991. Layered on top of this was the heavy stigma attached to Jamaat since Bangladesh’s founding, owing to its association with forces that supported the Pakistani military during the 1971 war of independence and allegations of serious international crimes.
Against this backdrop, Jamaat’s current momentum is remarkable. So, without suggesting that the party should be supported—or overlooking the legitimate criticisms one may have of Jamaat—how can one explain its meteoric rise? Below are eight possible factors, presented in no particular order:
Jamaat has not entirely escaped its past. It is still, at times, forced to defend its position regarding 1971, and rival parties continue to invoke the issue. Yet there is little doubt that, for a large portion of the electorate, Jamaat’s role during the Liberation War is no longer politically disqualifying.
Several factors may help explain this shift. First, the senior Jamaat figures accused of involvement in 1971-era crimes were convicted and executed during Awami League’s time in office, leaving the current leadership without direct links to those events. Second, the collapse of Awami League has significantly weakened the potency of its long-standing political narratives, one of which centred on repeatedly invoking Jamaat’s alleged war-crimes legacy. Third, for a growing and increasingly influential younger demographic, 1971 feels distant, abstract, and less relevant to their immediate political and economic concerns.
Perhaps the most commonly cited explanation for Jamaat’s growing appeal is its perceived distance from corruption. When the Hasina government fell, many Bangladeshis hoped this would mark the end of systematic extortion and rent-seeking by ruling-party activists at the local level. Yet since August 2024, many of the extortion networks previously controlled by Awami League cadres were quickly taken over by BNP-aligned groups. For a section of voters seeking genuine change, this reinforced the belief that BNP was, in practice, little different from its predecessor.
Jamaat, to them, stood apart. There were no widespread reports of Jamaat-run extortion rackets or organised corruption at the grassroots. This distinction, in their mind, reflects a deeper structural difference. Many local BNP activists apparently support the party in the expectation that access to power will bring financial opportunity. Jamaat activists, by contrast, apparently contribute money to the party rather than extracting it. Their political participation is not framed as a route to personal enrichment, and this perceived difference may have resonated powerfully with some disillusioned voters.
Following the fall of Awami League, hundreds of families were grieving lost relatives, and thousands more were caring for those seriously injured. Jamaat mobilised systematically to identify these families and, where possible, provide direct assistance—reportedly giving at least Tk 100,000 to each bereaved household and financial support to many of the injured, often through hospital visits.
While individual BNP politicians did offer aid in some cases, their efforts were neither as extensive nor as coordinated. Jamaat’s response reinforced its image as a disciplined organisation capable of translating its resources into tangible support. This form of welfare politics—charitable, visible, and organised—has long been a cornerstone of Jamaat’s strategy, and it continues to generate significant political goodwill.
Jamaat has benefited from its organisational strength. Almost immediately after the fall of Awami League, it began preparing in earnest for elections. Its disciplined internal structure has translated into more effective campaigning, particularly at the local level. Jamaat has invested heavily in face-to-face voter engagement, including extensive door-to-door outreach in rural areas—an approach that may well be more persuasive than large rallies or media-driven campaigns.
Jamaat-e-Islami is, at its core, an Islamist party committed to the long-term goal of introducing Islamic law in Bangladesh. In recent years, however, the party has deliberately sought to project a more moderate and centrist image. Rather than foregrounding its religious agenda, it has emphasised practical reforms, particularly anti-corruption measures, institutional accountability, and improvements in governance.
A striking illustration of this repositioning was provided by a speech delivered by the party’s leader, Shafiqur Rahman, at its Policy Summit in January 2026, titled “Aspiring Bangladesh.” Notably, the speech did not reference religion at all. Instead, Rahman described Jamaat as representing “mainstream Muslim democrats,” framing the party in terms that stress democratic legitimacy rather than theological ambition.
While the address may have been crafted partly with an international audience in mind, including foreign diplomats, it also reflects a broader strategic shift in how Jamaat presents itself domestically. Whether or not one finds this rebranding fully credible, it has undoubtedly helped the party broaden its appeal, particularly among urban and younger voters who might otherwise be instinctively wary of supporting a religious party.
The decision by the interim government and the Election Commission to bar Awami League from participating in the election may have also worked in Jamaat’s favour. Historically, when Awami League is on the ballot, Jamaat either contests independently or forms an alliance with BNP. If it runs separately, most of the anti-Awami League vote consolidates behind BNP. If it allies with BNP, Jamaat typically contests only a limited number of seats.
In the absence of Awami League, however, the dynamics change significantly. Voters who previously supported BNP primarily to prevent an Awami League victory may now feel freer to support Jamaat, without concern that their vote could inadvertently help bring Awami League back to power.
During Awami League’s time in office, anti-Indian sentiment grew steadily in Bangladesh. This was driven by several factors, including border killings, inflammatory rhetoric from Indian political figures about Bangladeshis, and the perception that the Indian government strongly supported Awami League. When the Awami League government fell in 2024 and Sheikh Hasina departed for India, public anger towards perceived Indian “hegemony” intensified, with many people feeling more able to express such views openly.
In this context, Jamaat is likely to be viewed by some voters as a more credible force in resisting perceived Indian influence than BNP, which is often regarded as more pragmatic in its approach to India and less instinctively confrontational. As a result, Jamaat may attract additional support from those for whom opposition to Indian influence has become a central political concern.
Following the fall of Awami League, there was a widespread public desire for change—change from autocracy, entrenched corruption, and what many described as the country’s “tired old politics.” In a political contest between BNP and Jamaat, it is Jamaat that, for some voters, is likely to more convincingly embody that sense of renewal.
Jamaat is often viewed as an outsider party, not deeply embedded in the patronage and corruption networks that many believe dominate the political system. Its leadership is not drawn from a dynastic political lineage, which further reinforces its image as distinct from the established political elite. And unlike BNP, which has a prior record in government that many voters may recall negatively, Jamaat does not carry the same burden of incumbency. These factors work to Jamaat’s advantage among voters seeking a decisive break from the past.
Moreover, Jamaat has taken a more enthusiastic stance towards the July National Charter’s reform proposals, while BNP has generally adopted a more cautious and conservative position. Jamaat’s recent alliance with the National Citizen Party (NCP) has also likely strengthened its association with reform and political change, further consolidating its appeal among those prioritising transformation.
David Bergman is a journalist who has written about Bangladesh for many years. His X handle is @TheDavidBergman.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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