India is considered a major determining power in the geopolitics of South Asia. Despite major changes in the political map of the region with the end of British rule in 1947 and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, India's geographic position and military-political capabilities have allowed it to maintain influence over neighbouring countries for a long time. Many South Asian countries have operated within India's sphere of influence either directly or indirectly at various times. However, indications of change in this situation have been observed in recent years. This change, which began in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, later became more apparent in Bangladesh and Nepal through the political and social rise of a new generation, particularly Generation-Z (Gen-Z).
In the context of Bangladesh, this change is particularly significant. The fall of the Awami League government, which had been in power for 15 years, occurred primarily due to an anti-discrimination movement led by the younger generation. When the movement reached its peak, Sheikh Hasina was ousted from power on 5 August 2024, and later, many leaders of her party took refuge in India. This course of events revived for many the old notion that India has always sought to keep Bangladesh a close yet dependent state since its independence, a notion that became more consolidated in the past decade and a half. Sheikh Hasina's widely discussed statement, "What I have given to India, they will remember for a lifetime, " further reinforced this idea in the public mind.
To understand the history of Bangladesh's independence, one must start from the very inception of the state of Pakistan. From the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the Bengalis of East Pakistan faced various types of discrimination. The Language Movement of 1952 was the first major protest against this deprivation, which laid the foundation for the national consciousness of the Bengalis. Subsequently, the Jukto Front election of 1954 and the imposition of military rule in 1958 further restricted the political rights of the Bengalis. Despite being the majority population, they were deprived of the opportunity to participate in state power, gradually strengthening the demand for independence.
Various analyses suggest that India strategically monitored the internal dissatisfaction and political instability in East Pakistan. Many believe that since 1948, India was looking for a possible opportunity to separate East Pakistan. Recently, Priyanka Gandhi, in her address in the Lok Sabha, mentioned that her grandmother, Indira Gandhi, divided the country in 1971 with the intent of weakening Pakistan. Although she did not mention the long struggle and sacrifices of the people of Bangladesh, her statement reignited the debate over India’s role in South Asia's geopolitics.
In this context, several important studies and books have analyzed India's geopolitical strategy, such as Srinath Raghavan's "1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh," Avinash Paliwal's "India’s Near East," and S. Jaishankar's "The India Way, " which have discussed India's strategic decisions and regional interests in detail.
According to analysts, by creating a new state and weakening Pakistan, India aimed to ensure its eastern security. The security of the insurgency-prone regions of Northeast India was particularly challenging for India. This perspective was further strengthened after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, where India faced significant military setbacks. The Indian forces had to retreat in some parts of Arunachal Pradesh (then NEFA), and the town of Tezpur in Assam was under threat. This experience profoundly impacted India’s security policy.
At that time, East Pakistan was considered a strategic challenge for India. Particularly, the security of the Siliguri Corridor (known as the ''Chicken's Neck''), the only land connection between Northeast India and the main landmass, was critically important for India, and East Pakistan’s position could have affected that security. Furthermore, the closeness between China and Pakistan and Pakistan's alleged support for separatist movements in Northeast India further heightened India's concerns.
According to Avinash Paliwal, this situation created a ‘two-and-a-half-front’ challenge in India’s military strategic considerations: the two complete fronts encircling China and Pakistan and the use of military forces to suppress the Naga and Mizo insurgencies in Northeast India, which he described as a ‘half-front.’
Pakistan had provided refuge to Naga leader AZ Fhizo and Mizo leader Laldenga. Various sources mention that the Hill Tracts were used for training the Mizo insurgents from the 1960s to 1971. After 1971, these activities moved to Myanmar, and stability returned to Mizoram through a peace agreement in 1986. In this context, the idea of transforming East Pakistan into a separate state became strategically significant for India’s policymakers. However, India did not attack East Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, even though it was relatively vulnerable. Many analysts believe this situation created a favourable environment for the subsequent independence movement in East Pakistan.
On the other hand, Pakistan never gave East Pakistan equal importance. The dismissal of the Jukto Front government, which won the 1954 election and the imposition of military rule in 1958 centralised power in West Pakistan's hands. This intensified the sense of deprivation among the Bengalis and strengthened nationalist consciousness.
Although the Awami League won an absolute majority in the general elections of 1970, there was a delay in transferring power. This led to a severe political crisis and the start of the Liberation War in 1971. During this time, India provided support to the freedom fighters of Bangladesh and ultimately intervened militarily. This resulted in Bangladesh achieving independence, which is undoubtedly a significant event in South Asian history.
However, the question remains—how strategic and how humanitarian was India's role in this entire process? Many analysts believe that alongside humanitarian aid, India’s own security and geopolitical interests also played a crucial role here. As a result, India managed to reduce the security risks in its eastern region and transitioned from a ''two-and-a-half front'' to a ''two-front'' situation.
India reaped the strategic advantages for a long time after 1971. In recent years, particularly, the Bangladesh-India relationship has been criticised for being unequal and one-sided in many areas. A large section of Bangladesh's population sees such a relationship as hegemonic, posing a great challenge in maintaining the balance of relations in the future.
Bangladesh certainly wishes to maintain friendly relations with India. However, this relationship must be based on equality, mutual respect, and sovereignty. A relationship that undermines the dignity of an independent state is unacceptable in any way. The most important point is that Bangladesh's independence is not a gift from an external power. It is the fruit of the long struggle, sacrifice, and self-sacrifice of the Bengali nation. The independence achieved through the blood, suffering, and sacrifice of millions is a unique example in history.
Therefore, it is not correct to explain the Liberation War of 1971 solely as an outcome of regional geopolitical strategy. It was a struggle for the independence of a nation. India's assistance was undoubtedly important, but that assistance was not the primary driving force behind Bangladesh's independence.
Bangladesh wants to maintain good relations with India in the future as well. But this should be based on equal respect and mutual interests—based on cooperation, not domination.
#M Sakhawat Hossain is a former advisor to the interim government.
*The opinions expressed here are the author’s own.
#This article, originally published in Prothom Alo print and online editions, has been rewritten in English by Rabiul Islam.
