The people of Bangladesh have suffered too heavily for too long from abuse of power, lack of accountable governance, deficits in the rule of law and access to justice, and multidimensional violations of human rights. During the 15-plus years of Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian and kleptocratic rule that was ultimately ousted by the blood-written July uprising, many of those now in positions of power following the election of February 12, 2026—both in parliament and the government—were, along with ordinary citizens, direct or indirect victims. The price paid for the politicisation, executive control, dysfunctionality, and professional bankruptcy of nearly every state institution has been unbearable.
The natural expectation, therefore, is that the right lessons have been learnt from the consequences of unaccountable governance built upon partisan and executive-controlled state institutions, and that there is an appetite among those in power to ensure the independence and effectiveness of institutions mandated to uphold accountable governance. At the top of the list of such institutions is the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC).
However, what has been happening around the legal framework for the NHRC thus far offers little indication of such an appetite. The first session of the 13th parliament, and the government in particular, did an unenviable job of handling the 133 ordinances issued during the interim government period. What stands out is that many of the 110 ordinances that were passed into law (13 of them after amendment) essentially enhance the power of the executive and relevant agencies, with sustained risks of unaccountable governance. On the other hand, among the 23 that were either repealed or shelved for “further scrutiny,” there are several that could have strengthened accountable governance, the key aspiration of the July movement.
One of them is the NHRC Ordinance, 2025, which was widely regarded as being largely consistent with the national aspirations and international standards such as the Paris Principles. A draft National Human Rights Commission Act, 2026, subsequently prepared by the government, has now been in circulation for some time. It does contain some important positive elements, including the disqualification of persons convicted of criminal offences or non-nationals from appointment as a commissioner, disclosure of meeting minutes, accountability of investigating officials, expanded jurisdiction of the NHRC’s National Preventive Mechanism Division, and provisions for reporting on actions taken.
However, the draft NHRC Act, 2026 also contains some provisions and omissions that are fundamentally contradictory to the long-cherished aspiration of a truly independent and effective human rights commission free from executive influence. These are also inconsistent with the relevant international standards. Indeed, the draft law seems designed to ensure that the NHRC remains dependent on the government and relevant agencies for any action seeking redress for allegations of human rights violations committed by government officials, law enforcement and security agencies, and members of the armed forces. This flies in the face of credible evidence of the pre-July abuses as presented through national and international sources, such as the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances and the UN OHCHR Fact-Finding Report.
Section 3(2) of the draft act has removed the provision included in the 2025 ordinance that stipulated that the NHRC would be independent and “shall not be under any ministry or department of the government.” By implication, the NHRC would now be attached to the government, reflecting the same politico-governance culture that has long resisted granting genuine independence to institutions established to hold power to account.
The 2025 ordinance provided that the NHRC could regularly search, inspect, and investigate detention facilities operated by all law enforcement, intelligence, surveillance and military agencies for potential violations of the detainees’ human rights. The NHRC could also make appropriate recommendations to the government, including the closure of such facilities if deemed unlawful, and seek accountability for those responsible. These provisions have been removed from the draft act, reflecting an apparent intention to preserve the culture of impunity surrounding human rights violations in such facilities.
The draft NHRC Act also grossly undermines the commission’s authority to investigate alleged human rights violations by government employees and members of law enforcement, security and armed forces. Unlike the 2025 ordinance, it imposes a requirement on the NHRC to seek prior permission from the government or the relevant appointing authority. Even more debilitating is the provision requiring the commission to depend on a so-called report from the head of the relevant force or the government before deciding whether to investigate allegations of human rights violations committed by disciplinary forces or any of their members. The draft further provides that, based on such reports, the NHRC may only recommend measures to the relevant force or the government. For all practical purposes, these provisions amount to blanket impunity for human rights violations committed by entities that are record-holders of some of the worst forms of human rights abuse in the country. These provisions should be removed through amendments to sections 16, 18, and 20 of the draft act.
The formation of the search committee under the draft act is also overly biased in favour of partisan and bureaucratic influence. The selection process has been kept non-transparent, with no scope for competitive selection. In-service government employees may be appointed as commissioners by taking leave. In a context where NHRC-like commissions in the country are already viewed or treated as rehabilitation centres for retired government officials, this would increase the risk of deeper partisan and bureaucratic entrenchment.
Furthermore, some fundamentally important eligibility criteria for appointment as a commissioner, such as non-partisanship, relevant experience, honesty and integrity, have been ignored. Another provision facilitating government control is the scope for appointment of up to 30 percent of commission personnel from government officials on deputation, without any clear requirement for scrutiny of competence or conflicts of interest.
Departing from the principles of gender equality and inclusivity embodied in the 2025 ordinance, Section 5(3) of the draft act fails to include a mandatory provision ensuring the representation of at least two women on the commission. Nor does it require the representation of marginalised communities, including ethnic minorities. Similarly, the provision addressing the long-felt need to establish divisional offices and comparable capacity at district and upazila levels has been dropped without justification.
Other weaknesses of the draft act include the lack of a clearly defined preventive role involving stakeholder engagement, public awareness, education, training, and research to promote a culture of respecting human rights across the social, political and institutional spheres. Nor is there any mechanism for holding the commission itself accountable for inaction or motivated action in response to information or allegations of human rights violations.
By failing to provide for the commission’s annual budget, including the salaries and benefits of commissioners, as “charged expenditure” paid out of the Consolidated Fund in accordance with the commission’s request, the scope of its financial independence has been grossly curtailed, leaving it dependent on the government’s goodwill. The draft act also vests the power to formulate rules in the government, thereby undermining the commission’s independence and empowering the executive to determine if, when, and what rules would be formulated to govern the NHRC’s operational and regulatory ecosystem. Experience shows that such arrangements can have paralysing effects on the commission.
If the government is genuinely interested in establishing a truly independent and effective NHRC, the draft act should be thoroughly overhauled along the lines outlined above, with adequate participatory and inclusive consultation of stakeholders, before it is placed before parliament for enactment. It remains to be seen whether there is sufficient political will to walk the talk.
This article is based on an extensive review of the draft NHRC Act, 2026 submitted by TIB to the government on June 5, 2026.
Dr Iftekharuzzaman is executive director at the Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB).
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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