The refugee crisis worldwide has emerged from complex geopolitics, struggles for dominance between countries, and the politics of citizenship. The process of denying citizenship to a group, especially a minority group, results in violent tensions and often forces that group to leave the country and seek refuge in neighbouring countries. According to UNHCR, the global refugee population stood at 41.6 million by the end of 2025, up from 21.3 million in 2015. The refugee population had nearly doubled by the end of 2025. However, if we consider the total displaced population, which includes refugees and other forcibly displaced people, the figure is much higher: 65.3 million in 2015 and 117.8 million in 2025.

Given the grave situation of refugees worldwide, various international organisations began working towards a sustainable solution to the problem while providing support for managing refugee populations. The most coordinated effort began with the 1951 Refugee Convention, adopted shortly after World War II in response to the growing number of refugees. The year 2026 marks the 75th anniversary of the Refugee Convention. This year's slogan is 'Until Everyone is Safe'. Through this, the convention emphasises a broader definition of safety. It is not merely the absence of violence; rather, it encompasses legal protection, shelter, healthcare, education, the right to work, and the opportunity to rebuild one's life and live with dignity.

Moreover, the convention views the protection of refugees as a collective responsibility, something we see little evidence of in reality. Instead, wealthier and more powerful countries continue to emphasise protecting their borders to control the flow of so-called illegal immigrants, including refugees.

Border management, security, and the reality of refugees

Most cases of displacement occur due to the weaponisation of geopolitical conflicts in several regions, including Palestine, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine. Most refugees are hosted by low- and middle-income countries in the Global South, while powerful and wealthier countries are increasingly securing their borders to prevent refugee movements. If we examine the prospect of resettling refugees in wealthier countries, it becomes clear that opportunities remain extremely limited, particularly for refugees from Asia and Africa, as the experience of the Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh illustrates.

Refugees and asylum seekers are viewed as security threats in many Western countries, especially as the media often portrays them negatively by securitising them. However, labelling refugees as a security threat can increase xenophobia, racism, and physical attacks against them. Such an approach is also evident in Bangladesh towards the Rohingya refugees, as the host community sees little progress towards a sustainable solution to their crisis. Therefore, viewing refugees as a threat rather than recognising them as a humanitarian responsibility is a grave problem that both the Refugee Convention and the UN have largely failed to address. Besides, there has been no successful diplomatic dialogue or meaningful discussion on third-country relocation for many refugee populations worldwide, including the Rohingya refugees.

How geopolitics affects borders and creates refugee crises can be seen in the recent 'push-in' attempts by India along several sections of the Bangladesh border. In recent months, reports on Bangladesh–India border tensions have highlighted repeated attempts to push groups of people into Bangladesh after identifying them as Bangladeshi nationals by the Indian authorities. Such actions have implications not only for bilateral relations and foreign policy between the two countries but also for the everyday lives of borderland communities. Border regions are characterised by deep socio-economic interdependence and long-standing social connections that often transcend political boundaries. When tensions of this nature arise, these fragile relationships come under increasing strain.

Labelling refugees as a security threat can increase xenophobia, racism, and physical attacks against them. Such an approach is also evident in Bangladesh towards the Rohingya refugees, as the host community sees little progress towards a sustainable solution to their crisis. Therefore, viewing refugees as a threat rather than recognising them as a humanitarian responsibility is a grave problem that both the Refugee Convention and the UN have largely failed to address.

Historically, such practices have been more likely to be undertaken by the economically and politically stronger neighbouring state, a reality that has long shaped the dynamics of the Bangladesh–India border. A similar tension can also be seen along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border, which has led to an increase in the number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Over the last one and a half years, 152,029 Rohingya have been forced to flee to Bangladesh from Myanmar, and Bangladesh has accepted them on humanitarian grounds. However, Bangladesh is now considering fencing the Bangladesh–Myanmar border to strengthen border security and control the flow of refugees from Myanmar. The continued influx of Rohingya has created a huge burden for Bangladesh, as funding has remained a persistent challenge from the outset. Moreover, there continues to be international pressure to expand the size and capacity of the Rohingya refugee camps.

Funding crisis in refugee management

The funding crisis is one of the key difficulties facing refugee-hosting nations, as we already know that 65% of refugees are sheltered in neighbouring countries and that 68% of host countries are low- and middle-income countries. Most of these refugee-hosting countries are grappling with their own development challenges, and the responsibilities of refugee management only add to them. Bangladesh is no exception, bearing the burden of managing 1,197,411 Rohingya as of 31 May 2026, including the 39,737 Rohingya who are officially registered as refugees and have taken shelter there since the 1990s.

It has been nine years since the mass Rohingya exodus to Bangladesh in 2017. During this period, not a single Rohingya has been repatriated to their homeland, and no diplomatic engagement with Myanmar has resulted in a breakthrough. Bangladesh is now struggling to manage the refugee population and provide the support required for the Rohingya to lead a dignified life in the refugee camps.

Although Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is providing all the necessary support that it can. This is probably why the authorities in Bangladesh have labelled them 'Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals'. Even with the coordination of the Refugee Convention framework and several UN bodies, the crisis has yet to move towards a positive solution, which frustrates both the Rohingya and the authorities in Bangladesh, as though this is a crisis for which Bangladesh alone is responsible, and the global community has nothing to do with it. The support Bangladesh receives from the West is not sufficient to manage such a large refugee population.

Looking at the funding trend for the Rohingya refugee response since 2017, we can see a gradual decline. Donors contributed nearly USD 4.8 billion to the Joint Response Plans between 2017 and 2024, amounting to 70% of the total financial requirements during that period. However, funding declined significantly in 2025, when only 38% of the total requirement was met, which was alarming. In 2026, only 60% of the target has been achieved to manage the large Rohingya population. This declining level of funding is placing increasing strain on Bangladesh, making it extremely difficult to ensure the necessary services for the Rohingya.

As the 1951 Refugee Convention promised to ensure the safety of refugees, including legal protection, shelter, healthcare, education, the right to work, and the opportunity to rebuild their lives and live with dignity, it is nearly impossible to ensure all of these provisions comprehensively in the camps in Bangladesh because of the funding shortage. Even if we view the concept of safety under the 1951 Convention from a broader perspective, it is still absent for the Rohingya population in Bangladesh. It is extremely difficult for many agencies, including the Government of Bangladesh, to ensure the necessary services for the Rohingya to live a dignified life in the camps because of insufficient funding and resource mobilisation. This is an area where serious attention from donors, UN organisations, and the wealthier and more powerful countries is urgently needed.

Rhetoric of 'burden sharing'

Refugee management in the global context is a highly complex process, in which the primary responsibility lies with refugee-hosting countries. The so-called burden sharing, or shared and collective responsibility, remains largely rhetorical, even though wealthier and more powerful countries provide financial support, which is insufficient for refugee-hosting countries. The concept of burden sharing has become increasingly narrow, with global powers assuming only minimal responsibilities, as many fulfil their commitments primarily through financial contributions.

Funding is, of course, an essential precondition for refugee management, but it also masks the real issues surrounding burden sharing and the need to take effective measures to address them. Moreover, the displacement of people across borders has occurred largely because of a lack of political will, and many refugee situations could be resolved if such political will existed.

We see such an approach towards the Rohingya community, which raises serious questions about the efforts of the UN and the 1951 Refugee Convention, especially in a year when its central message is to ensure the safety of refugees.

Burden sharing has also become a political tool in refugee management. We hardly see it taking place equally or meaningfully for refugees from the Global South, which places a huge burden on low- and middle-income countries in hosting and managing refugees and in complying with the 1951 Refugee Convention. This, in turn, places the lives and fate of refugees in a difficult situation, as most refugee-hosting nations fail to meet the international standards of refugee management. This also creates further vulnerabilities, and the broader ideals of protection and refugee safety become mere slogans. We can see that an enormous number of Rohingya refugees are living with limited facilities, placing the fate of their children in an uncertain reality where no one knows what will happen in the coming days.

Can the Bangladesh–China–Myanmar Economic Corridor be a saviour?

During Bangladesh's Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's recent visit to China, we noticed that both parties were eager to establish an economic corridor among the three countries so that the transportation of goods would become easier between them. In addition, this corridor could serve as China's gateway to South Asia. Since India was unwilling to cooperate, the previous idea of the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor failed.

The reality is that implementing the corridor may not be possible without involving Myanmar's Rakhine State. However, Rakhine is now largely under the control of the Arakan Army. At the same time, the recent situation suggests that the Myanmar authorities will not relinquish it easily, as they continue to launch attacks to regain control of the region, which could also increase the risk of a new Rohingya influx into Bangladesh. Keeping all these factors in mind, the proposed corridor provides Bangladesh with a reasonably strong bargaining tool, which could be leveraged both for Bangladesh's economic interests and for the repatriation of the Rohingya.

However, everything depends on how Bangladesh negotiates with China and Myanmar. As China has enormous strategic interests in the region, this gives Bangladesh additional leverage on the corridor issue, which it should utilise effectively.

However, another challenging factor remains Bangladesh's relationship with India. Such a project may also affect India's interests, particularly the so-called Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project through Rakhine State. Therefore, Bangladesh has to act strategically in dealing with this issue. Besides, from a geopolitical perspective, the entire Chattogram region is an important component of Bangladesh's Bay of Bengal strategy, making the matter even more complex. At the same time, however, it could place Bangladesh in a strategically advantageous position.

Nevertheless, the Rohingya crisis has already reached an unprecedented level of complexity, and it does not have an easy solution, especially as the world's most powerful countries continue to look away from the crisis. Therefore, Bangladesh has to take the bold steps necessary to resolve the issue while placing its own interests first. No one will come and solve this problem for Bangladesh, and that is now clear as daylight. Moreover, Bangladesh has nothing to lose in this bargain. Therefore, a political decision has to be taken regarding the corridor in this context.

Are refugee protection and safety merely slogans?

Although the refugee crisis worldwide is viewed as a humanitarian crisis, the underlying causes of almost all refugee crises are geopolitics, the vested interests of powerful countries, and the interests of dominant ethnic communities within particular national contexts. When the causes are not merely humanitarian, is it possible to solve these grave problems simply by providing services to meet refugees' daily needs? When a country commits violence and carries out state-sponsored ethnic cleansing, is providing shelters for refugees alone enough to prevent such atrocities? If refugees fail to return to their homes with dignity, how can we ensure their safety in refugee camps where they have only limited rights and facilities?

When we talk about millions of Rohingya refugees, we should think about the children who were born in the camps with little hope for the future. A large number of young people in the Rohingya camps live with the constant fear of being recruited by violent groups or becoming involved in drug trafficking and human trafficking, which increases their vulnerabilities and puts their futures at risk. They are living lives without hope, marked by fear and vulnerability. If the global powers and UN organisations do not treat refugee issues seriously and do not exert pressure on the perpetrators and the states responsible, we are unlikely to see meaningful solutions to the problem.

Although the largest influx of Rohingya refugees arrived in Bangladesh in 2017, Rohingya refugees have been living in Bangladesh for more than 40 years in the registered camps established in the 1990s, yet we have still not seen any sustainable solution for them.

Seventy-five years after the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention, we now need to reflect critically on what the world's civilisation can genuinely do for the millions of refugees worldwide, when host nations cannot continue begging for funding while managing refugees year after year. It is now clear that this is not merely a humanitarian crisis; it is also a political crisis of modern civilisation. It is equally a failure and a crisis of global diplomacy in a chaotic and changing world order, where powerful countries remain locked in continuous competition for supremacy.

Dr Bulbul Siddiqi is Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Bangladesh China Research Centre at North South University.

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