BANGLADESH has recently has passed through a turbulent, transformative phase. In that context, the interim government, headed by Muhammad Yunus, assumed office amid a political reality in which an effective parliament was absent, demands for administrative restructuring were strong and expectations for reforms in state institutions were intense. In such circumstances, the government chose to promulgate ordinances under constitutional authority, a mechanism that effectively became an alternative to parliamentary lawmaking.
In more than a year and a half, the interim government promulgated 133 ordinances. The ordinances covered a wide spectrum: law and order, administrative reorganisation, economic policy and financial discipline, electoral and constitutional structural reforms and, in some instances, sensitive matters such as indemnity provisions and institutional restructuring. While the frequent promulgation of ordinances signalled administrative dynamism and a commitment to rapid policy implementation, it simultaneously generated debates on democratic constraints and constitutional balance.
Until 17 February, when the tenure of the interim government ended, the 133 ordinances have been in force. However, after the 13th parliamentary elections, a new political reality has emerged, raising a crucial question: what is the legal future of the ordinances? Once the parliament resumes functioning fully, will they be passed into laws or they will lapse automatically? Thus, beyond their substantive content, their constitutional status and political implications have become central concerns. In this context, the ordinances are no longer mere administrative instruments. They have become a testing ground for democratic continuity, the limits of executive authority and the integrity of constitutional principles.
The interim period was the product of a particular constitutional and political context. In the absence of a functioning parliament, the normal legislative process was suspended. In this vacuum, the president’s power to promulgate ordinances, laid out in Article 93 of the constitution, became the principal legal instrument. Ordinarily, this power may be exercised when the parliament is not in session and circumstances require an immediate action. Yet, during the interim government’s tenure, this exceptional mechanism effectively evolved into a regular alternative method of lawmaking.
The government justified the promulgation of successive ordinances by invoking the necessity of urgent decisions across multiple domains: administrative reforms, the maintenance of law and order, financial discipline, anti-corruption measures, electoral reforms and, even, constitutional amendment initiatives. According to the government, a swift action was indispensable to address long-standing structural complexities and policy paralysis. In the absence of the parliament, ordinances were the only effective tool.
It is at this juncture that controversy emerges. A segment of lawyers and constitutional scholars questioned whether all the ordinances genuinely met the constitutional threshold of ‘necessity’ and ‘urgency.’ They argued that without a clearly demonstrable standard of immediacy, the continuous promulgation of more than 100 ordinances risked exceeding constitutional limits and disturbing the balance of powers. Some ordinances were alleged to have stretched, or even crossed, the constitutional boundaries of presidential authority, particularly those relating to indemnity provisions, fundamental administrative restructuring and constitutional amendments. Critics contend that such sensitive matters warranted parliamentary debates and democratic scrutiny rather than an executive decree.
At the heart of the issue lies a fundamental tension: the need for rapid reforms versus adherence to constitutionally prescribed procedures and democratic accountability. Ordinance-making power is inherently temporary and exceptional. When it becomes the primary legislative mechanism, it may conflict with the underlying philosophy of constitutional governance.
The constitution treats ordinances as an exceptional arrangement, not a rule, but a temporary alternative necessitated by circumstance. Article 93 provides that when the parliament is not in session and urgent necessity arises, the president may promulgate ordinances. Yet, this power is subject to strict limitations. Once the parliament reconvenes, an ordinance must be placed before it within a specified period. If it is not passed into law within 30 days of the first sitting of the parliament, it automatically ceases to have effect. This safeguard exists to ensure democratic accountability. An ordinance does not possess permanent legislative authority. Its survival depends on parliamentary approval through debates, amendment and vote. Ultimately, its validity rests on the decision of the people’s representatives.
The same constitutional rule applies to the 133 ordinances that the interim government promulgated. Whether they will be placed before the parliament for approval is now a central issue. Initial political signals and analyses suggest that the likelihood of most ordinances being passed into laws is low. In such a case, they would automatically lapse within 30 days, thereby losing their legal force.
Nevertheless, an important legal question remains: what will be the status of administrative or legal actions taken pursuant to these ordinances while they were in force? According to established judicial interpretation, actions undertaken during the period in which an ordinance is valid are generally considered legally effective. However, their prospective effect ceases once the ordinance lapses. Ultimately, the courts may be called on to provide an authoritative clarification.
For the elected government, led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the 133 ordinances promulgated during the interim period now present a complex constitutional and policy dilemma. While in opposition, the party criticised several of the ordinances. Now, in government, it bears the responsibility of determining their fate. The issue is, therefore, not merely legal. It is also a test of political accountability.
The government appears to have three possible courses of action. First, it may review and amend necessary and public interest-oriented ordinances through parliamentary debates and pass them into permanent laws. Second, it may decline to place controversial or unnecessary ordinances before the parliament, thereby allowing them to lapse in accordance with constitutional procedure. Third, with respect to sensitive matters such as indemnity provisions or constitutional amendment initiatives, it may undertake separate political and legal review processes before arriving at fresh decisions. These choices will reflect not only legal judgement but also the government’s political commitments and democratic credentials.
The 133 ordinances now stand at a constitutional crossroads. The law dictates that without parliamentary approval, their demise is inevitable. Politics, however, suggests that in the interest of institutional continuity and public welfare, certain ordinances may warrant preservation.
Thus, which ordinances will endure as law and which will fade into history will depend on the government’s policy priorities, the depth of parliamentary debates and the standard of democratic accountability that it upholds. The central question, therefore, deepens: were the 133 ordinances of the interim government a product of constitutional necessity or a strategy to manage political circumstances? The answer will shape the evaluation of the recent legislative process and define the trajectory of its constitutional practice.
Dr Jahangir Alam Sarker ([email protected]) is a lawyer and researcher.
