In the past weeks, intensive debate has ensued on whether Bangladesh should or should not join the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA), a tripartite defence treaty between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed on August 7. There are conflicting indicationson whether Bangladesh has been invited to join. While a press report suggests that it has been, Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman told the parliament that Bangladesh would consider it positively if invited. Statements of two state ministers for foreign affairs, Humaiun Kobir and Shama Obaed, provide an impression that it’s already under consideration by the government.
The context
For most parts of the past 15 years, conversations about Bangladesh’s foreign policy revolved around the question of whether it would align with India or China. With the US’s adoption of the Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2016, the discussions were about whether Bangladesh should be on board. At that point, it seemed to be a triangular tussle for Bangladesh between the US, China and India. The arguments for the relationships were: India is the neighbour with long historical ties and China has a deep pocket needed for economic development. Having a relationship with the US, the largest export destination of Bangladesh, is an imperative.
As the Hasina regime was deposed, the scenario changed. During the interim government led by Professor Muhammad Yunus, India was not only absent but was also unwilling to work beyond diplomatic niceties and the US was no longer pursuing the Indo-Pacific centred policy. Many suggested that China has got the upper hand. Yunus’ China visit was an indication that China’s previous support for the Hasina regime was left behind in the past. The maiden trip of the new Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to Malaysia, followed by China, was essentially a continuation of the interim government’s policy. The hope that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s invitation to his counterpart to join the outreach meeting of the BRICS summit in New Delhi would provide an opportunity to patch things up could not go further, thanks to Sheikh Hasina’s press conference and renewed tension between the two countries over her extradition.
But all these seem to have been pushed to the back burner, if not vanished, after August 7, in the wake of the Mecca Treaty.
What is the treaty about?
Little information about the Mecca Treaty is known except that it’s a defence treaty with a collective security clause akin to Nato’s Article 5, which stipulates that “any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all.” The general understanding is that Saudi Arabia will provide financial backing and funding for defence projects; Türkiye will contribute advanced military technology, drones, and deep-tech defence equipment, and Pakistan will supply frontline military manpower and its existing defence capabilities. Despite the ambiguity, many are calling it “the Muslim Nato” and painting it as a new security architecture. It is far from a completely new arrangement, as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia already have a strategic mutual defence agreement since September 2025, and Türkiye and Pakistan have expanded military training, electronic warfare and defence industrial co-operation. The tension between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has subsided with increasing defence ties. As such, the important question is whether these countries share threat perceptions and would act even when their immediate interests are not aligned.
Operational aspects such as whether there will be a joint command structure like Nato, and whether regular exercises, joint contingency planning, intelligence sharing, logistics agreements and integrated air and missile defence would be developed are either yet to be settled or yet to be known.
End of the Pax-American or a return to the past?
Treaty enthusiasts have described this as the beginning of a “Muslim Nato,” hoping that other regional countries would join the alliance. In their understanding, the alliance will act as a deterrent against Israel and India in the region.Others have described this as “the end of the US-led Middle East order,” which shaped the regional security architecture for five decades. While this sounds like quite a momentous shift in the region, one must not forget that none of these countries are out of the US orbit. Türkiye remains a Nato member, while Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have very close security relationships with the US. Besides, in recent days the US and Saudi Arabia have signed a nuclear deal allowing US companies to build nuclear plants for civilian use. Indeed, the Iran war, especially the unpredictability of the Trump administration, has created some unease and concerns about whether the US security umbrella is sufficient to protect the countries in the region. These have created the urge to have some strategic autonomy, which has led to adding “another layer of protection.”
The pact has received the blessings of Trump, as it essentially continues the longstanding US policy to create an alliance of the Middle East countries which would not become a threat to Israel.Cento, also known as Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955, was the earliest attempt, and the latest was the 2022 Abraham Accords. Signatories of the Abraham Accords not only normalised relationship with Israel but essentially accepted the US-Israeli predominance. Although none of these three countries—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye—had signed the Abraham Accords, except Pakistan others have various levels of relations with Israel. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Israel has called each other an enemy. In some measures, those which were away from the Abraham Accords have been brought under one agreement—the Mecca Pact. Notwithstanding the historical contestation between Persians and Arabs and the hostile relations between the US and Iran since 1979, Saudi Arabia, with the active support of the US, tried to build “a Sunni wall” around Iran to contain the spread of the Iranian brand of Islamism. These contribute to the suspicion about the intent, which the Pakistani foreign minister tried to assuage, saying that the alliance is not directed against any country. It is not surprising that Iran denied media reports that it has been invited to join.
The pros and cons of joining the treaty
Those who are professing to join underscore the potential benefits, which include providing vital strategic depth and enhancing national security. The most vigorous argument is that Bangladesh has not developed a strategic relationship with any country, leaving Bangladesh vulnerable and friendless. One analyst highlighted the religious identity and suggested that as the country is “an island of Muslim people surrounded by non-Muslims,” a treaty like this will bring help. Others contend that it will strengthen economic cooperation with the member states and will diversify Bangladesh’s sources of weapons. Hardly spoken, but a key factor in support for joining the treaty has been Bangladesh’s strained relationship with India. The perception is that it will serve as a deterrent.
But there are serious downsides to joining the pact. As there are several ongoing conflicts and longstanding tensions in the region, Bangladesh’s joining the pact is likely to bring these faraway conflicts home. Conflicts between various countries and forces in the region, for example, between Saudi Arabia and Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, have little strategic significance for Bangladesh. Yet the treaty will make Bangladesh a party to it. In the event of a member being attacked, due to reciprocal defence obligations, Bangladesh will have to send its troops to war. It is legitimate to ask whether it is the best way to utilise Bangladesh’s kinetic resources. There is little geographical and strategic reason for Bangladesh to share threat perceptions of other countries and vice versa. One may also ask: will Bangladesh’s priorities receive equal treatment?
The argument that Bangladesh is an island among non-Muslim countries is deeply flawed because Bangladesh’s foreign policy should not be guided by religious identity but rather by its national interests—military, economic and political alike. The argument that joining the pact will help to diversify the source of weapons is a folly because Bangladesh is already buying weapons from Türkiye, and defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia has started in 2025. Finally, it is likely that it will require allocating resources that are best used dealing with crises which are far more pressing.
Bangladesh’s positive reaction towards the pact has made India wary, as India views this as a tacit presence of Pakistan along its eastern borders, posing security threats; it will help Bangladesh move away from the India-leaning foreign policy. While Bangladesh should be cognisant of India’s wariness, this should not influence Bangladesh’s decision, whether to join or not. Bangladesh’s decision should be driven by its national interests. As of now, arguments for joining do not outweigh the risks, challenges and potential benefits. Entering into a defence agreement is not something that can be reversed after a change of government, and it should be done only after the benefits align with national interests in the long run, rather than impulsively as a response to the current challenges.
Ali Riaz is distinguished professor of political science at Illinois State University in the US. He previously served as a special assistant to the chief adviser of the Interim Government of Bangladesh and in the Constitution Reform Commission and National Consensus Commission.
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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