International labour migration is a key pillar of Bangladesh’s economy, with most workers going to the Gulf region. In 2025, out of 1,116,399 migrants, about 82.4% (919,981) went to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (BMET, 2026). Remittances are equally important: Bangladesh received $32.8 billion in 2025, of which around $15.07 billion—about 46%—came from GCC countries (Bangladesh Bank, 2026). This shows the country’s heavy dependence on the Gulf for both employment and income.
However, migration is not only economic; it is also shaped by politics and international relations. Rising tensions in the Middle East, especially the US–Israel–Iran conflict, are creating new uncertainties for Bangladeshi workers in terms of jobs, mobility, and safety. Therefore, migration should not be seen simply as a matter of labour demand and supply. It needs to be understood within a broader geopolitical context, where global power relations shape both opportunities and risks.
Political nature of migrant workers
To understand this situation, we need to look at how countries behave in international politics. Political scientists Hans Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations, 1948) and Kenneth Waltz (Theory of International Politics, 1979) explain that during crises, states focus mainly on their own interests and security. As a result, migrant workers become less important. They are needed in stable times, but are easily pushed aside when risks increase.
Because of this, migration governance becomes weak. Agreements such as MoUs often fail during crises, as countries take decisions independently. As Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller show in The Age of Migration (2014), host countries can change rules suddenly, while countries like Bangladesh have little influence to protect their workers.
Migrant workers also remain in a vulnerable position. They have little bargaining power, and in many Middle Eastern countries, the kafala system ties their legal status to employers. Human Rights Watch (EU: Human Rights Should Be Priority at GCC Summit, 2024) highlights that this increases the risk of exploitation. During crises, support systems such as evacuation and legal assistance remain limited.
As a result, crises quickly turn into real risks. Workers lose jobs first, are forced to return without compensation, and face movement restrictions. We saw the same during the COVID-19 crisis and the Libya conflict (since 2011). At the same time, xenophobia increases. For example, UN human rights experts (OHCHR, May 21, 2020) reported that migrants in Malaysia were blamed for spreading the virus and were detained or deported.
A similar pattern is now visible in the Iran war, where some migrant workers are being detained or deported for sharing war-related content on social media. Overall, migrant workers are not just labour—they are a geopolitically vulnerable population, often the first to be excluded and the least protected during crises.
Future migration trends & structural risks
The ongoing tensions surrounding Iran will not be limited to politics; they will also affect the global labour market in the future. The war has already damaged key infrastructure such as the oil and gas sectors, which are the backbone of Gulf economies. As a result, government revenues will decline, major investments will be delayed, and economic uncertainty will increase across the region.
In Saudi Arabia, this impact will be most visible in its Vision 2030 projects. One of the largest projects is NEOM—a futuristic city worth around $500 billion—which includes plans for smart cities like “The Line”, advanced technology zones, and tourism hubs. Alongside NEOM, projects such as the Red Sea tourism project, Qiddiya entertainment city, and the FIFA World Cup 2034 are expected to create millions of jobs. However, if instability continues in the region, these projects may face delays, rising costs, or downsizing.
This impact will also affect the United Arab Emirates—especially Dubai and Abu Dhabi—as well as Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. Major real estate and infrastructure projects may slow down, investor confidence may decline, property sales may fall, and jobs in construction and services may decrease. At the same time, prolonged conflict may damage the region’s reputation for stability, leading to further declines in investment and business.
At the same time, structural changes will continue. Gulf countries will invest more in automation and digital technologies, reducing the demand for low-skilled labour. Governments will also strengthen nationalisation policies to prioritise local citizens. As a result, demand for low-skilled migrant workers will gradually decline.
For Bangladesh, the consequences will be serious. Job opportunities in the Gulf will become more uncertain, recruitment will slow down, and visa restrictions will increase. Remittance inflows may decline due to unstable employment. Many migrants may be forced to return without savings, increasing pressure on the domestic economy. Families dependent on migration income will face growing hardship.
From risk to opportunity: A geopolitical strategy
At the same time, these risks also create opportunities for Bangladesh to rethink its migration strategy. When risks spread, new opportunities also emerge. This makes it important to explore labour markets beyond the Gulf region.
A good example is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Through this initiative, large infrastructure projects are being developed across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Many countries face labour shortages due to small populations or low birth rates. As noted in the World Bank’s Belt and Road Economics report (2019), these investments are expanding rapidly and creating new labour demand. Similar opportunities are also emerging in Russia, Central Asia, and parts of Africa, where investments in gas, oil, and energy sectors are increasing labour demand. If Bangladesh can develop a skilled workforce, it can take advantage of these opportunities.
To capture these opportunities, Bangladesh needs to strengthen migration diplomacy. It must go beyond traditional agreements and include crisis-time protection measures such as evacuation support, compensation, legal safeguards, and waivers of costs like iqama renewal fees during emergencies. Bangladesh should also develop an early warning system to monitor geopolitical risks and adjust migration policies in advance.
At the same time, migration strategies must shift towards skills and language. Bangladesh should invest in training in Russian, German, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese, and gradually move from low-skilled to skilled labour markets. Language has become a key tool for accessing new labour markets. For example, Russian is widely used in Central Asia and parts of Eastern Europe, allowing workers to access multiple countries through a single language.
To achieve this, Bangladesh needs new training systems. Through bilateral cooperation, foreign trainers can be brought in, and the skilled Bangladeshi diaspora can be engaged online. By digitalising training centres, students can learn directly from them. Partnerships with foreign governments or companies can help develop workers based on labour market needs and allow direct recruitment. This will improve skills, reduce dependence on brokers, and make migration safer and more transparent.
In addition, a new strategic direction could be virtual migration, which is clearly different from traditional outsourcing. While outsourcing usually depends on intermediaries, virtual migration allows Bangladeshi workers to stay in the country and directly provide services to foreign employers through digital platforms. This includes IT services, freelancing, and various forms of remote professional work. Since this process does not depend on visas, borders, or physical relocation, it is comparatively less affected by geopolitical instability. As global demand for digital services continues to grow, this type of virtual migration can create relatively stable income opportunities and help reduce both the risks and costs associated with overseas employment.
Finally, geopolitics should be seen not as a crisis, but as an opportunity to explore new labour markets and build a safe and sustainable migration system for Bangladesh.
Mohammad Jalal Uddin Sikder is an Associate Professor and Researcher at the Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University.
