Eminent water expert Md. Khalequzzaman, PhD, professor of geology and oceanography at Commonwealth University of Pennsylvania, speaks to Khairul Hassan Jahin of The Daily Star about why the proposed Padma Barrage may deepen Bangladesh’s sediment, water, and ecological crises rather than resolve them.
How do you assess the proposed Padma Barrage project?
Its original name was the Ganges Barrage, which is more appropriate because the river is known as the Ganges up to Daulatdia. Calling it the Padma Barrage may create the impression that we are overlooking Bangladesh’s fair share of Ganges water under the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty.
For a delta to survive, maintain its landmass, and continue advancing towards the sea, sediment deposition in coastal areas is essential. If sediment deposition declines, the delta becomes more vulnerable, especially as sea levels continue to rise. In that sense, there is no alternative to sedimentation. In the 1960s, Bangladesh received roughly 200 crore tonnes of sediment annually through all its major rivers combined. Today, that figure has fallen to below 100 crore tonnes; or, as some studies suggest, 60-70 crore tonnes. The main reason is upstream intervention.
Studies suggest that a large share of sediment has been retained behind the Farakka Barrage since its construction. If another barrage is built on the Padma at Pangsha in Rajbari, a significant portion of the sediment that still enters Bangladesh during the monsoon could also be trapped.
At present, the Ganges brings an estimated 40-60 crore tonnes of sediment into Bangladesh each year. Much of it moves through the Meghna system towards the estuary; some is deposited on coastal floodplains, while the rest is carried into the sea. If another barrage is constructed, the downstream sediment supply will decline further, and more of that sediment will accumulate upstream and around the barrage itself.
The Farakka experience is instructive. Research by SANDRP and Kalyan Rudra, chairman of West Bengal Pollution Control Board, found that Farakka trapping 30-60 crore tonnes of sediment annually has reduced the river’s capacity to carry water and intensified waterlogging, flooding, and erosion. Around 40,000 families in Malda have reportedly been affected. Downstream, in Murshidabad, water scarcity is common, yet when large volumes are released, erosion intensifies. Roughly 100 square kilometres of land have been lost, and around 50,000 homes have reportedly been destroyed.
These may appear to be India’s problems, but they are highly relevant to us. Many Indian scientists, hydrologists, and environmentalists have concluded that Farakka was a fundamentally flawed decision. Movements in West Bengal and Bihar have demanded its removal for the damage within India. That experience should be taken seriously before Bangladesh considers another barrage on the same river system.
Given the uncertainty surrounding dry-season water availability from upstream and the upcoming expiry of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty in 2026, how viable is the Padma Barrage project for Bangladesh?
I think this is a highly premature and poorly considered decision. Because of the Farakka Barrage, Bangladesh does not receive adequate water during the dry season. Even after the treaty was signed, we have not consistently received our rightful share. A study I was part of examined 20 years of data. Despite the treaty, Bangladesh did not receive its fair share of water 52 percent of the time. During the most critical period, Bangladesh failed to receive its rightful share nearly 65 percent of the time.
The central flaw of the current treaty is its lack of a minimum water guarantee. Under the agreement, if the flow at Farakka drops below 70,000 cusecs, the available water is simply split in half. For example, if the flow dwindles to 50,000 cusecs, Bangladesh receives only 25,000 cusecs instead of its anticipated 35,000, leaving the country to absorb the deficit caused by upstream shortages.
In my view, discussions on the Padma Barrage should be put on hold. Bangladesh’s priority should be to renew the Ganges Treaty in a stronger form, with a guarantee clause of the kind that existed in the 1977 agreement, but is absent from the current treaty. The next treaty should be more robust and, if possible, cover all 12 months rather than just the five dry-season months. Climate change is altering rainfall patterns, river flows, and water availability. We therefore need a basin-wide agreement that ensures an appropriate volume of dry-season flow at Farakka.
The Ganges Basin also includes Nepal. If we want a scientifically grounded agreement, it should be basin-based, year-round, include Nepal, and guarantee a minimum dry-season flow. It should also address sediment, not just water, and specify how sediment will be passed downstream. The treaty should further require India to notify Bangladesh about any new upstream diversionary structures beyond Farakka. Bangladesh should first see where the treaty negotiations are heading. Only then can we estimate how much water will actually be available and discuss how to manage it.
What lessons does the Teesta Barrage experience offer for the proposed Padma Barrage, and how realistic are its claims regarding irrigation, navigation, and water management?
If we take the Teesta Barrage as a lesson, then a Ganges or Padma Barrage is not a sound decision unless we first know exactly how much water will come from India in each season, and unless that flow is guaranteed.
The Ganges-dependent areas of Bangladesh are concentrated mainly in the southwest, which accounts for around 37 percent of the country’s land area and is already under severe stress. Salinity is increasing in the Sundarbans, in the Ganges-Kobadak Project area, and in waterlogged regions such as Bhabadah. Our concern is legitimate. But the Padma Barrage is not the right response.
The project plans to store roughly 3 billion cubic metres (BCM) of water. However, when you consider that the Padma River brings an enormous 350 to 525 BCM of water into Bangladesh every year, that 3 BCM storage capacity is basically a drop in the bucket. Additionally, a single day’s flood flow can be twice the amount of water the barrage is expected to store over three months.
One of the key claims is that the barrage will provide irrigation to 19 lakh hectares of land. But my calculations suggest that irrigating that area would require 9-26 BCM of water. Yet the project claims that irrigation water for the entire area can be provided by the barrage. That is misleading. Even partial irrigation would consume far more water than the proposed storage can realistically support. And if 100 percent of the stored water is used for irrigation, nothing would remain for environmental flow, fisheries, or navigation.
The proposal also claims that the barrage will increase navigability, expand irrigation, and reduce salinity. But there is no credible basis for claiming that enough water would remain to enhance navigability.
The Padma already receives inadequate water in the dry season, even under an existing treaty. In the Teesta, where there is no treaty at all, water barely arrives. Downstream of the proposed barrage at Pangsha, another 20-23 kilometres of river remain before Goalanda. If every available drop is retained behind the barrage, that stretch could fall under a kind of “double Farakka” condition. Without a strong treaty and a guarantee clause, a Padma Barrage could create another dry, exposed riverbed like the Teesta project. A barrage cannot create water.
Instead of pursuing megaprojects like the Padma Barrage, what kind of water management strategy should Bangladesh adopt to protect its long-term water and ecological security?
Bangladesh should accede to the UN Watercourses Convention and ratify it through parliament. That would strengthen our legal and diplomatic position regarding international rivers. Other basin countries—such as India, Nepal, and, in the case of the Brahmaputra, China—would also need to join and accept it as a framework for dispute resolution. India may not sign. Even so, Bangladesh should. By doing so, we can tell the international community that we adhere to the prevailing principles of international water law, and we expect support in protecting our rights. This would strengthen Bangladesh’s claims to all its international rivers. Even if others do not sign immediately, Bangladesh’s standing in international forums would improve. The convention should be used as a strategic tool.
As for the alternative to the Padma Barrage, we must treat the issue on a basin-wide scale. All countries in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin need to move towards integrated river basin management. What happens upstream directly affects downstream regions. This is why coordinated basin-level water governance is essential.
Hydro-diplomacy must become a central pillar of Bangladesh’s foreign policy. Bangladesh has strategic value to India in terms of security, regional stability, connectivity, and transit. Water and sediment are essential for Bangladesh. Our rights in international rivers are not charity or requests; they are rights.
We can also do a great deal domestically. The Padma Barrage proposal includes dredging components totalling about 381 kilometres—roughly 135 kilometres in the Gorai-Madhumati system and 246 kilometres in the Hisna-Mathabhanga system. This should be pursued seriously, alongside dredging in coastal rivers to increase water-carrying and water-holding capacity.
Abandoned canals, silted-up channels, and encroached waterways must also be restored. Dredged material should be treated as a resource for raising low-lying coastal land, reclaiming degraded areas, or producing construction materials.
Instead of retaining all available water behind a Padma Barrage, we should focus on the smaller distributaries and branch rivers in the southwest. Many have silted up, and many polders have caused persistent waterlogging. Some of those polders could be converted into eight-month embankments, allowing water and sediment to enter for part of the year while still providing seasonal protection.
At the same time, rivers, canals, and wetlands must be restored so that their flow, carrying, and storage capacities all improve. If we recover canals, rivers, and floodplains; dredge them properly; use sediment productively; and increase natural retention across the landscape, many of the underlying problems can be addressed far more sustainably.
We should also revisit basin-wide storage options in Nepal. In the Koshi basin, cooperative reservoir projects could store water for dry-season release, support irrigation in India and Nepal, and increase dry-season flows into the Ganges.
The Padma Barrage proposal also suggests generating around 76 megawatts of hydropower. I do not find that persuasive. Farakka is far upstream, where the gradient is much steeper, yet it has not produced meaningful hydropower. This electricity shortfall could be addressed far more safely through solar power, including in rural areas, and through wind energy.
Rivers should not be treated in fragmented, project-by-project terms. They must be understood within a broader framework of integrated development and basin-wide water governance. Bangladesh must improve internal river management, prevent encroachment and pollution, restore navigability, and expand natural water-storage capacity. If we address these issues together rather than through isolated megaprojects, many of the problems can be tackled far more effectively.
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