Prothom Alo :

Iftekharuzzaman: First, the government that comes to power will obviously depend on the election results and on what kind of Parliament we get. Because first there is Parliament, then the government—and there is a mutual relationship between Parliament and the government from the perspective of controlling corruption and ensuring good governance.

What I see is this: in Bangladesh, the pattern that has existed for a long time in politics and governance—what we might call the political and governance ecosystem—was expected to change as a result of the blood-stained movement against authoritarianism. It was hoped that what would change was the political “capital” based on money, muscle, religion, patriarchy, and majoritarianism.

In essence, what I mean is this: the “capital” of our politics is supposed to be the public interest. Politics should produce the public interest, and to produce that, it needs capital. But the capital being used is money, muscle, and religion.

Politics is meant to ensure the public interest. The “product” of politics is the public interest—why do people do politics? To deliver public interest, right? But like any other form of production, this has its own factors of production. What are the factors of production here? They are money, muscle, and religion.

Religion—political religion—whose influence we can clearly see everywhere. This is not new; it existed before as well. Money and muscle were always there, and religion too. But the influence of religion has increased comparatively. And I am not talking only about religious-based political parties. More broadly, the use of religion in politics—and the way it is used—can now be seen not only among religious parties but also among mainstream political parties.

So, this will be reflected in practice. But the Parliament we are going to have—how much it can establish an accountable system of government and fulfill the related expectations—will depend on the character of that Parliament once it is formed.

I bring up Parliament when answering the question about the biggest challenges for the new government in tackling corruption because, naturally, most people consider the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) to be the primary institution for controlling corruption. That is absolutely true—it has clearly defined legal responsibilities. But “legal” alone is not enough; the ACC cannot function effectively outside the broader political and governance ecosystem. And this is where the role of the national Parliament becomes crucial. Parliament is number one on the list of institutions that can contribute to preventing corruption.

If the Parliament is not capable of producing public interest—if it cannot act in a way that ensures the public interest—then those in power who use money, muscle, and religion as their “capital” to extract personal gains will make it very difficult for the public to benefit.

If the new Parliament is formed in a way that respects the July Charter and implements its proposals in practice, then there is a real possibility that, compared to past Parliaments in Bangladesh, there will be an opportunity to establish a somewhat more accountable system of government.
The three basic functions of Parliament—law-making, debating and discussing issues in the public interest, and holding the government accountable to the people, which is one of the key elements in preventing corruption—have a much brighter prospect than before. In other words, the potential for these roles to be fulfilled is now far stronger.

For example, if I say that the Deputy Speaker must be elected from the opposition and that there will be only one Deputy Speaker. That is a good thing. It has long been expected and it should happen. Whether it will actually happen is something we will have to see. Among the parliamentary committees, five of the most important ones will be chaired by members of the opposition. There are several positive aspects like this, which should create an opportunity for Parliament to play its role in holding the government accountable to the people on behalf of the people.

So, it’s a good thing, it’s a good possibility. But to what extent this will actually happen will depend, as I said, on Parliament as a reflection of the political governance ecosystem.

That is one aspect. The second is that if we look directly at the government that will come to power, their biggest challenge in preventing corruption will be how seriously they review the proposals of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Reform Commission.

As I said earlier, almost all the active political parties that are contesting the election have accepted nearly 100 per cent of those proposals. Since those proposals have not yet been implemented, the real question is how far they will go in examining them and how far they will move toward actual implementation. In reality, how much the new government contributes to ACC reform—and to curbing corruption overall—will depend on that.

So far, in the political manifestos that have been published and in what they are saying on the campaign trail, almost everyone is loudly pledging to fight corruption to win votes. But after winning votes with anti-corruption slogans, how much corruption they actually control—and whether they use the power they gain to serve the public or to profit from the muscle, money, and religion they invested in the campaign—will determine how sincere and committed the government truly is in tackling corruption and setting real examples.

There are many things we have called for. After a new government is formed, one of the key things we will demand—and I would call this a major challenge—is the formulation of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy. This strategy should define the anti-corruption roles of political parties, government bodies, state institutions, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and non-state actors. It should clearly set out what each of them is responsible for.

There should also be an Office of the Ombudsman to monitor how well these roles are being carried out. We have proposed this, and there is even a constitutional obligation and commitment in this regard. Because if we think that corruption can be controlled by relying only on the ACC while allowing all other institutions to be run in corrupt ways, that simply will not work.

That is why I believe the first responsibility is to formulate this strategy and then take action accordingly. Who will do this? The government should take the initiative and make it possible through an independent expert group. That is what we have proposed.

Next, the proposals of the ACC Reform Commission related to the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) that the interim government failed to implement, or left partially unaddressed, must be carefully reviewed. After examining them, the government must thoroughly implement the ACC Reform Commission’s recommendations to ensure the ACC’s full independence and accountability. That is the second point.

Third, in Bangladesh there is no clear legal framework for managing conflicts of interest. We have always seen that when people are in power, they use the authority they have to make decisions in ways that serve their own interests. This was also seen during the interim government. Various government decisions were taken to benefit those who made the decisions themselves. This is what is called a conflict of interest.

We believe it is absolutely essential to create a proper legal basis for conflict-of-interest management and to implement it. Right now, there are only bits and pieces—some clauses and provisions here and there—but there is no real enforcement, no effective implementation, and no monitoring. This must be ensured. A proper conflict-of-interest management law must be enacted.