The August 5, 2026 media interaction at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club South Asia (FCC South Asia) in Delhi by ousted Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina appears to have triggered a full-scale diplomatic spat between Bangladesh and India. It was her second such event hosted at the same venue by the same media group within seven months. The differences between the January 23 and August 5 events, however, are remarkably stark, not only in their substance but also in their fallout.
Both events were organised after Hasina was found guilty of crimes against humanity by the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) and sentenced to death. On January 23, the FCC only delivered an audio message from Hasina. On August 5, however, both she and her son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, took questions from the media. The first event took place while the interim government led by Professor Muhammad Yunus was in office, ahead of the February 12 national election. The second was held on the very day Bangladesh was observing the second anniversary of the uprising bringing an end to her rule.
On both occasions, journalists—mostly from India, plausibly because most international news organisations operate their South Asia bureaus or regional hubs from Delhi—crowded into the FCC premise with considerable interest to hear her. Yet the FCC’s enthusiastic hosting of the events failed to answer a basic question: why did Hasina not appear either in person or by video? Her physical absence inevitably leaves room for speculation about her health, security, and freedom of movement.
The August 5 event assumed additional significance because India’s new High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Dinesh Trivedi, had, during a courtesy call on Prime Minister’s Foreign Affairs Adviser Humayun Kabir on August 3, received an unusually strong and advance warning against allowing the deposed Awami League chief any platform to make political statements.
South Asia watchers had interpreted Trivedi’s appointment to Dhaka—he is a former Union minister and has close links with West Bengal—as an attempt to recalibrate and rejuvenate bilateral relations following the severe setback caused by the fall of the Hasina regime. He was also accorded the status of a cabinet minister, potentially giving him access to Prime Minister Narendra Modi on a footing comparable to that of Foreign Minister S Jaishankar. Many observers also viewed Jaishankar’s attendance, alongside Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla, at the state funeral of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia as evidence of Delhi’s interest in rebuilding relations with BNP and Tarique Rahman.
Modi was reportedly among the first foreign leaders to invite Tarique Rahman to Delhi after the February 12 election. Rahman’s decision to visit Beijing before Delhi undoubtedly caused some unease among policymakers in the Indian capital. Against this backdrop, another proposed visit—to attend the BRICS outreach meeting in his capacity as chair of the regional grouping BIMSTEC—now appears to hang in the balance. Adding to the disquiet in Dhaka was the fact that the invitation to the BRICS summit did not address Tarique Rahman as the prime minister of Bangladesh. Finally, the political backlash over Delhi’s decision to allow Hasina to address a much-hyped media event has cast a further shadow over the proposed visit.
Although such a visit would ostensibly focus on relations between two multilateral groupings rather than bilateral issues, it could nevertheless become an important icebreaker and contribute to the normalisation of Bangladesh-India relations.
Dhaka’s response to the decision to allow Hasina to speak remotely at the FCC-hosted event was both expected and justified, although some argue that an even stronger protest could have been lodged through a more carefully calibrated choice of words. India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said the event was a private media interaction, that the Indian government had no role in it, and that it did not endorse what was said there. He also added that the Indian government “does not endorse anything said at the forum, especially with regard to the duly constituted government of Bangladesh.” Yet Delhi’s apparent double standard has not gone unnoticed.
The 2018 deportation of Lord Alex Carlile, a member of the legal team of then opposition BNP leader Khaleda Zia, for attempting to hold a press conference in Delhi, remains fresh in the minds of the BNP leadership. Raveesh Kumar, then spokesperson for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, told journalists at a briefing that it appeared to him that the lawyer’s visit was intended to “create some kind of problem” in India-Bangladesh relations and also to create “some kind of misunderstanding” between India and the opposition party in Bangladesh.
There is little doubt that the August 5 event, although formally hosted by FCC South Asia, was designed by Awami League to undermine the sacrifices Bangladeshis made to end autocracy and restore democracy—particularly by choosing the very day on which Hasina had been forced to flee to India. Some of her statements at the event, especially those containing potentially incendiary elements, were bound to be interpreted in Bangladesh as contemptuous of the ICT’s verdict and of the spirit of the July uprising and its martyrs, thereby provoking outrage. Had she expressed remorse, however, the reaction might have been very different.
Suhashini Haider, The Hindu’s diplomatic editor, asked a pointed question: “Did she regret the violence? Did she regret killing the protesters there? Did she feel sorry for what happened eventually?” Instead of Hasina answering, her son Joy intervened. Rather than expressing regret, he invoked the indemnity ordinance concerning the killing of police officers and Awami League supporters. He argued: “If one set of killings is legal, then how does the question of apology arise? You can’t have both. You can’t have one set of killings legal and another set of killings someone has to apologise for.”
He went on to say that Awami League would apologise and express regret only when the indemnity was lifted and those who had killed police officers and Awami League members were arrested. “But until that day, there is nothing for that Awami League to apologise for. Because, currently, all killings in Bangladesh are legal,” he said.
This position contrasts sharply with Joy’s comments to the BBC’s NewsHour programme a day after his mother was overthrown. At the time, he said: “She’s in her late 70s. She is so disappointed that after all her hard work, for a minority to rise up against her, I think she’s done. My family and I are done.”
Interestingly, the Delhi media event, although titled “Sheikh Hasina’s Homecoming,” was anything but a discussion about her return to Bangladesh. Her refusal to name a date for her return, despite being asked the question directly more than once, perhaps explains why. Analysts say that by announcing a vague homecoming plan, Hasina was seeking to rejuvenate supporters who have faced serious adversity and suffering over the past two years and who may increasingly be losing faith in the future of their party.
It is well understood that cross-border travel requires official authorisation and valid travel documents recognised by both countries, whether the movement takes place through extradition or otherwise. Dhaka is unlikely to agree to allow her return without a formal extradition arrangement, while India, for its part, is equally unlikely to put her on a flight to Bangladesh while the death sentence handed down by the ICT remains in force.
Moreover, given the international aviation rules that prevent airlines from carrying passengers without valid travel documents, her return to Dhaka on a commercial flight appears highly improbable under the current circumstances.
Without an acknowledgement of wrongdoing or some expression of remorse, there appears to be little prospect that Awami League, whose activities are currently banned, can reorganise and resurrect itself as a viable political force. However, its overseas political activities—including events such as the one at the FCC—are likely to continue causing further damage to the already fragile relations between the two neighbouring countries.
