INTERNATIONAL politics in the twentieth century was shaped by the choices of great powers. Empires grew and collapsed; superpowers waged war; alliances rose and broke up. Smaller nations were often forced to navigate a world in which others’ choices dictated their options. Times are changing.
Great powers matter. The US remains the dominant military power in the world. China continues its remarkable economic and technological rise. India becomes a rising global power. Nevertheless, one of the defining trends of the modern era occurs outside the established centres of power. International politics in the twenty-first century is shaped by nations that refuse to take sides.
Welcome to the age of strategic hedging. Strategic hedging is not about neutrality. It is neither a Cold War nor a desire to dodge tough decisions. Strategic hedging means engaging competing power centres at once while preserving one’s freedom of manoeuvre. It reflects the recognition that in the interconnected and multipolar world, overreliance on any one country becomes a strategic vulnerability.
Many nations pursue this policy. Although they vary in terms of geography, political systems, economic models, and historical experience, they have one thing in common — an urge to maximise options and minimise dependencies without becoming an instrument of someone else’s geopolitical strategy.
Take Vietnam, for instance. No nation has such complex historical relations with both China and the United States. And yet, Hanoi manages to strengthen economic and strategic ties with Washington while maintaining a comprehensive economic relationship with Beijing. Vietnam cooperates with the United States in everything from trade and technology to maritime security even though China remains one of its biggest economic partners. Instead of seeing the two relationships as incompatible, Vietnam treats them as complementary aspects of its national strategy.
Indonesia follows a similar route. As the largest economy in Southeast Asia and the world’s fourth most populous nation, Indonesia resists attempts to push it to align with one side or the other. Jakarta conducts business with China as a major investor and trading partner while strengthening relations with the United States, Japan, Australia, and other regional players. Indonesia is not interested in choosing one over the other.
Saudi Arabia represents yet another example. For decades, Saudi foreign policy was largely defined by its strategic relationship with the United States. Now, however, the kingdom pursues a much more diversified policy. It maintains strong security ties with the US while building economic relationships with China, India, and Russia and pursuing a more autonomous regional policy. As a result, it develops foreign policy driven by its own interests rather than geopolitical considerations.
No one has pursued strategic hedging more successfully than Turkey. Despite being a NATO member, Turkey is no longer confined to the Western security system. At the same time, it develops relationships with Russia, China, the Gulf states, and emerging powers of Asia and Africa. Although this strategy causes frictions, it reflects a broader trend — Turkey strives to achieve strategic flexibility in a changing world.
India, despite being recognised as a major power, has developed a rather complex strategy of strategic hedging. New Delhi has enhanced cooperation with the United States through initiatives such as the Quad, while maintaining defence, energy, and diplomatic ties that do not necessarily fit within the Western framework. India’s foreign policy is described as ‘multi-alignment’ — a concept that reflects a growing preference for diverse relationships rather than exclusive partnerships.
These examples are not united by any ideology. They are united by pragmatism. The international order becomes more fragmented. Everything from trade and technology to finance, energy, security, and diplomacy becomes increasingly interrelated. At the same time, the struggle between the United States and China generates pressures that many nations would prefer to avoid. Few governments are ready to renounce access to the American markets, technologies, and investments. Few governments are ready to give up the financial, manufacturing, and economic opportunities China offers.
Therefore, many states seek an alternative path. Bangladesh is one of them. For most of its history, Bangladesh was perceived as a recipient of development and external aid. This perception no longer reflects reality. Today, Bangladesh is one of the most successful economic stories of Asia. Its rapidly developing economy, strategic location in the Bay of Bengal, diplomatic presence, and growing relevance in the region elevate its international profile. These factors broaden Bangladesh’s options.
The United States remains its main export partner and a key source of investment, technology, and education opportunities. China is becoming a major development partner, implementing infrastructure, energy, and industrial projects. India remains a critical partner due to its geography, connectivity, trade, and regional stability. Japan continues to play an important role in infrastructure and economic cooperation. Europe remains an important market and a development partner. Gulf states remain an important destination for migrant labourers.
Bangladesh’s development policy, therefore, is based not on exclusivity but on diversification. This makes strategic hedging not only a preferable choice but also a necessity.
Nevertheless, strategic hedging involves certain risks. Relationships with competing powers require sophisticated diplomacy, institutional capacity, and strategic thinking. It is much easier to talk about balance than to keep it. As the great powers’ competition intensifies, the pressure to show loyalty, alignment, or preference is likely to grow. Nations that strive for flexibility might end up being monitored by everyone.
In addition, strategic hedging works only if it is part of a bigger picture. Without clear priorities, diversification may lead to inconsistency. Without strong institutions, flexibility may turn into vulnerability. Strategic hedging is successful when a nation knows exactly what it wants to achieve and uses external relationships to promote its objectives.
That is why the rise of strategic hedging should not be seen as a departure from the idea of international cooperation. On the contrary, it reflects the recognition that international cooperation is most efficient when it is diversified. The goal is not isolation but optionality. Nations seek diverse relationships not because they wish to avoid commitments, but because they do not want to become dependent on one power.
The new international order will be shaped by the actions of major powers. The United States and China will play a central role in international politics for decades to come. Nevertheless, to understand the future only through the prism of great powers’ rivalry risks missing a less dramatic but no less important transformation.
More nations shaping the twenty-first century will not seek dominance over others but freedom to cooperate with everyone. The age of strategic hedging is here. Its best representatives may not be the strongest nations in the world, but rather those that learn to navigate a world of dispersed power, persistent competition, and strategic flexibility.
Zillur Rahman is a political analyst and president of the Centre for Governance Studies. He hosts Tritiyo Matra on Channel i.
