Recently, the Police Headquarters issued a nationwide alert about possible militant attacks on key installations, including the Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban, public places such as Shahbagh intersection, places of worship, entertainment centres, police and army establishments, as well as armouries. Despite contradictory statements later made by Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed and Prime Minister’s Adviser on Information and Broadcasting Dr Zahed Ur Rahman on the existence of militancy in Bangladesh, the alert underscores that violent extremism has not disappeared; it has only changed form, language, and platform.
A report by The Daily Star, based on court filings and intelligence findings, gives the warning a sharper context. It says police detected communications between several alleged Neo-JMB members, and that a 16-year-old boy from Habiganj Sadar had been in regular contact with two dismissed army personnel. After the boy’s arrest earlier this month, the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit reportedly seized his phone and found materials that investigators believe indicate links with Neo-JMB, as well as his presence at a secret meeting at Zia Udyan. The documents describe him as an “IS-ideology follower/Neo-JMB member.” Officials also claim the group used online platforms and pseudonyms, with the boy allegedly even receiving bomb-making training. His mother, however, denied any militant involvement, saying he is mentally unstable. That denial warrants consideration given his age; however, one cannot dismiss the pattern.
Another report, published by the Times of Bangladesh, has also caused a stir recently. According to it, a Bangladesh Air Force warrant officer has been allegedly missing from a Chattogram base for about two months and later traced to a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hideout. This has apparently led to a "sweeping" internal probe and the detention of more than 20 people, including BAF members and non-combatants. The report cited unnamed security and intelligence sources, while the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) declined to comment. Because the investigation is ongoing, these claims must be treated carefully. But even as reported allegations, they demand careful scrutiny. If extremist recruitment has touched even a small segment of trained personnel, it is no longer only a question of fringe radicalisation. It becomes an institutional security concern.
This is the point that Bangladesh keeps missing. Counterterrorism should not mean panic, media trial, or collective suspicion of religious groups. After the recent terrorism alert, a CTTC joint commissioner was right to say there is “no reason to panic.” But calm is not the same as denial. Earlier assurances from the interim government sit uneasily alongside these recent warnings, suggesting that national security concerns have been overlooked for some time. In July 2025, then Home Adviser Jahangir Alam Chowdhury said there was “no militancy in Bangladesh at present.” Around the same period, then DMP Commissioner Sheikh Md Sazzat Ali reportedly dismissed militancy as a current problem and suggested that earlier “militant drama” had been used to justify killings. Such political assurances may resonate in a polarised public sphere, but they risk obscuring the complexity of our evolving security landscape.
The concern here is not limited to one teenager or one alleged cell. The Daily Star reported in November 2025 that two Bangladeshis, Ratan Dhali and Foysal Hossain, were killed while fighting for TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. The Dissent, a journalism platform, has consistently produced evidence-based reports on this issue and warned citizens about the threat, even when the interim government’s home minister and DMP commissioner were denying it. According to Prothom Alo, Hossain’s family believed he had gone to Dubai for work, only to learn later that he had died in Pakistan during its security forces’ operation against TTP. The Daily Star also reported that law enforcement agencies were monitoring people attempting to join TTP.
These cases show that transnational jihadist recruitment is no longer an abstract foreign policy issue; it has already entered families through migration routes, online networks, and ideological grooming.
TTP, or the Pakistani Taliban, is not an ordinary political or religious group. The UN Security Council sanctions narrative identifies it as associated with al-Qaeda. The Global Terrorism Index 2026 identifies TTP as one of the four deadliest terrorist organisations globally in 2025, and says it was the only one among those four to record an increase in deaths from terrorism. This is the organisation some Bangladeshis are reportedly trying to join. That should end the temptation to romanticise the issue as youthful confusion, anti-Western anger, or simple religious emotion.
Bangladesh has lived through this turmoil before. On August 17, 2005, Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) detonated hundreds of bombs across 63 of the country’s 64 districts within about 30 minutes. That was not only an attack on public safety; it was a direct challenge to the constitutional state. Then came Holey Artisan in 2016, where 20 hostages, mostly foreigners, were killed. That attack showed that violent extremism was not confined to rural militancy or madrasa stereotypes. It reached elite urban spaces, digital culture, and educated youth circles.
Still, there is a mistake Bangladesh must not repeat. Denial is dangerous, but politicised counterterrorism is also dangerous. For years, governments have used the language of terrorism to discredit political opponents. During the Awami League era, the term “terrorist” was often used loosely against opposition activists. After the fall of the regime, the interim government also used anti-terror language against Awami League members in ways that sometimes raised serious human rights concerns. The Human Rights Watch warned in October 2025 that amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act were being used to arrest alleged supporters of Awami League and restrict meetings, publications, and online speech. Moreover, Bangladesh has a traumatic history of enforced disappearances, with the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances identifying some security agencies among the main perpetrators named by victims and families. These findings matter because public trust is not a luxury; it is an essential component of the counterterrorism infrastructure.
A family that fears arbitrary detention may stay silent even when a son is being radicalised. A community that sees counterterrorism as partisan revenge will not cooperate with intelligence agencies. This is how real threats hide within the noise created by state abuse. Bangladesh, therefore, needs a firmer but more democratic counterterrorism doctrine that puts transparency and human rights at its core. The state must be uncompromising towards those who plan violence and seek to destroy the constitutional state for a utopian “Khilafat state”. At the same time, it must be equally uncompromising about due process, judicial oversight, evidence-based prosecution, and protection from torture, enforced disappearance, and politically motivated cases. These are not opposing goals; they are mutually necessary for national security and for sustaining public support.
The social media and public sphere also need close attention. In recent years, pro-al-Qaeda, pro-ISIS, pro-Taliban, and Neo-JMB-style narratives have become more visible on social media and in some public forums. Not every conservative religious view is extremism, and the state must never criminalise belief. However, it must draw a clear line between religious expression and ideological preparation for violence. When speakers glorify armed jihad in Iraq, Syria, or Afghanistan, justify killing opponents and bombings targeting civilians, delegitimise the constitutional state, or present Bangladesh’s security forces as enemies of Islam, the matter moves from opinion to incitement and recruitment.
Bangladesh’s security agencies need resources, training, coordination, and public support, but they also need reform and accountability. Bangladesh has reduced the visible threat of terrorism over the years, which is a notable achievement, but low visibility does not mean no threat. Extremism often becomes quiet, reorganises, enters new platforms, and waits for moments of political confusion. To address the extremism-related national security threat, the answer is neither blind support for security agencies nor cynical dismissal of every warning. Fighting violent Islamist extremism means defending both national security and constitutional rights.
Asif Bin Ali is a geopolitical analyst and doctoral fellow at Georgia State University in the US. He can be reached at [email protected].
Views expressed in this article are the author's own.
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