Bangladesh’s political journey has repeatedly swung between hope and disappointment. The question now is whether the country is about to witness yet another repeat of that cycle.
The 13th Parliament sat on March 12. But the ruling party did not convene a Constitution Reform Council as mandated by the July National Charter (Constitutional Reform) Implementation Order, 2025. Nor were there any attempts to convene such a council. The main opposition Jamaat-e-Islami brought it up at parliament leading to heated exchanges and debate.
But the BNP’s reluctance to adopt a clear path towards reforms, citing constitutional complexities, coupled with the special committee’s decision against ratifying 20 ordinances, has only deepened the uncertainty around July charter proposals for change. Many of these ordinances were central to reform -- judicial independence, prevention of enforced disappearances, and strengthening anti-corruption and human rights institutions -- long-standing demands of citizens and rights groups.
Of the four to be repealed, three are related to judicial independence. These ordinances included the country’s first legal framework for appointing judges to the apex courts, creating a Supreme Court Secretariat, and granting the judiciary administrative and financial autonomy -- steps meant to break free from executive dominance.
The constitution states that the president shall appoint judges in consultation with the Chief Justice. But Article 48(3) limits the president’s powers, requiring the prime minister’s advice for all functions except appointing the prime minister and Chief Justice. In practice, this means Supreme Court appointments ultimately reflect the prime minister’s preference. As things stand, that practice is likely to continue, until such time course, that the parliament enacts a law on Supreme Court judges’ appointment.
Rights activists have long accused the Awami League of using enforced disappearances to silence opposition. The relevant ordinance criminalised enforced disappearance and set death penalty as the maximum punishment.
The Anti-Corruption Commission (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025, expanded the ACC’s powers, allowing direct case filings, covering financial crimes abroad, and increasing commission membership.
The Revenue Policy and Revenue Management Ordinance, 2025, separated revenue policy from collection, creating two divisions under the finance ministry.
The Human Rights Commission ordinances empowered this body to launch its own investigations and act as a real watchdog. The commission was empowered to inspect facilities controlled by security agencies, and summon documents. A search committee was introduced to free appointments from government control, and removal of the chairman was tied to the same process used for Supreme Court judges.
Together, these were encouraging attempts to increase accountability of the ruling government. These would eventually foster strong democratic institutions of this republic. But dropping these ordinances means we are back to square one, as authority reverts to the executive.
This move risks stalling the key reform initiatives introduced by the interim government. For citizens who saw these measures as historic breakthroughs, the setback is a sobering reminder of how fragile reform remains when faced with entrenched political interests.
At the same time, ongoing debate over the formation of the Constitution Reform Council, coupled with opposition’s dissent on nearly all ordinances set to expire, is likely to deepen divisions. As a result, reform itself may become a new fault line in Bangladesh’s political arena.
The disappointment is sharper because these reform hopes emerged in a moment of renewed aspiration. The BNP came to power after two decades, following an acceptable national election held in the wake of a mass uprising.
The July Charter, forged through the National Consensus Commission, was a hard-won agreement that brought parties across the spectrum together. Unlike earlier documents, it was the product of extensive consultations, where political rivals agreed on contentious reform issues that had plagued Bangladesh for decades.
That spirit of consensus raised hopes that the cycle of missed opportunities might finally be broken. Yet history offers sobering reminders.
In November 1990, at the height of the anti-Ershad movement, three major alliances declared the Tin Joter Ruprekha -- a tripartite roadmap pledging judicial independence, fundamental rights, and reforms to restore voter confidence. After Ershad’s fall, most of those promises faded away.
In 1991, Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed’s interim government set up 29 task forces under Rehman Sobhan, engaging over 250 of the country’s brightest minds. Their detailed recommendations were widely praised, yet largely ignored by the incoming government.
Fast forward to 2007, when the caretaker government led by Fakhruddin Ahmed established the Regulatory Reforms Commission (RRC) under Akbar Ali Khan. The commission submitted 153 recommendations to modernise governance and administration. By 2009, Khan resigned, citing non-cooperation. Only a fraction of the proposals was implemented, and the RRC’s 131-page report remains only on paper.
Yet it remains a case of hoping against hope -- a ray of hope still persists, as the special committee recommended that the 16 ordinances can be reintroduced in parliament as stronger bills following scrutiny and further improvement. Shelving these ordinances would not only again weaken institutions but also betray the aspirations of citizens who had hoped for meaningful change. One can only hope that, after so many years, a democratically elected government will heed the people’s call and allow good sense to prevail.”
The greater interest of the nation demands that these aspirations not be abandoned but reintroduced with stronger political will and broader consensus.
